

JPRS-UMA-90-016
11 JULY 1990



**FOREIGN
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19981021 134

JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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CONTENTS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Kirilenko - Arbatov Debate Continues [G. Kirilenko; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 11, Jun 90]	1
Public Addresses Concerns to Akhromeyev, Yakovlev [V. Yermolin; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 14 Jun 90]	8
Baltic Fleet's V Adm A. Kornienko Interviewed [<i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 9, May 90]	9
Major General Batarchuk on Party Authority, Political Structure [<i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 2, Jan 90]	13
Latvian Military Commissar Protests Treatment on Local TV Letter Denounces 'Fraud' [Ya. Duda; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH</i> , 13 Feb 90]	18
Interview Text Published [R. Broka; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH</i> , 16 Feb 90]	18
Lt Gen Zakharov Of Turkestan MD On Local Nationality Draftees [A.I. Zakharov; <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 4 Mar 90]	19
Baltic Fleet's Adm Ivanov Interviewed on Lithuania [V.P. Ivanov; <i>SOVETSKIY PATRIOT</i> No 13, 26 Mar-1 Apr 90]	21
Political Workers' Role, Responsibilities Examined [A. Taranov; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 5, Mar 90]	23
Increasing Success of Military Officers in Local Elections [B. Karpov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 28 Mar 90]	24
Col Gen B. Gromov on Regiment Conditions, Insufficient Personnel [S. Kobyshev; <i>LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA</i> , 11 Apr 90]	24
Military Delegates to Party Congress Interviewed [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Jun 90]	26

ARMED FORCES

Lt Gen Klimov on Effective Management for Military Economy [A. Klimov; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 1, Jan 90]	28
New Appointment: Lt Gen V. F. Popov [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 1, Jan 90]	32
Military Efficiency Undermined by Field, Construction Work [V. Mukhin; <i>KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL</i> No 1, Jan 90]	33
Deputy Chief of Finance Directorate on Draft Law on Pensions [N. Bay; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 10 Mar 90]	36
Notice of Kiev Military District Exercise [KASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Mar 90]	38
Gromov Appeals to Republic Leaders on Desertion [S. Nagoryanskiy; <i>LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA</i> , 11 Apr 90]	38
Thoughts on Non-Military Incentives for NCO Corps [A. Beskurnikov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 14 Apr 90]	39
Private Fatally Wounded By Attack On Guardpost [V. Kuzhilin; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 18 Apr 90]	39
Supreme Soviet Deputies Inspect Nuclear Test Site [L. Kruglov; <i>SELSKAYA ZHIZN</i> , 15 Jun 90]	39

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Shortage of Aircraft Mechanics Reducing Readiness, Flight Training [G. Korolev; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 19 Apr 90]	41
Impact of Baltic Situation on PVO Subunit [S. Turchenko; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 29 May 90]	42

NAVAL FORCES

A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military Perestroika [G.M. Sturua; <i>MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA</i> No 5, 90]	46
Shortage of Warrant Officers in Pacific Fleet [A. Ivanov; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 22 Apr 90]	53
Problems of Dismantling Old Submarine Reactors [A. Mozgovoy; <i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 15 May 90]	54

REAR SERVICES, DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Lack of Medical Support for Dependents [A. Bugay; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 Mar 90]	56
Military IL-76MD Converted to 'Flying Hospital' [A. Kusurgashev, V. Maltsev; SEMYA, 1 Apr 90]	57
Problems of Defense Conversion in Ulyanovsk Oblast [S. Shmelev; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 10 Apr 90]	59
Conversion Products at Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aircraft Plant [A. Tsvetkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Apr 90]	61

PRE-DRAFT TRAINING AND THE DRAFT

Readers Debate Utility of Pre-Draft Training	62
Praise, Criticism [UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No 13, Mar 90]	62
Initial Military Training Thwarts Initiative [L. Melnikova, Ye. Blekhman; UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No. 13, Mar 90]	62
Military Training in School Criticized [Ya. Penkov; UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No 13, Mar 90]	63
Military Encroachment on School Hours Scored [V. Lyakh; UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No 13, Mar 90]	64
Discussion of Difficulties in Administering Draft [Nikolay Zhichkin; SOVETSKIY PATRIOT No 10, 5-11 Mar 90]	64
Civil-Military Roundtable: Pros, Cons of Professional Army [V. Badurkin; TRUD, 27 Mar 90]	67
Azerbaijani Procuracy Promotes Observance of Draft [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 27 May 90]	70

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

GLAVPUR Initiates Textbook Competition [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 May 90]	71
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MILITARY HISTORY

'Confidential' 1939 Agreement Between Army, Lithuania [SOYUZ No 14, Apr 90]	72
New-Found Wartime Documents Reveal German Intent Toward Baltics A. [Yuryeva; SOYUZ No 13, Mar 90]	73

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Costs to USSR of Angola Involvement Examined [V. Yanelis; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 23, 6 Jun 90]	77
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Kirilenko - Arbatov Debate Continues

90UM0656A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 90
(signed to press 31 May 90) pp 36-44

[Interview with Maj Gen G. Kirilenko, doctor of military sciences and author of open letter to Academician G. Arbatov, by Lt Col V. Zabrodin; place and date not specified: "Concern for Security or... Reduced Security?"]

[Text]

[Zabrodin] German Vasilyevich¹, was the idea of writing an open letter to Academician G.A. Arbatov born in you independently or was this an "initiative" from above: in the General Staff or USSR Defense Ministry?

[Kirilenko] This idea came to me accidentally. I had never previously appeared in the press in such a genre. And to answer your question directly, I would say, using your terminology: The "initiative" came...from the academician himself. This was what happened. I had received an invitation to a sitting of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In the congress for the first time, I tried to record all that appeared to be of interest. Before the first break the next speakers were announced as General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, and Academician G.A. Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute. Like other deputies also, I thought that they would have much that was of interest to communicate on current problems of the Army and foreign policy.

I knew Arbatov from his works, articles, and appearances on Studio Nine on television as a top scholar specializing in American affairs. And for this reason I quite naturally awaited his opinions with great interest. I thought they would concern current foreign policy and economic problems. And it came as a big surprise to me, therefore, when...the speech was on questions which were not directly related to the activity of the institute he heads, on questions which military science attributes to the theory of military economics and the organizational development of the armed forces.

The contentiousness and one-sidedness of his line of reasoning seemed to me dangerous to the extent that the deputies, and subsequently readers, might perceive them as the truth accessible to a well-known academician.

Naturally I had a desire to object immediately, at once, but I realized that doing this in public was practically impossible. During the break a deputy whom I knew calmed me down, joking that those who for some reason or other have nothing to say about their own work frequently venture to argue about the Army, as about sport also.

But when, in issue No. 5 of the journal *OGONEK*, Georgiy Arkadyevich continued and developed the subject he had begun at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and which he had most likely come to like, I

deemed it necessary to take issue with the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute in an open letter on its main propositions.

[Zabrodin] What was the readers' response to the publication of your letter in *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* this March?

[Kirilenko] The readers' reaction surprised me by its assertiveness. I received calls from the military districts and military academies, veterans of the armed forces, military experts, and central party and state establishments. Proposals concerning publication of an expanded text of the letter in certain newspapers were received.

But most unexpected, perhaps, was the invitation from the Indian Embassy. The Indian ambassador and his economic adviser had been interested by my "articles" in *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* and *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*. I was invited to a dinner in honor of the visit to Moscow of India's deputy defense minister.

There was an exchange of opinions during the reception. I was persuaded once again here of the great significance India attaches to a strengthening of friendly relations with our country, and that it closely links its position in Asia and in the world with the position there of the USSR. For this reason India is watching closely and with interest the processes occurring in both the country's economic life and its armed forces.

[Zabrodin] What is your fundamental disagreement with Academician Arbatov?

[Kirilenko] Fundamentally on two issues: our surplus military power and inordinate military spending.

If we cannot consider unobjective the observation addressed to the military that it is always preparing to fight the last war, such an observation would be all the more legitimate when addressed to those who served in the Army at one time. It is for this reason, evidently, that the acknowledgment of our significant superiority in tanks was for Academician Arbatov a staggering fact. In this case I would like to stagger him also with the fact that on the eve of the Great Patriotic War we had more horses in the Army than did the enemy. Yet were the esteemed academician to understand that their role in a modern war could be almost identical, his reaction would be of a different nature. I will permit myself, if the United States and Canada Institute does not believe our sources, to refer to an opinion expressed in the London journal *THE ECONOMIST*: "Modern armies are based on electronics. The number of barrels and shells, aircraft and bombs is not such an important indicator as the computers which guide them, as the means of communication which make it possible to control troops' operations on the battlefield, and as the devices revealing the enemy's position and concealing one's own."

How is it possible today to talk about a surplus of our military power if in these items we are inferior to our potential enemy? We should all clearly understand that

we possess parity and defensive sufficiency only with regard for the nuclear weapons that we have. But inasmuch as we are pursuing an active policy of their reduction and elimination, we should also be thinking about whether we will have defensive sufficiency given a total reduction in nuclear weapons (and the simultaneous creation in the United States of the SDI), under conditions of their complete elimination even more. Do we have a "surplus of military power" and a "reserve of strength" for this contingency in conventional types of arms and military equipment?

The answer to this question was heard in the speeches of many officers who participated in the All-Army Officer Meeting in December 1989. Here are just a few of them:

"Our inventories are crowded with obsolete equipment, and new models that we are receiving, albeit costly, are frequently completely 'raw' and are not ready for use, and often lack the necessary reliability and operational durability."

"The state of working order of some ships is highly deplorable, the time between overhauls is doubly in excess of the limit and more, and the duration of repairs drags on for up to two or three years instead of five or six months. In this time the personnel loses the skills of operating the materiel. There is a shortage in the navy of equipped dock frontages, and the newest ships stand idle in the roads, using up engine time."

"We still have insufficient radars capable of detecting low-flying targets at a great distance and ensuring that they are escorted."

"There are insufficient training centers in the navy, and drills are conducted on combat equipment which leads to its premature wear."

"Officers, as professionals, are losing their skills, being taken up with a large amount of economic work."

"The transition to quality parameters of military organizational development is impossible without removal of the contradiction between the high significance of the assignments performed by regular servicemen and the low level of their material compensation and so forth."

Just a small segment of the current problems of the armed forces has been touched on here, but even it permits an unequivocal answer to the question of whether defense corresponds currently to the principle of sufficiency and whether talk about a "surplus of military power" is not too complacent. In the current situation it might be more expedient, perhaps, to think not simply about a reduction in the military budget but primarily of its more correct redistribution in order to bring the country's defenses up to the level of desired sufficiency.

And the esteemed academician's euphoria at the 10-percent reduction in American military appropriations (over five years)—thanks to inflation and his inattention here to the fact that in our country defense spending in the past year alone fell by 8.2 percent and, obviously, by

the same amount again as a result of inflation—can evoke nothing other than astonishment.

The amounts of the appropriations for military needs proposed by the Bush administration in the 1990-1991 fiscal year are set at a sum total of \$306 billion. The draft Pentagon budget being debated currently in the U.S. Congress is in comparable prices only 2.6 percent less than the previous one. Reports have appeared in this connection concerning the United States' intention of closing down a number of enterprises and military bases and of a certain reduction in the numbers of the armed forces over the course of the 1990's. And although it is only outlined and planned as yet, this needs to be taken into account. However, nor can we close our eyes to the fact that, as a whole, the American budget preserves all the main aims of previous years including the programs for the creation of the MX mobile missiles based on railroad flatcars, programs for the building of the Stealth B-2 bombers and Seawolf submarines, and finally the SDI program for which \$4.8 billion are requested.

[Zabrodin] But do you agree with your opponent in any respect?

[Kirilenko] Yes, I do. In that the other side's intentions need to be judged "not so much by its words as by its military possibilities." And the possibilities of the United States, and NATO even more, are very considerable given the preservation of by no means defensive doctrines; multi-million-strong armies and multi-billion military budgets; and their absolute superiority in naval forces, tactical aviation attack aircraft, as well as reconnaissance, communications, and electronic warfare facilities.

Inasmuch as my opponent trusts American sources and readily swears by their objectivity, I suggest that you look at this problem from the standpoint of the U.S. Defense Information Center expounded by the former senator and now American commentator William Proxmire in the journal DEFENSE NEWS. His article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the two superpowers and their alliances.

It notes the following:

"Even prior to the start of the cataclysms in East Europe, NATO military spending was 30 percent higher than Warsaw Pact spending and is at the present time considerably more.

"In terms of military aircraft, NATO possesses not only qualitative superiority but also a 15-percent numerical advantage (1,500 more). As far as helicopters are concerned, the NATO advantage here is absolute: 14,200 compared with 5,600 for the Warsaw Pact.

"The correlation of the numbers of surface ships—including aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—constitutes 537 for NATO and 306 for the Warsaw Pact."

According to the U.S. Defense Information Center, in 1988 the United States was superior to the USSR in terms of the overall numbers of nuclear weapons in a correlation of 30,000 to 25,000, and in strategic nuclear arms of 12,680 to 9,900 respectively, and in terms of the number of nuclear weapons targeted on the territory of the other side the correlation is even more appreciable—16,000 to 10,500.

The advantage of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR in terms of numbers of the tank fleet is reduced appreciably by the greater number of new tanks with NATO and the increased numbers and high quality of new antitank weapons, including helicopters specially intended for combating "armor."

It should be added in addition to what has been said that, as distinct from the Warsaw Pact, NATO continues stable at its previous manning level.

The situation in the economy of the member countries is fortunate—average annual GNP constitutes \$9 trillion which makes it possible to maintain annual NATO military spending, constituting \$440 billion, at the level of approximately five percent. On the other hand the economy of the Warsaw Pact states, where the aggregate annual GNP is considerably less—\$3.4 trillion—has difficulty bearing the burden of annual military spending of the order of \$340 billion (all calculations are made, I emphasize, in "dollar cost" equivalent: arms, military programs, and so forth).

I have to agree with Academician Arbatov's conclusion that "military force should be 'reasonably sufficient'—no more, no less," as also, most likely, I would have to agree with the fact that whereas for the side with the lesser numbers of arms there has to arise the natural question of whether the force is sufficient, for the party with the greater numbers the question is: Is it reasonable to have so much?

[Zabrodin] G.A. Arbatov said: "A most burdensome manifestation and legacy of stagnation is the total freedom of maneuver of the military and military industry." Such a statement from the rostrum of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies is puzzling, to put it mildly....

[Kirilenko] I confess that I was puzzled most by the title of Academician Arbatov's article in the journal OGONEK: "The Army for the Country or the Country for the Army?" It seemed to me the height of impropriety. Having read the article, there involuntarily came to me the question: Would the editors of the journal OGONEK, say, publish an article of mine of similar quality entitled, for example, "The United States and Canada Institute—an American and Canadian Institute or an Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences?" Whereas I can only guess at the reaction of the journal OGONEK, I now have no doubts as to the negative response of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI inasmuch as the newspaper's editors flat-out refused to publish my letter to Academician Arbatov.

Of what freedom of maneuver of the military and military industry can it be if in the Defense Ministry there are far more problems than any other department, if the junior officers are in terms of their material position literally on the poverty line, if approximately 200,000 servicemen lack apartments, and if many types of weapons and military equipment are far inferior in their qualitative parameters to their NATO country counterparts, as a result of which we have a high accident rate in the navy and air force and so forth.

It is my profound belief that a most burdensome manifestation and legacy of stagnation are in fact such judgments concerning the "free hand" of the military. It would be legitimate to speak of the irresponsible use of the military in the sense that in both the period of stagnation and in our time its hands have plugged many national economic holes; the hands and bodies of the military covered up the mistakes of the "Afghan policy" devised by our Orientalists and America specialists—today's heralds of perestroika; the bare hands of the military plucked uranium and graphite from the Chernobyl reactor; the hands of the military pulled the bodies of the casualties from beneath the ruins of Spitak; today the hands and bodies of the military are resolving interethnic conflicts.

In arguing about the freedom of maneuver of the military and excessive spending on defense, the director of the United States and Canada Institute should make it only a mental comparison of the level of material and social provision of the staff of his institute and officers of the Defense Ministry who are their equivalent in terms of age and education. Besides age and educational level, the only other comparable factor which they might have is duration of postings; true, some to the United States and Canada, but others "to the wild Transbaykal steppe."

As far as military industry is concerned, I would remind people that even in the stagnation years it manufactured 40 percent of the civilian product.

Syria, Israel, and Jordan, not to mention Saudi Arabia, have a considerably greater proportion of military spending on defense than us, but this does not prevent them maintaining a higher living standard. For this reason assertions that our armed forces "have drained, deformed, and undermined the economy and finances; lowered the living standard; exacerbated social contradictions; and so forth" are in some respects reminiscent of a witch-hunt.

I am profoundly convinced that the degree of civilization of any society may be gauged by its attitude toward the army. The respectful attitude toward the army in the United States and other developed countries merely confirms this.

[Zabrodin] Taking issue with Marshal Akhromeyev, the director of the United States and Canada Institute notes that even given a reduction by 500,000 our armed forces

will remain larger by 1.5 million than the American armed forces. Does he have his own counting system?

[Kirilenko] I wrote about this in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, but I will now put it more broadly. If we are comparing the strength of our armed forces and those of the United States, it needs to be considered first of all that the American military carries no economic burdens and for this reason the numbers of its really armed forces are entirely comparable with ours. Further, along the United States' borders there is not a single subunit of forces of a possible enemy, and for this reason the Pentagon contemplates using the army and navy only in overseas theaters in conjunction with its allies. And this means that the American armed forces need to be counted in Europe with the forces of the other NATO countries, and in the Far East with the armed forces of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. It is obvious even to one who is not a military expert that such a comparison is far from being in favor not only of the USSR but also the Warsaw Pact as it was composed last year, say.

As far as Academician Arbatov's counting system is concerned, it reflects rather the American viewpoint. First, it does not attribute to the U.S. armed forces the National Guard and formations of the organized reserve of arms of the services, although their equipment strength level and readiness for conducting combat operations are comparable and even superior to our reduced-strength formations and units.

Second, he counts as part of our armed forces construction, "reclamation," and road-building units and subunits, although the degree of their combat readiness is comparable neither to the National Guard nor formations of the organized reserve of arms of the services of the United States. On the other hand, as far as the border and internal troops are concerned, Georgiy Arkadyevich should have remembered that we had such during the last war also, but that even in the most difficult days of 1941 they remained at their posts in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, and in the Far East exercising their professional functions.

The improper nature of the combinations of the computation of the correlation of the strength level of our armed forces and those of the United States can be discerned particularly clearly in the disregard for the degree of training of a professional army whose personnel serves on average approximately six years and is almost 90 percent composed of persons with higher education, and an army manned on the principles of universal military service for a two-year term and brought up to strength by persons with an education considerably below average, many of whom have an inadequate knowledge of the language of interethnic communication.

The unobjectiveness of a comparison of the strength level of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States should have been for the director of the United States and Canada Institute, as also for the editors of

OGONEK, just as obvious as the unobjectiveness of a comparison of the ruble and the dollar. Just try and convert 70.9 billion rubles [R] into dollars not at the official but at the market rate, and it will then be clear, possibly, that our parity is being maintained not thanks to high military spending but thanks to the low pay of the servicemen and their high sense of responsibility for the fate of the fatherland and to the conscientious labor of people working in the defense industry.

Today the absurdity of such combinations involved in the tallying of the correlation of the numbers of the armed forces and military budgets can be seen particularly clearly against the background of the processes occurring in the East European countries, when the need to count the correlation of the armed forces of the USSR not against the United States but against NATO is becoming increasingly clear. Whereas this was improbable yesterday, it is perfectly apparent today.

[Zabrodin] German Vasilyevich, here is a paradox. Arbatov, Kornilov, and other "specialists" on the Soviet armed forces themselves say in OGONEK that servicemen in our country have been deprived materially: They are paid crumbs and concern is not displayed for them as it is, for example, in the United States. I have in front of me an extract from Yu. Kornilov's article in OGONEK No. 15 for this April: "The pay of officers and generals of the American armed forces is six-eight times higher than that of the corresponding categories of our servicemen. The Soviet soldier receives, unless I am mistaken, seven rubles a month. The American? The monthly wage of a recruit in the United States is \$671; of the private, \$753; of the corporal, \$876; and of the sergeant, \$1,060. That is, tens of times more...." Why are these figures presented? To induce the USSR Supreme Soviet to bring up the question of a raise in the pay of our soldiers, sergeants, and officers?

[Kirilenko] You know, I gave this article in OGONEK under the specious headline "Secrets of Parity" a close read. The purpose of the article is not raising the "wages" of soldiers and officers or submitting some serviceable proposals pertaining to an improvement in their material, social amenity, and legal position, but rather requesting that the USSR Supreme Soviet, "having looked into" the Ministry of Defense budget, uncover several billion "above-norm" rubles which could be...readdressed to the civilian economy which is in crisis, and for the solution of other most acute problems. And the personnel of the armed forces?! Let it live, consequently, in hope and convert the dollars of the American mercenaries into the official (or unofficial) ruble rate! But we do not live in the United States.

I hoped in general that during the Congress of USSR People's Deputies some of those who were literally rushing toward the microphone to express their opinions of the country's armed forces would appeal to the people's elect: "If we are raising the question of a professional army let us not tomorrow, not in 10 years time, but now raise the pay and allowances for officers,

warrant officers, and those on extended service. In our country they are, after all, essentially professionals today! And it would be desirable to pay soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and petty officers R50-70 a month as long as they are being drafted—partly thanks to the reduction in the personnel of the army and navy, and equipment supplies, and the withdrawal of formations and units from a number of countries which are already under way, and so forth." No, they are keeping mum about this.

[Zabrodin] Does the assertion that the USSR shares with the United States the dubious fame of being the biggest dealers in weapons and military equipment correspond to reality? To what extent is this ravaging the country?

[Kirilenko] What do you think? Was the fame of the Tula gunsmiths or the craftsmen of edged weapons made of Damascus steel ever dubious? Such fame could only become dubious, perhaps, under the conditions of universal demilitarized thinking. As yet, however, mankind is taking only the first steps toward it.

At the present time all countries, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, have the right to individual and collective self-defense, but not all countries possess their own defense industry. For this reason many of them link their security with the acquisition of weapons on military markets.

The principal weapons consumers are states located in zones of acute international tension, specifically in areas of the Near and Middle East, which account for approximately three-fifths of world exports. In recent years there has been a steep increase in the list of countries engaged in arms-supply business. Whereas earlier it was a question of five to 10 main manufacturers, there are today approximately 40 of them. They include states which were even recently in the developing category. According to foreign data, the 10 biggest "merchants" now include Brazil which has in terms of volume of arms sales overtaken Israel and Spain.

Yes, the biggest suppliers of arms to the world market are at present the USSR and the United States. However, the manufacture and exports of weapons are not only not ravaging these countries but are a profitable item in their foreign trade. According to foreign estimates, arms exports in Soviet foreign trade provide the country with up to 15 percent of hard currency receipts.

Under conditions where the list of weapons-exporting countries is growing, it is hard to find any logic in the suggestion that we should wind down our arms trade. Hoping that other countries would follow our example is naive, to say the least.

[Zabrodin] Will you not, incidentally, name the countries whose share of military spending in GNP is greater than in the USSR?

[Kirilenko] Israel; a number of countries of the Near and Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan;

and certain others are among such countries according to data of the London Institute for Strategic Studies.

As far as the high proportion of military spending in the USSR's GNP (approximately 7.7 percent, and in the United States 5.9 percent) is concerned, this is explained primarily by our GNP, which is less than that of the United States by a factor of two almost, and also by the fact that the Soviet share of the spending of the Warsaw Pact has always been in excess of 90 percent, while the American contribution to NATO approximately 50 percent.

It is difficult, probably, to reproach the military in either case. But the political scientists who issued recommendations in respect of preservation of the realities which had taken shape in East Europe in May 1945 "for all time" should assume their due share of responsibility.

Was it the Ministry of Defense which made the decision to deploy Soviet forces abroad? Why does the Army continually alone bear the burden of responsibility for the political mistakes of other ministries and departments? This testifies, evidently, to the fact that there has taken shape today not only a shortage of consumer goods and foodstuffs but also of elementary human and professional morality.

[Zabrodin] So what do you understand by reasonable defense sufficiency?

[Kirilenko] I altogether dislike the phrase "reasonable defense sufficiency." It is reminiscent of the still-remembered "the economy must be economical" proposition. I cannot conceive of unreasonable sufficiency. As a military man, I am convinced that this phrase "reasonable defense sufficiency" has to depreciate the sense of responsibility in the country's foreign and domestic policy makers. With it, it is possible to reduce military spending and the armed forces themselves to the utmost. But who, other than Defense Ministry experts, could say how much in the way of divisions, weapons, and military equipment is for us reasonable and sufficient for defense, and how much is unreasonable and insufficient? You will agree, it is possible in this way to justify any figure in peace time. Yet this is dangerous.

What do you think; did the makeup of our armed forces correspond to the reasonable defense sufficiency principle in June 1941?

I recall that in the border districts alone we had twice as many aircraft and three times as many tanks as the enemy.

It has long been known that, given approximate equality in the provision of armies with equipment in war, it is trained personnel and their degree of education, moral-political condition, professional training, and combat experience which comes to the fore.

F. Engels observed that "an advantage militarily is obtained by the country with a higher level of civilization over its less-developed neighbors." Thus in World

War I the average degree of education of our soldiers corresponded to grades 1-2, and of the Germans 3-4. The ratio of losses given this breakdown was 2:1. In World War II the correlation of education constituted grades 3-4 in our Army and grades 6-7 in Germany, and the ratio of combat losses was accordingly 3.5:1. At the present time the average level of education of our conscripts is objectively not higher than the eighth grade. For comparison I would say that by the mid-1990's it is planned that the U.S. Army will have a personnel—privates included—90 percent of which has higher education. And if it is borne in mind that they will serve an average of six years and engage exclusively in combat training and fire and drive combat vehicles almost twice as much, the principle of defense sufficiency needs to be approached very competently and unfailingly reasonably.

In my opinion, the "defensive focus principle" would reflect more accurately the essence of the changes in the organizational development of the armed forces.

But to answer your question specifically, I understand by defense sufficiency the capacity for inflicting on any aggressor damage which is unacceptable to him.

[Zabrodin] Currently part of the population and even certain USSR people's deputies believe that it is essential to solve many socioeconomic problems in the country thanks to a sharp reduction in military appropriations. What is your attitude toward this viewpoint?

[Kirilenko] Let us first try to agree with this opinion. And then, remembering all that we have dealt with above, let us try to determine how much can be taken from the expenditure on defense to revitalize our economy.

If it is provisionally cut in half even, it is clear that this would not save and would not revive our economy but would weaken defenses to such an extent that it could make them not only insufficient but also hopelessly backward, and in the future utterly futile.

Of course, considering today's socioeconomic conditions, R70 billion is a considerable sum. But first, no one has yet dared propose the elimination of all military spending, and second, let us take a closer look: Is this sum that ruinous for our country?

A summary calculation made from the testimony of N. Fedorov, leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet working group studying problems of unproductive losses, shows from far from complete data that overall unproductive expenditure and losses in the national economy are computed as being within the R580 billion to R629 billion range. Together with this the USSR Procuracy reports that criminal capital in the country is the equivalent of R240 billion (and according to other sources, considerably more). One-third of this sum (as much as the country allocates annually for defense) is engaged in "shadow turnover."

Is it not this potential which should primarily be used for solving our socioeconomic problems? You will agree that against the background of the unproductive losses which we have just cited even the resources allocated the country's defenses do not appear that burdensome.

Thus, however strange this sounds today, it is necessary in order for our defense to be "reasonably sufficient" to ensure that our economy be truly economical. In other words, we need to be counting from the other end and not becoming incensed on this account. It is necessary primarily to make the economy reasonable in order that defense might be entirely sufficient.

[Zabrodin] Has Academician G.A. Arbatov responded to you?

[Kirilenko] He has not yet replied in point of fact to the questions which have been broached, although he expressed the hope in OGONEK No. 17 (for this April) that he would manage, possibly, to do so in the future. I will hope together with him.

As far as his accusation that my "critical volley" was made in "the form of personal attacks, phrases, and elements sustained even in the best style of the Stalin times of political denunciation" is concerned, I would like to respond as follows. First, to confess that I borrowed this "best style" of exposition from Academician Arbatov's article "The Army for the Country or the Country for the Army?" The reader may easily see this for himself by comparing our publications. Second, Georgiy Arbatov has every right, evidently, to judge the style of "the Stalin times of political denunciation" inasmuch as I did not, owing to my age, live in those times and acquire the corresponding experience and conditioning. They are undoubtedly more visible to him.

Together with this, the academician's agreement with the need to switch to an honest, scrupulous, and most importantly, benevolent dialogue cannot fail to evoke a sense of satisfaction. If, of course, he has expressed such consent... "without any slyness."

[Zabrodin] German Vasilyevich, what, for all that, can you say specifically regarding Academician Arbatov's article in the April issue of the journal OGONEK "But What About Without Slyness?"

[Kirilenko] Primarily that the length of the article and its illustrations point to the close interaction and mutual accord of G.A. Arbatov and V.A. Korotich. However, as far as its content is concerned, in my opinion it contradicts the conclusion drawn at the end.

One altogether has the impression that Georgiy Arkadyevich has of late been writing more frequently on his problems in the journal OGONEK than in the press organ of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA.

Inasmuch as Arbatov has "professionally" confronted his "military comrades" with a number of questions, I will attempt to answer them.

The first question—concerning aircraft carriers. Yes, they are expensive. But the decisions on their construction were made no less than 10 years prior to the adoption of the current defense doctrine. And of the persons who could at that time—if only somewhat—have influenced the shaping of the opinion of the country's leadership on the expediency of their construction, none other than Georgiy Arkadyevich himself, perhaps, remains in business. The present military leadership, on the other hand, was serving at that time in the localities, very far from Moscow.

The second question—concerning the quantity of weapons manufactured. Yes, unfortunately, we military people also avail ourselves of the same source of information as Academician Arbatov. The point being that in our country, far from all the arms are manufactured in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. Some of them, as I have said, are intended for export. This is the first point. But the second is that I would like to recall that we were forced by the numbers of some types of weapons to compensate for the disadvantageous correlation in other types. So the roots of the lack of responsibility need to be sought more deeply.

The question of military aviation. Academician Arbatov writes that he heard that last year Aeroflot was unable to carry 20 million passengers, whereas military aviation was burning up almost three times as much fuel as all of Aeroflot. I confess that I also heard that last year military transport aircraft continued to fly in freight to the area of the consequences of the earthquakes and flooding and promptly transferred freight and troops to the areas of "interethnic intercourse" and also carried out other national economic transportation.

So, as you can see, we avail ourselves of rumors approximately equally. True, there are also rumors to the effect that the flying time of our pilots on other types of combat aircraft lags behind the American level by a factor of two or three. But we do not wish to believe such rumors. It is more convenient this way. Is it not?

And the final question—concerning the number of generals. There can be no doubt that we have more generals than does the U.S. Army inasmuch as with us the Army is bigger and the structure of the armed forces is considerably different. This should be understood. But why we have more academicians than the Americans also (although science, economic science particularly, brings us absolutely no joy) it is hard to understand.

As a whole, as many readers have already observed, Academician Arbatov's current affairs activity has of late been of a distinctly anti-Army thrust. I believe that, the main purpose aside, a desire to distract the public from possible questions is being realized hereby: What is the United States and Canada Institute doing in the USSR? How effective is its activity? And so forth.

[Zabrodin] A final question which is not directly related to your argument with Academician Arbatov. How do you explain for yourself the attacks on the armed forces?

[Kirilenko] I would recall first that whereas the authority of the U.S. Army is today—as the Americans themselves, primarily their President, acknowledge—the highest it has been in society since the war, the authority of our armed forces is the lowest it has ever been. Without absolving the officer corps of its share of responsibility for this, I would like to emphasize that great "credit" is due the mass media here also.

With the start of perestroika and the revolutionary transformations in our country forces emerged in the political arena which have been conducting a struggle for power and a change in the current system. The army is for them a serious obstacle. Whence the endeavor to undermine its authority and in the guise of "constructive" criticism and "practical" advice to lower the combat readiness of the armed forces.

[Zabrodin] And are undermining it by circulating, for example, once again with the help of a recent issue of OGONEK, the latest canard: "According to figures of NATO experts...in 1988 the USSR spent on military purposes from R130 billion to R160 billion—twice as much as declared. As CIA experts maintain, our country's military spending in real terms has in recent years increased by approximately one percent...."

[Kirilenko] Yes, well, some people, evidently, very much wish to "believe" the unknown NATO and CIA experts. I, however, would prefer to believe the figures (appropriations for defense and percentage reduction in military spending) which come from our official sources, the president of USSR included....

Footnotes

1. German Vasilyevich Kirilenko. Born in 1937 in Dagestan. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1954. Member of the CPSU. Graduated from the Tambov Military School in 1957, the M.V. Frunze Military Academy in 1972, and the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff in 1976. He served for 15 years at the regimental level (including five years in command of a motorized rifle company and as battalion and regimental chief of staff), and worked in the General Staff Academy Research Department and as a lecturer in the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy.

Geography of service: Tambov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Kushka, Chardzhou, Kerki, Karaganda, Minsk, and so forth. In 1982 he defended his candidate's dissertation on strategy and military economics, and in 1989, his doctoral thesis.

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Public Addresses Concerns to Akhromeyev, Yakovlev*90UM0665A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jun 90 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank V. Yermolin under the rubric "Mail Under the 'Call-in Telephone' Heading": "Where Is the Politburo Looking?"]

[Text] On 14 April Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, adviser to the President of the USSR and member of the nation's Supreme Soviet, spent two hours at the call-in telephone, and A.N. Yakovlev, member of the President's Council and of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee did the same on 7 May. Reports reflecting as nearly as possible the conversations between the guests and readers were published in the 24 April and 15 May issues of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA respectively. Since then the editors' mail has brought letters for Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev. Many of the letters are addressed directly to the editors, asking that they be published as open messages. Unfortunately, it would be impossible to publish all the letters pertaining to the conversations on the call-in telephone. There are too many.

We are providing you with a survey of both the written and the phoned responses.

A considerable portion of the calls and letters to the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee have contained complaints or personal requests. What have the readers asked about? About the recomputation of a pension, improving a housing situation, the reinstatement of an unjustly fired individual, the awarding of a frontline award, preferential listing for a motor vehicle. I cannot list all of the numerous petitions. I can only say that some of the matters are being checked out and we hope they will be resolved. In a nation which has, in addition to the other shortages, a lack of legal protection for the citizen, the line of supplicants—if only by phone—will not dry up for a long time to come.

Pensioner N.I. Chernelyuk of Cherkassy complains not to a local court or to sympathetic neighbors but right to the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about someone who has taken over part of the shared yard near the garage. "I've been trying to call you for two hours, but I couldn't get through!" he said, telling off the editors. "What kind of system is that"? Our system is not ideal, of course. For some reason, though, most angry readers, like Kornelyuk, vented their ire at us, and we were providing a single telephone for the entire nation. According to some citizens our endless problems could be resolved easily: Just set all the members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee down with telephones and let them sit there day after day and respond to calls from the workers. And we would not need a law-governed state.

When one looks at the kind of complaints coming in and their social significance, it is difficult not to believe that in the minds of the people the will of a high-ranking person and the Law itself are one and the same. Most of those unjustly fired, passed over in the line for an apartment or mistreated by a tyrannical official and other "humiliated and insulted" individuals pester party and state authorities, the editorial boards of newspapers and magazines and the offices of "high officials"—always Moscow-based. And from all indications it does not seem surprising to the people in the offices that people go to them and not to a court. So they hear the complaints out, "record" them and take steps. Not always and not everywhere, but that is another subject.

Complaints have also come in from military personnel and their families. This is a special subject, since the legal status of these "personnel of the state," defenders of the homeland, has not yet come to fruition in the law-making bodies. Delays with promotions, transfers to new stations, appointments to positions... These subjects have almost disappeared from the mail recently. And not because the problems themselves are disappearing. They simply pale in comparison with the threat to the personal safety of the serviceman, his unsatisfactory living situation and his uncertainty about the future when it comes time for his release into the reserve. The calls and letters have shown that many people are in favor of relations between the servicemen and the state which would be legally regulated and would specify reciprocal obligations of the two parties. It should be pointed out, however, that the military readers addressing the Marshal of the Soviet Union or the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee made personal requests least of all. They regarded the latter primarily as political figures, which accounts for the nature and the level of the questions. The main thing disturbing people is how we are to proceed and actually achieve the society's renewal.

There were many opponents to the approaches to this matter of both the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. V.V. Kovshov of Kazan, for example, believes that we should never graft onto socialism such elements of capitalism as private ownership, a free market and so forth. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Kamentsev, however, another veteran and former frontline fighter who lives in Stryi, Lvov Oblast, is convinced of the following: "Nothing has come out of our 73 years of Soviet power, and nothing will come of it." In his opinion, in 1917 "a group of professional revolutionaries who knew nothing about economics played on the base instincts of the crowd." This accounts for the results "of the 70-year experiment."

This polarization of views both on the revolution and on the path we have traveled is typical today. It is therefore not surprising that in the telephone conversations with readers both Sergey Fedorovich and Aleksandr Nikolayevich, firm advocates of resolving acute problems

primarily through dialog, spoke more than once of the need to learn how to listen to and understand one another.

As a well-known polemicist in matters pertaining to the Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev has received numerous letters and calls supporting his position. Mariya Arkhipovna Sodalok of Maykop called Sergey Fedorovich "the only fighting marshal," since he is the one who always rebuffs "more skillfully and convincingly than the others" attempts to "pit the army against the people and provoke anti-army sentiments in people." This assessment is shared by A.F. Koliy of Kolomna, A.P. Shkegov of Bendery and many others. Maj Ye.G. Markovskiy of Dolinsk (Sakhalin), however, believes that "the whole truth about the army, which is sometimes simply terrible, does no harm to the army's prestige. On the contrary, knowing what lies behind the commonly used term 'hardships of the service,' the people will have a different regard for both the military man and the needs of the Armed Forces.

Here is another opinion: "An important man like Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev should not permit himself to be drawn into debate by certain publications. What are the knowledgeable agencies which should have put the upstart editors in their place long ago doing?" (Yu.S. Kalinich of Krasnodar) The marshal obviously does not need the help of "knowledgeable agencies." He tries to get people to come around to his way of thinking primarily with reasoning presented in published debate.

Something else is also obvious, however. For Comrade Kalinich this engagement in debate is a sign of weakness and lack of proper respect for authority.

Mikhail Yakovlevich Kurdyukov of Vilnyus said approximately the same thing as the Krasnodar reader, but using the example of events in Lithuania. He believes that as a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yakovlev could have prevented the development of events in Lithuania in March of this year. How? In the opinion of Mikhail Yakovlevich, it would have been enough resolutely to instruct the republic's Communist Party to take on Sajudis and to rake Sajudis itself over the coals. Everything would have turned out different. The fact that such "strong-willed decisions" have been adopted more than once in our history and have led to nothing good but have only driven the disease inside is not taken into account.

The letters and calls to A.N. Yakovlev clearly show the concern of our readers with the correlation between two such entities as "perestroika" and "socialism." "It seems to me," Viktor Petrenko of Dnepropetrovsk told the editors by phone, "that the correlation between 'perestroika' and 'socialism' is inversely proportional. Is this not another surprise for the government?" This was followed by the irritated question: "Where is the Politburo looking?" But today—and it is time to point this out—in the situation of functioning republic and Union

parliaments elected by the people, and only by us, it would be more correct to put the question this way: "Where are we looking"? But precisely in this vein the "we," and particularly the "I," come through weakly in the readers' addresses to our high-ranking guests. Most frequently they are just a presentation of demands to some energetic individual representing a system with unlimited possibilities.

I would add to what has been said the fact that all of your letters, dear readers, and all of your calls will receive attention. We just remind you that both Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev have agreed to answer letters and phone calls only on the day indicated and only during the two hours designated for the telephone discussion. This is a miserably short time to take in even a part of that which is troubling the people today, of course. Ultimately the search for answers to questions affecting the fate of the homeland is not a matter of telephone discussion. It would perhaps be better to try to find answers to the difficult questions of life ourselves. Along the paths which we select.

Baltic Fleet's V Adm A. Kornienko Interviewed

90UM0619A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 90
(Signed to press 23 Apr 90) pp 10-15

[Interview with Baltic Fleet Vice Admiral A. Kornienko under the rubric: "Theory and Practice": "You Cannot Assemble a Temple from Debris"; date and place not given; first paragraph is *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* introduction]

[Text] Below is the text of *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*'s interview with Vice Admiral A. Kornienko, chief of the Political Directorate, Red Banner (Twice Awarded) Baltic Fleet; and member of the Military Council.

[*KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL*] Anatoliy Ivanovich, you participated in the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party and are well acquainted with the situation in the republic. What can you tell us about the latest events occurring there?

[Kornienko] I believe that the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party, in deciding to leave the CPSU, did not fully realize that the decisions it made at the 20th Congress will lead to disintegration of the party, stratification of society along nationalistic lines, and destruction of party and state unity. Separatist and nationalistic feelings have gotten the upper hand. I am firmly convinced that attempts to build a long-term policy on the basis of nationalistic feelings is a risky and unpromising exercise. Political bankruptcy is a certainty.

Many persons are deeply troubled by the question: "How could all this have happened?" The leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party explains its haste by saying that it was most interested in gaining the upper

hand over the political situation, without waiting for the 28th Congress of the CPSU, thus laying in protection against unforeseen circumstances. The fact of the matter is that the leadership of the republic party organization has for a long time been surrendering to the reactionary Sayudis.

There is ample evidence of this. The Lithuanian Communist Party handed over the mass information media to the Sayudists. Massive pressure was constantly applied to mold public opinion. True communists were subjected to public defamation. The ideological and organizational foundations of party work were attacked. Even worse, the initiative for making preparations for the Congress was in the hands of Sayudis. How else can you explain the fact that only 23 delegates out of the 1,038 represented the working class and peasants? All this paved the way for Sayudis to assume political power.

All that which ensued—and I am speaking of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decision to secede from the USSR—is in my opinion a direct result of loss of the leading position by the Communist Party of Lithuania. Highly disturbing is the fact that the best communists and party workers are losing their authority. They have not been picked up by the reorganized elective organs. Members of the Communist Party Central Committee who occupy positions in the CPSU are subjected to complete demoralization and defamation. These courageous people have demonstrated enviable steadfastness, and we should support them as much as possible.

With regard to the resolution "restoring the independence" of Lithuania, I am of the opinion that this lacks legal merit. It is sufficient to say that it was passed by deputies who were voted in by only 41.2 percent of the Lithuanian voters. That does not represent all the people.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What do you think is the main cause of the difficulties being experienced by the CPSU? Does the situation require the application of extreme measures?

[Kornienko] The CPSU Central Committee platform under consideration at the present time addresses these questions to a great extent. Yes, the party is being accused of all kinds of transgressions; its supposed crisis is discussed on all street corners. The bill it is running up for past and present errors is growing by the hour, not by the day. The tension in society and within CPSU organizations is increasing at the same time. However, contradictions—even biting ones—do not constitute a crisis. What can we see today? What processes are typical for the party? Primarily renewal, democratization, glasnost—with improvement of its structures—and a search for an exact position and role in society.

It is high time to bring the party policy and regulations in line with present realities, a task on the agenda of the CPSU 28th Congress. Prime importance attaches to

greater democratization of intra-party life. All communists should participate in voting for the leading party organs, including the CPSU Central Committee.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What are your feelings on suggestions made in the press (including the central press) from time to time relative to depoliticizing the Army and abolishing the Armed Forces party-political apparatus?

[Kornienko] Who is advancing that idea? I think those who promote the motto "We are for the soviets, providing there are not communists!". It is no accident that the idea of depoliticization came into full force along with the attack on socialist values, including on the socialist army. There are forces that would like the Army and Navy, not only the soviets, to be devoid of communists, of course. How can I—a communist—feel about this? I am adamantly opposed, naturally.

It has become fashionable to look for analogues in other countries, including capitalist countries. I do not know of an army of a single major power that has done away with a political apparatus in the armed forces. It exists in the United States of America, for example. I am speaking of society-oriented service, which has a formal structure and is adequately financed.

And another aspect. I have travelled to foreign countries a number of times. My line of work is such that I must maintain constant awareness of what is being published in the foreign press. I would like to say that I have never seen any foreign publication print attacks on an army such as those that populate some of our newspapers and magazines. Moreover, foreign countries are doing quite a bit to raise the prestige of serving in the armed forces. That is something to think about, you will agree.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Various opinions are circulating in the service relative to the future of political organs and political workers in units and subunits. For example, it is suggested that lower political organs be made elective, while political directorates of districts, fleets, and branches of the service be abolished. Thoughts are also expressed relative to combining the positions of deputy commander for political affairs and party committee secretary, i.e., rendering the position elective, and doing away with the institution of company, battalion, and equivalent political workers. Suggestions have also been made to "lock" secretaries of party committees directly into political organs so that they could not command units and ships. What is your opinion in this regard?

[Kornienko] That is not a simple question to answer; I have already addressed it in part. If we recognize that depoliticization of the Army is an absurdity, then we must agree that abolishing the party-political apparatus is also an absurdity. We have already learned how to destroy. However, breaking up something is the opposite of constructing it. That is why I state emphatically that we must not break up the party-political structure, which

required decades to build and in the process accumulated a great amount of positive experience. We must instead see to it that this structure operates in a new way, one that would be responsive to the demands of the day.

Now I would like to speak about election of political organs. I cannot rule out its applicability to research institutes, or possibly even military schools, institutions, and military enterprises. Those organizations have their way of operating, and there is room for deliberation. When it comes to one-man command, I cannot imagine how political organs can be rendered elective. The point here is that the regulations specify that the political section chief in a combined unit (soyedineniye) or unit is also the deputy commander of the combined unit or unit for political affairs. If we are to elect the political section chief, then we must also elect the other deputy commanders, including the chief of staff. You will agree that this is unacceptable for the Armed Forces.

It is difficult to imagine how we can abolish the institution of company and battalion political workers and their equivalents. Our ships and submarines must carry out sea duty for several months at a time, operating singly, at that. Who aboard will organize party-political work?

Also difficult to imagine is how a party committee secretary can be "locked" directly into a political organ. On the contrary, the draft of the CPSU Regulations makes provision for division of administrative, educational, and party functions. The March Central Committee Plenum provided the basis for creating party organs from the bottom upward in the Armed Forces. It is they—not the political organs—that will head party work. The time for introducing this measure has long been ripe; I believe that this will accelerate democratization not only of intra-party relations in Army and Navy party organizations, but also in the entire life of units and subunits.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Our readers send in suggestions to expand the section "Organization of the CPSU in the USSR Armed Forces" in the draft regulations, thus obviating the need for the "Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy." What can you say in this regard? Do you have any definite ideas relative to rewriting the regulations?

[Kornienko] I agree that the instructions must be changed. In that case the particular activities of Army and Navy communists must be set down in the "Regulations (Polozheniye) for Political Organs and Party Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy." I purposely included the term "party organizations," since it will be necessary to draw the authority line between the political organs and the new elective party organs, starting with combined units and working upward. Incidentally, they are not adequately dealt with in the draft regulations, which should include the procedure for their election, structure, and duties.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] It is common knowledge that the party Central Committee is undergoing considerable restructuring: diminution of the apparat, clarification of functions of departments and sectors, etc. Do you think that the present organizational and personnel structure of political management should be changed?

[Kornienko] The perestroika process proper has already reduced the size of the management apparat. I believe that the existing structure requires additional renewal. For example, it seems to me that the name of one of the departments—Propaganda and Agitation—is obsolete. There is advantage to combining this department with the related Technical Propaganda Means Department, with the name changed to Political Management Ideological Department. I believe that it should include an ideological commission elected by Naval party conference. It could also be possible to send to it as delegates representatives from large party organizations. A liaison officer would also be required to interface with the mass information media. By this I mean civilian as well as military media.

The Department of Military Field Party-Political Work Organization as it stands now is also probably obsolete. The point is that combat ships do not amount to a very large part of Naval forces as far as percentage is concerned. There would be an advantage to combining it with the Organizational Party Work Department. I see the purpose of these changes as expanding the circle of ideological and party activists that would participate in originating suggestions for improving political work.

I should think that the time has come to reorganize party commissions, also. The point is that if the new party regulations grant wide authority to primary party organizations, including the authority to make the final decision on acceptance into the party, it will be possible to reform party commissions into party control commissions, in which case the latter would oversee implementation of party decisions, the party regulations, and standards of party ethics.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Some servicemen are of the opinion that political workers, particularly political organ workers, have done virtually nothing as far as restructuring their work is concerned; that many of them have developed the habit of adhering to "paper work," refusing to get out of their rut, etc. What does the Navy think about this? What is the Political Directorate doing to encourage activity and initiative on the part of political workers?

[Kornienko] It is most unpleasant for me to admit it, but there is some truth to that. There are many causes. In my opinion, high on the list are shortcomings in the system employed to train political workers. It is no secret that the vast majority of military political school graduates does not possess any service experience, let alone life experiences. More than 90 percent of them come directly from secondary school. Only half of them possess the

personality and type of mind required to be political workers, while the remainder acquire skill in coping with the difficulties of the job only in the course of doing their duty. Some of them are unable to "find themselves" in the career they selected, even after some years have passed. Fortunately, it is not they who represent today's Naval political personnel. I can say that most of the political workers are well-trained in both political and military aspects. For example, all political officers of aviation squadrons fly modern aircraft, and in the Naval Infantry they drive combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Every other ship's deputy for political affairs is authorized to serve a ship's watch and run a ship independently.

The Political Directorate has plans for effecting improvements in training and nurturing Naval political personnel. The guiding principle is: "We teach others while we ourselves learn." Political Directorate officers refuse to perform unnecessary administrative work, do not take the place of political organ workers, combine and coordinate the efforts of people, and encourage communists to create a sound moral atmosphere in each military collective. Relative to the political personnel training program, we attempted to organize the latter with emphasis placed on endowing the officers with sound Marxist-Leninist training; a good knowledge of the concept, purpose, and mechanisms of perestroika; and mastery in political analysis of the work of political organs and party organizations.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] The prestige of political workers is decreasing in the Armed Forces. What explanation can you offer for that?

[Kornienko] I am not so sure that political workers' prestige is dropping. In the final analysis, everything depends on who is entrusted with party-political work. I will cite an example. Captain 3rd Rank P. Vetlitskiy is a senior instructor in a party work organization of a political section in the Naval Landing Forces. The primary organization bureau in which he is registered distributed a questionnaire among communists while preparations were being made for the report-back election meeting. One of the questions asked was: "Who do you consider to be the most authoritative communists in our staff party organization?" Tabulation of the results indicated that Pavel Igorevich was among those who had the highest rating, to use chess language.

Alas! Some political workers do not possess talent for dealing with people, keep to their offices and cabins, practice paper shuffling, tend to take the place of commanders, and take on the function of distributors of deficits. They run around all day long, getting lost in a maze of details and forgetting their main purpose. They do not make themselves available; they never have time to work with anyone on a personal basis.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] It is a reality that political organs must become organs of social change for servicemen and their families. What are you

doing in this regard in the Navy? Are they capable of satisfying the needs and demands of people?

[Kornienko] What do I think the role of political organs should be? First and foremost, they should breath new life into existing structures—people's control organs, for example. I believe that many political organs can and should do much to promote democratization of the work being carried out by permanent certification commissions, housing distribution commissions, and deficit reduction. It seems to me that these interests should be employed to enlist the active participation of those officers and warrant officers who won their deputy's mandate in a difficult political struggle. Political organs should make it a rule to defend the interests of servicemen; monitor the satisfaction of their legal rights; and speak out in a loud voice against any abuses of power, regardless of the source.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] We are presently also standing at the crossroads relative to development of initiative and independence of party organizations. However, evidence indicates that little progress is being made.

[Kornienko] I do think about that at times. There comes a time when a communist must leave the service and enter the reserves. His fellow servicemen arrange a farewell get-together; he is thanked for his service, showered with valuable gifts, and handed letters of appreciation signed by his superior officer. But what about the party organization? The party organization secretary deletes his name from the register, and the political section chief signs his release document. The action itself seems to fall short of something: He is released and given a document attesting to that fact on top of that. The point here is that this does not represent the effort of a single year. On the contrary, the communist labored a long time and exhibited social responsibility, after all. Some people may consider this to be a small thing, but small things of this kind comprise the authority of a party organization.

The draft regulations open up vast possibilities for primary organizations. Elective party organs which will be set up according to plan at all levels of the Army will rejuvenate party work, of course. I believe that the main advantage of this structure lies in freeing the primary organizations from political organ patronage, thus enabling them to develop their full potential. However, party organs will require our assistance in the initial period.

The process of freeing political organs from party leadership functions will not be painless. However, this is the only way in which we can establish the power of the party masses in deed, not word. I believe that the authority of party organizations will rise noticeably if they do not hesitate to take on those problems which are troubling people today. Harmony in interethnic relations; prevention of violations of the regulations; the social sphere;

assurance of social justice; questions of nurturing—these I believe should be the goals of the party's efforts.

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Major General Batarchuk on Party Authority, Political Structure

90UM0421A Moscow *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 2, Jan 90 pp 13-20

[Interview, published under the heading "Theory and Practice" with Maj Gen Nikolay Aleksandrovich Batarchuk entitled "Authority of the Vanguard: Reflections Prior to the Congress"; Nikolay Aleksandrovich Batarchuk has been in the Armed Forces since 1959. He completed the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political School, the Legal Faculty of the Altay State University (by correspondence) and the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. He has been involved in Komsomol and political work. Recent years have been spent on the CPSU Central Committee initially as an instructor, and later as a deputy head and sector head]

[Text] The party in perestroika, perestroika in the party—this problem is more and more drawing the attention of both communists and nonparty persons in line with the current state of society and the preparations for the next 28th CPSU Congress. Here they will renew the Party Program and adopt new Bylaws and work out a political platform for the CPSU for the coming period of perestroika. For this reason it is so important now to have collective advice on how to better resolve many questions which have risen in our party house. In opening up the new section "Reflections Before the Congress," the author has invited readers to take an active part in a discussion of the place and role of the CPSU as the political vanguard of society, the role and methods of work of the political bodies, the authority of the primary party organizations and the democratizing of internal party relations. We will also expect both specific proposals which concern the urgent changes in the CPSU Bylaws, the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and the Regulation Governing Political Bodies. We propose publishing letters, articles, correspondence, questions, replies and critical comments from the spot—in a word, all those materials which can help by comparing different positions, opinions and views on finding in the course of the pre-congress debate a reply to the main question: what is the party to be at present?

Answering the questions posed by the Department of Party Life Under the Journal Editors is the sector head of the State Legal Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Maj Gen Nikolay Aleksandrovich Batarchuk.

[Correspondent] The Soviet people are linking changes in the life of the nation primarily with the renewal of the party. However, at present a situation has arisen whereby perestroika in the CPSU has lagged behind the

processes occurring in society. This is the opinion of many of our readers. What do you see as the main reason for the difficulties presently being experienced by the party, and what problems, in your view, first need a collective analysis and study in the party?

[Batarchuk] The replies to these questions have been repeatedly given at various levels, including in speeches by the leaders of our party. A large number of publications in the press has been devoted to the problems of restructuring the party. For this reason, I will merely voice my own opinion. In my view, the main reason for the difficulties presently being experienced by the party lies in the truly gigantic scope of tasks which it has assumed, in acting as the initiator of renewal in all spheres of our society's life. Their scope, complexity grows day by day. In uniting and mobilizing all the Soviet people to resolve these tasks, the party simultaneously, as they say, "along the way," is being improved and restructuring itself.

I consider myself among the persons who link the fate of perestroika in the nation closely with the renewal of the CPSU. I am firmly convinced that without its consolidating effect on all aspects of social life, there will be no perestroika. And the fact that for now the changes in the party are going on more slowly than in society as a whole, naturally causes concern and alarm among a predominant majority of the communists. Very difficult processes are underway and many of them have not yet matured, and there is the acquiring of experience, knowledge and strength. And at present we do not have the right to permit confusion.

I would like to emphasize that the party has spoken of this lag with the same honesty and rectitude with which it assumed responsibility for the previous deformations of socialism. The problem, in my view, is that the measures adopted after the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference in restructuring the party were not sufficient against the background of the high pace of politicizing society and the renewal of all aspects of its life. Unfortunately, under these conditions many party organizations did not succeed in overcoming the passivity of a large portion of the communists inherited from the times of stagnation as well as the ossification of internal party relations. As a result, a situation arose whereby many people began to gain greater opportunities outside the party for manifesting their social activeness. This fact cannot help but cause growing criticism in society and dissatisfaction of the communists themselves and cannot help but create difficulties in ensuring the party's vanguard role.

I would also like to emphasize something else. Our times are extremely dynamic and even now the situation in many party organizations is different than, for instance, a year or even six months ago. The party workers of all levels have gone, if it can be so put, into the people, into the shops, into the production sections, into the residential blocks.... Their voices are resounding evermore frequently and persuasively in meetings and assemblies of

the labor collectives, and ties are becoming closer with those informal situations which are driven by concern for perestroika and the position in elections for the local and republic bodies is becoming firmer and more aggressive. There has been a noticeable change in the psychology and the approaches among the members of the party committees and the workers of the political bodies.

In a word, in order that the CPSU effectively carry out its role as the political vanguard, it is essential to ensure the social activeness of each party organization and each communist. The search for the ways to resolve this most important problem, it seems to me, is the prime one in the entire package of measures to renew the party.

[Correspondent] At present, a broad discussion is underway of the problems related to the place and role of the CPSU in society. In practical terms there is not only a party-wide but also a public-wide debate. And any debate is primarily a clash of views, positions and opinions. Here the question arises of the possibility for all the communists to have their say and be heard.

[Batarchuk] I am firmly convinced that in the course of the debate, a mass of fresh ideas and constructive proposals will appear on the ways for strengthening the party's authority in society and for the more effective use of its enormous intellectual potential in the interests of perestroika. It cannot be otherwise, as the process of the democratization of internal party life is already irreversible. Loyalty to this direction elaborated in April 1985 has been confirmed in the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference as well as in the practice of daily work in carrying them out. Take for example, the Army and Navy party organizations. The introduction of alternates in forming the elective party bodies, the collective discussion and adoption of decisions, greater openness in the work of the party collectives and their leading bodies, regular reporting by the political bodies to the communists and a noticeable turn toward vital organizational work with the personnel—this is a far-from-complete list of fundamental measures which are already actually being realized.

I feel that the further enriching of the content and forms of internal party life can be aided by the rebirth of the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism. At present, there are various opinions on this score. For example, proposals have been heard to replace it with the formula of "democratic unity." But ultimately it is not a matter of terms but rather of content. It would be difficult to actually see the "undermining" of party unity in the real existence of different approaches to the interpretation of this principle or the presence of alternative platforms for democratizing internal party life. Here, in my opinion, it is better to be guided by Lenin's comment than to demand that all the Central Committee members think alike would mean to act for a split. At the same time, we cannot consider as valid the appeals to totally give up this principle as the fundamental principle of party organization. For the role of the political

vanguard in society can only be carried out by an ideologically united political organization which has a unified Program and unified Bylaws and which are compulsory for execution by each and every communist. I support the opinion voiced in the press that the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism which presupposes a full life for all party organizations, their independence, conscious discipline and unity of actions and based upon the elaboration of democratically elaborated common political and ideological positions, should permeate all the new CPSU Bylaws.

Even now, it is apparent that we need precisely new Bylaws. The Central Committee is receiving from the party organizations and individual communists a mass of profound, interesting proposals on the reworking of them. They all are being carefully studied and analyzed. Like any other proposals directed at improving party activities. Both at the center and on the spot. Let me say generally that party policy at present is elaborated not only, and possibly it would be more correct to say, not even so much in the upper echelons as in the grass root party levels. This relates to your comment on the possibility for everyone who has a party card to voice his opinion. And incidentally, also for the nonparty persons. One cannot help but note that at present the party is being turned more and more into the center for elaborating political and ideological concepts, positions and views on all questions which concern society. At present, any idea which works for perestroika is valuable.

In a word, the focusing on the resurrection of the traditions of Bolshevism and the use of positive work experience already acquired in the course of perestroika in handling critical comments and proposals from the communists help to concentrate their creative energy in the search for the truth. And such experience does exist. And also among the Army and Navy party organizations. In February 1989, the CPSU Central Committee adopted the Decree "On Critical Comments Voiced in the Party Conferences of the Soviet Army and Navy" and this generalized the proposals from the communists and outlined measures to implement them.

[Correspondent] A political reform is being implemented in the nation and there is a process of separating the functions of the party, the soviet and economic bodies. This objectively leads to a renewal of the forms and methods of political leadership over all spheres of social life, including the military area. In other words, the problem arises of the party and the army. At present, voices are being heard at times that in the interests of democracy the army should be depoliticized.

[Batarchuk] This problem has also arisen on a level of practical consideration from the very first days of the existence of our state and has never left the agenda. The superior, determining principle in military organizational development and which is the leading role of the party in the Armed Forces was formulated by V.I. Lenin and has honorably withstood the test of time. "The

policy of the military department," as was pointed out in the Decree of the Party Central Committee "On the Policy of the Military Department" in December 1918, "is carried out on the precise grounds of the general directives issued by the party in the form of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision."

I do not see any objective reasons which at present would necessitate a change in the established practice of leadership over military organizational development by the CPSU. Those who see certain failings in this do not mention these factors. In actuality, the army should live and act in strict accord with the laws. At present, as is known, an entire block of laws is being worked out which would regulate more precisely than hitherto the legal status of the Armed Forces in society. But this in no way means that party influence should be lessened in the Army and Navy. I view such appeals as a direct extension of actions by those forces which are endeavoring to dispute the role of the CPSU as the political vanguard of society.

Moreover, at present the political means for resolving international problems are moving more and more to the forefront, and this also presupposes a further rise in the role of the CPSU in defending the socialist fatherland. For this reason, I feel that a constructive way is to seek out new approaches to improving party leadership over the Armed Forces and not its unsubstantiated negation.

[Correspondent] The mass information media are now paying a great deal of attention to criticizing the shortcomings existing in the Armed Forces. Here there have also been valid accusations and attacks. In a number of letters to the editors the following question has been posed: How is the situation existing around the army being evaluated in the CPSU Central Committee and in its personnel?

[Batarchuk] I am profoundly convinced that the time when the shortcomings which did exist in the army were beyond criticism by society are a matter of the past once and for all. Healthy, constructive criticism of the army is needed as any other state institutions. But here we should be careful. For some reason, the opinion has arisen among the people that exclusively the press is "fighting" the shortcomings in the Armed Forces and that it alone is "railing" against "hazing" and the other negative phenomena. I see the reason for this one-sidedness in the articles by a whole series of publications in a drive for sensationalism and where it is assumed that only the press sees and discloses the flaws. Certainly recently a series of decrees by the CPSU Central Committee has been adopted and these in a very acute manner pose the questions of combat readiness and discipline in the Army and Navy. The state of affairs in the Armed Forces was thoroughly examined at a recent session of the Main Military Council Under the USSR Defense Council. Why has little been written about this?

It must be said that in the Armed Forces as a whole, the mass information media are highly regarded in rooting

out the existing shortcomings. More and more frequently the soldiers themselves, the officers and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense appear in the "civilian" press with acute, objective materials on army problems. This is evidence of the trust in the press. But we also know something else: in army circles they do not accept tendentiousness, hurried conclusions or superficial judgments. The Central Committee has received numerous letters which express a valid concern over the attempts to drive a wedge between the army and the people. In line with this the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat "On the Treatment of the Life and Activities of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Central Press" of 29 April 1989 was adopted. This document has become the basis for rectifying the committed errors and is being used to strengthen the authority of the Armed Forces.

[Correspondent] Our readers are interested in what changes are now occurring in the work of the State Legal Department of the Central Committee and your sector in particular....

[Batarchuk] As you know, in accord with the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, there has been a reorganization of the structure of the party apparatus, including the CPSU Central Committee apparatus. The aim has been to activate its operations through new forms of organizing the work. If one speaks briefly about the tasks which are carried out by the State Legal Department as a whole, then it, upon authorization of the CPSU Central Committee, without being guilty of any interference or petty intervention into the practical activities of the appropriate state bodies, is concerned with the questions of improving legislation, socialist legality and human rights, protecting public order as well as with the problems of state security and defense organizational development. The range of listed questions also determines the purpose of the structural subdivisions in the department, and in particular, the sector for general problems of military organizational development. It has been entrusted with the duties of supervising the execution of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on the USSR Armed Forces. As for the basic measures, aims and methods of our work, we would like to emphasize merely the main one. In line with perestroika and the reduction in the personnel of the CPSU Central Committee, we have moved from a sectorial copying of the corresponding structures of the USSR Ministry of Defense to a special problem approach to the work. That is, we are focusing efforts on the most important areas of defense organizational development and we are endeavoring to penetrate more profoundly into the essence of the complex processes going on there, to study and compare the opinions of a large number of specialists and elaborate and present for the CPSU Central Committee sound proposals on restructuring the life and activities of the Armed Forces.

It can be heard at times that the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy operates under the rights of a Central Committee department so why should there be parallel structures in the Central Committee?

But, as you see, we have totally different functions. We are not involved with the direct organization of party political work in the troops. But all the questions are settled by us in close contact, including with the military councils, the political directorates of the Armed Services, the military districts and troop groups. The workers from our department systematically visit in the field for becoming acquainted with the course of carrying out the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee on the questions of military organizational development and for providing help to the commanders and political workers in eliminating the existing shortcomings. Here it should be pointed out that it would be difficult to replace such immediate contact with the personnel.

[Correspondent] The attacks on the party as a whole have involved attacks on the political bodies as the bodies of party leadership in the Army and Navy. Particularly on the primary ones. What do you see as the ways for increasing the authority of the political bodies? At present, for example, proposals are being made to make them elective.

[Batarchuk] As is known, the CPSU Bylaws stipulate that leadership over party work in the Armed Forces is carried out by the CPSU Central Committee through the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. This fundamental provision cannot be forgotten in all instances when it is a question of political bodies. Whoever raises the question "to be or not to be for the political bodies," he ultimately means what should the party leadership of the Armed Forces be.

I have already voiced my opinion on this score. I would merely take up certain questions a solution to which, as it seems, would determine the authority of any party body.

A portion of the political bodies has not yet been able to overcome a gravitation toward "commanding" the party organizations. Their work is regulated from the top to the bottom, right down to the party groups and to such questions as what is the agenda of the next meeting. What is the reason for this? Probably the main one is in the insufficient training of the workers in the political bodies. Many of them have never been in elective positions.

Another important aspect is the link of the political bodies with the communists and with all servicemen. Their workers do not always know the needs and requests of others. In the primary party organizations a mass of critical comments and specific proposals has been voiced but far from all of these have been supported in the political departments. As a result, the personnel has been forced to turn to the superior levels.

Not all opportunities have been used for raising the vanguard role of the communists in service and discipline. The former approaches prevail with a reliance on strong-arm pressure and administrative measures. At the same time, little attention is being paid to the problems of the spiritual life of the people and social questions.

In summing up all of this, I would like to say that the mastering of political methods of leadership, dialogue on equal bases with the primary party organizations, the reporting to them in party work, providing help in the educating of communists and the personal example of principledness, humility and order in the political department workers are the sole way for improving the authority of the leading party bodies in the troops. This was profoundly and thoroughly examined, incidentally, in the co-report by Army Gen Aleksey Dmitriyevich Lizichev at the All-Army Officer Assembly.

As for proposals on the electing of certain officials in the primary political bodies, these have been received by the personnel of the CPSU Central Committee, but their authors forget the specific features of the Armed Forces. The army always, at any time, should be ready to carry out the tasks confronting it in a particular period, that is, under conditions when elective bodies could not act efficiently.

[Correspondent] In the letters from the correspondents, more and more frequently one hears the idea that the numerous levels of party leadership in the Army and Navy, including the Main Political Directorate, the political directorates of the Armed Services, the districts, troop groups, fleets, the political departments of the field forces, associations and in the units in Air Defense, gives rise to parallelism, duplication, the inevitability of paperwork and an abundance of inspectors in the units and on the ships. In your view, have not structural changes matured in the party political apparatus?

[Batarchuk] The letters are a good barometer. Yes, there is duplication and there is also the direct taking over from inferior political bodies by superior ones. However, in working in the troops, we have been convinced that this circumstance is more related not to the structure of the political bodies in the Armed Forces but rather to flaws in the style of their work. It can only be welcomed that the men at present are beginning to think more broadly and analyze the situation not only in their own collective but on a scale of the district, and the Armed Forces as a whole. Thus, many solutions arise out of collective wisdom. But the revolutionary impatience, if it can be so put, is too great. It is more difficult to restructure than it is to build from scratch. It sounds enticing to cut back, eliminate or break up. But what is to go in its place? I agree that it makes no sense when a commission from the district political directorate is replaced by a commission from the political directorate of the Armed Service. But this speaks primarily of poor planning and inefficient control. I share the concern over the unabating flow of paperwork circulating from the top downwards and back up. But certainly this shows that not everyone realizes that to lead means primarily to organize a vital undertaking and not hand out indiscriminately commands or send out paper. It is my feeling that not all illnesses should be treated surgically. Often therapy is needed.

Certainly, this does not mean that we must completely put aside the very possibility of structural changes in the party political apparatus. In the process of reducing the Armed Forces such a necessity can arise. But here the only correct path to follow is to proceed from life. It is just as dangerous to rush ahead as it is to fall behind.

[Correspondent] The Army and Navy political workers and the party aktiv at present are in a difficult situation. The Armed Forces are being reduced. There is confusion in the minds of many servicemen. A changeover to qualitative parameters requires, in particular, the development of new types of weapons and the replacing of old ones while the military budget is being cut back. The demands made on the skills of the personnel are rising while the former students, the best trained part of the personnel, have been discharged from the ranks of the Armed Forces. (Incidentally, far from all of them have returned to the classroom.) The officer corps is being reduced and many former servicemen have lost their social benefits. All of this has caused a feeling of uncertainty among the personnel and has not had the best effect on the attitude toward service. What would you say about this?

[Batarchuk] Without oversimplifying but also without complicating the current situation in the Armed Forces, I would like to emphasize that there have never been and probably never will be any simple conditions for the commanders and political workers to work with the men. However, one cannot help but point out that in the currently existing difficult situation, the command and political personnel, without complaining of the difficulties, is hard at work on carrying out the tasks which, as you understand, have not become any easier. We are carefully following the dynamics of the moods of the servicemen. We are convinced that the Army and Navy officers in their predominant majority have accepted with understanding the decisions on the unilateral reduction in the Armed Forces and weaponry, viewing these as a new important step in further improving the international situation.

At the same time, it would be wrong not to see that the given decision has caused definite negative emotions in certain categories of servicemen. It does not seem quite right to call this confusion. The problem is that at present difficult processes are underway in our society as a whole. Along with the positive trends related to the general improvement in the sociopolitical situation in the nation, the officer personnel is under the influence of a whole series of serious negative factors. These were persuasively described in the decree adopted this year by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Attitudes of Officer Personnel in the Soviet Army and Navy" and which, incidentally, was published in IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS. This document served as a good basis for working out important measures for social benefits for the servicemen. Only recently, a number of party and government decisions has been adopted on the questions of providing housing, residential permits, job placement

and pension support for officers in line with their discharge into the reserves. In November of last year, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on increasing officer pay. The proposals on changes in calculating the length of employment in assigning pensions to the wives of servicemen and a whole series of other innovations have been received with approbation.

In your question there is the valid fear heard of the reality of implementing the party plans to convert defense construction to qualitative parameters under the conditions of reducing financial expenditures on defense. This is a very complicated problem. It was thoroughly reviewed at the Main Military Council Under the USSR Defense Council, as has already been mentioned in our conversation. Upon its instructions, a special authoritative commission has been organized and this is to prepare proposals on improving the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces under present-day conditions.

[Correspondent] To raise party authority is primarily to raise the authority of its primary party organizations. For now they are still fettered by petty interference from the political bodies, beginning with the fact that the political department determines the structure of the primary organization, it "recommends" the secretary and ending with the miserly 3 percent deductions from the party dues and which is difficult to rely on. What realistic ways do you see for increasing the independence and militance of the primary party organizations?

[Batarchuk] I fully share this concern. We say that the basis of the party is the primary organizations. But look what is happening. In the last 2 years, for example, in the Transbaykal Military District the admission of officers to the party has declined by more than double. In 85 companies and batteries, at the moment of our inspection there was not a single communist. At the Leningrad Navy Base, over the last several years, the number of party organizations in the subunits has declined by approximately 20 percent. In the training unit of this base, 1/3 of the ships does not have any party organizations. These figures have been mentioned in your journal. Due to the poorly conceived placement of communists, many party organizations over a period of several months lose their viability.

Now let me voice the following notion. The potential for the independence of the party organizations residing even in the current CPSU Bylaws is not fully realized not due to the surplus attention, as many feel, paid to them by the political bodies but rather because of the shortage of this attention. This can be seen from the narrowness of the forms and methods of influence by certain party collectives on solving the pending tasks.

Another question: just what should this attention be? I have already had my say on this score. In truth, I would like to add the following. Democratizing the relations of the political bodies and the primary organizations is, to put it figuratively, a two-way street. The rights of the

party organizations recently have been substantially broadened but not all the party collectives are ready to benefit from this. Hence, the responsibility for the certain lag behind the processes occurring in army life in my view should be shared equally by the political bodies and the primary organizations.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the "humanization" of party work is going on very slowly. The declaring of the demand for the pure and honest appearance of a party member for now has been little backed up in practical deeds relating to their ideological tempering and education in the traditions of Bolshevism. For this reason, in party work we must really turn to the people, decisively abandon formalism and overcome isolation from life. How is this to be done? By what means? I feel that this will become the basis of the pre-congress reflections in the Army and Navy party organizations.

Editorial Note. At the request of Nikolay Aleksandrovich Batachuk, the interview fee owed him for the article is to be turned over to the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V.I. Lenin.

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Latvian Military Commissar Protests Treatment on Local TV

Letter Denounces 'Fraud'

90UM0394A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 1

[Letter to the editor by Major General Yanis Duda, Latvian SSR Military Commissar: "PROTEST with Regard to Television Fraud"]

[Text] On February 3 1990, Latvian SSR Television should have shown the Republic's Military Commissar answering citizen's personal questions on "Panorama". But for some reason it was obvious from the television broadcast that I was being interviewed mainly on the territory of Nth military unit and not in my office where I conducted citizen reception hours on January 27. How do they explain this television "trick?" What was it all really like? It was as follows.

Latvian Television Correspondent R. Broka and a television cameraman arrived at the January 27 reception. While I was receiving citizens, she also interviewed me about how citizens of the Latvian SSR are performing military service and also about some USSR Armed Forces problems. Colonel V. Teymer and Private K. Bite were present at that time.

Television Correspondent R. Broka assured me that this material would be shown on television without misrepresentations on February 3rd. However, on February 3 1990, the edited television footage that was shown on Panorama completely misrepresented the essence and sense of the interview. What did television viewers see

on the screen? They saw the military commissar "describing" the outrages that were occurring on the grounds of one military unit and not answering the questions that Television Correspondent R. Broka was asking that day.

As a result of editing, the broadcast's meaning was reduced to the fact that the Soviet Armed Forces are a jail for citizens of the USSR.

I am compelled to express a categorical protest against such misrepresentations and juggling of facts that are intolerable not only for a worker of the mass media but also for any citizen and I want to obtain an official answer and explanation on such an unprecedented case.

It remains to add that the footage shown on television was secretly filmed without the knowledge of the military unit commander. This is not the first instance of such "work" by correspondents of republic television.

Interview Text Published

90UM0394B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 16 Feb 90 p 4

[Text of Television Interview with Major General Ya. Duda, Latvian SSR Military Commissar, by Latvian SSR Television Correspondent Rita Broka and [Cameraman] Aynars Ashaks, creators of a video short subject on the Panorama television program: "Fraud or Reality?"]

[Text] On February 10 1990 in ZA RODINU Newspaper and on February 13 in SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH Newspaper, Latvian SSR Military Commissar Major General Ya. Duda published a protest under the headline "With Regard to Television Fraud" with a demand for "explanations on such an unprecedented case."

In order for this "case" to also be understood by SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH Newspaper readers, we, as the creators of the protested video materials, offer the text of the interview recorded on January 27 1990 in the office of Military Commissar Ya. Duda at the beginning of our "explanation":

I.

[Broka] How do you assess today's Army?

[Duda] Today's Army? The Army meets its own requirements. If we compare it with the world's armies, it meets its own requirements.

[Broka] The opinion exists that the Army is similar to a jail.

[Duda] All people have the right to have their own opinions. But I do not think so. You are looking at me and do I really look like a jailer? In all states, discipline and order are maintained in the Army and that is all.

[Broka] Do you support the Latvian people's aspiration to create their own Army?

[Duda] I support the aspirations of all of the peoples of Latvia that affect economic sovereignty. As for the Army, first of all you need officers. We have very few Latvian officers. And the Army will never be a national [ethnic] formation since the number of residents totals 50 to 50. The Army will still be an inter-ethnic formation.

[Broka] You obviously did not entirely correctly understand me. I had in mind an army that would consist of Latvian residents.

[Duda] Yes, then the composition of the army will be—50 percent Latvians and 50 percent people of other nationalities. This is the number of residents in our republic in a percentage ratio and it cannot be any other way. What is the difference between that army and today's? It will nevertheless be inter-ethnic.

II.

[Broka] Young men will serve near their homes on their own territory and in their homeland.

[Duda] Yes, everyone would like to live and serve near their homes and on their own territory. But, unfortunately today the international situation is such that we must protect not only our territory.

[Broka] Do you really think that young men from Latvia need to resolve the issue of Nagornyy Karabakh or Azerbaijan?

[Duda] Everyone needs to resolve it. The Army needs to resolve it. Because the Army is not only the stabilizer in international relations but is also the stabilizer in domestic matters.

For technical reasons, only the first portion of the recorded interview was shown on Panorama and that portion was partially illustrated using another video recording made at practically the same time on the grounds of a military unit located in Riga in the center of a residential area. If we specifically respond to the last paragraph of Military Commissar Duda's "protest" "that the footage shown on the television screens was secretly filmed..." we can very responsibly say that, first of all, all secrets of this military unit end at window level on the third stories of apartment houses located alongside it. And secondly, the military unit's fence has numerous broad entrances that local residents use not only as short cuts but also to walk their dogs. We also partially took advantage of one of these entrances and filmed a portion of the material without authorization. But the primary video material was recorded after we received official authorization from Military Unit Commander I.G. Kuchugurnyy.

Did we have the moral right to illustrate the interview with Military Commissar Ya. Duda using video materials shot at the previously mentioned military unit?

Yes and no. No—because the military commissar is associated with the Army only through the fact that he

drafts [young men] into its ranks and receives Soviet Army servicemen's mothers, brides, and relatives.

Of course, Yanis Duda cannot be responsible for the disorder inside the fence of that specific military unit or for the pre-perestroyka period placards that adorn the unit's main thoroughfare.

But, as creators of the video short subject, we were pursuing another goal. The military unit shown is visually similar to hundreds of other military units. Therefore, in our material, it only personified the Army that Commissar Yanis Duda was assessing.

In this short subject, as creators, we were attempting to only approximate the reality into which Voenkomats [Military Commissariats] draft young men.

We think that a discussion can unfold on the pages of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH not only with regard to the protest of Military Commissar Yanis Duda and the video short subject creator's answer but also peoples' opinions on what they associate the words "Soviet Army" with.

Lt Gen Zakharov Of Turkestan MD On Local Nationality Draftees

90UM0411A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
4 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent L. Savelyev on conversation with A.I. Zakharov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan Military District, regarding nationality questions in the military: "The Army Is Maintaining Its Positions"]

[Text] "The army is maintaining its positions," said A.I. Zakharov, head of the Political Directorate of the Turkmen Military District, to Tashkent journalists upon his return from the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The first question asked by the correspondents was completely understandable.

"Your impressions about the Plenum?"

"This was probably the first time during the five year plan that I heard such kind words about the army!"

Yes, the epoch of complements about our "invincible and legendary army" has been replaced by a time of stricter evaluations of its activity. Stricter, but not always fair.

The warming of relations with NATO member states has given rise to conversations which almost claim that our country does not need the army. However, the military-political situation which is developing along unpredictable paths in the countries of Eastern Europe requires a different approach to the question of our army's combat preparedness. We are hearing calls to reexamine the question of borders from that quarter.

Antimilitary sentiments not only exist but they are making themselves known in more obvious ways. Last year in Uzbekistan hundreds of people evaded military service. The qualitative component of the new recruits is not that high either. Ten percent of those serving in the troops of the military district have a criminal record. If you remember the age of the soldiers, the crimes did not take place very long ago. 60-70 percent of the young men are physically weak and are not able to satisfactorily complete exercises on the gymnastics equipment.

36 percent came into the army out of the PTU [Polytechnical School]. That would seem to be an excellent thing. The men have already had work experience. But according to sociological research, 85 percent of those queried indicated that the PTU was the place where they were introduced to the system whereby new recruits are subjected to cruel hazing. And 40 percent identified this phenomenon with the word "cruelty."

At times the helplessness of the commanders and political workers hinders attempts to block this cruelty which has been introduced into the military collectives.

In addition to compulsory military service becoming unpopular, the profession of a military officer has become unpopular as well. Competition to enter the military institutes has decreased by 7-8 times and there is a significant drop out rate from all the courses. Many of those who do finish the institutes immediately submit a request for a discharge from the army. In this way, it turns out that a number of the country's military institutes are not producing results. Military psychologists, sociologists and lawyers in the individual units could help to correct the matter. However, it is useless to search for these occupations in the staffing lists. To all of these troubles is added the dissatisfaction of the officers with social-welfare conditions. Thousand of officers' families do not have a place to call home.

This statistic is not encouraging. Nonetheless, as General Lieutenant Zakharov said, the army is maintaining its positions. It has been entrusted with the defense of the achievements of October and it is carrying out its duty before the people.

In one way or another the correspondents, in touching upon the subject of the military, linked it with the decisions of the February Plenum. Changes in the organizational structure of the party were stipulated in the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress. The question of whether the party-political structure of the Armed Forces would change was of interest to this PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent. After all, that would be nonsense. Let's say the regiment's electoral party committee is subordinate to the appointed deputy commander for political affairs!

The Military Council member said that questions of party-political leadership in the Armed Forces were analyzed in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and

that it was decided to leave everything as it is. The Chief of the Political Directorate did not give a clear explanation of that.

It was interesting to learn that communists in the military for the first time will elect their delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress at okrug party conferences and not at plenums of territorial party organizations.

By the way, about territories. More than any other subject, letters are written to the minister of defense from Uzbekistan and Armenia demanding that young men from the native population be given the opportunity to serve within the territory of their own republics. The minister of defense has allowed one-fifth of the draftees to serve in their own okrugs.

The opportunity exists to send delegations of fellow countrymen to those who serve far away from their home land. As reported by A.Ya. Rubeko, chief of the political department of the republic military registration and enlistment office, party and soviet organs from the oblasts of Uzbekistan have established direct contacts with military units of all okrugs. For example, Karakalpakiya maintains contact with soldiers of the Volga-Ural military district, the Andizhan oblast with the Leningrad military district, the Bukhara oblast with the Carpathian military district, the Kashkadarya oblast with the Transbaykal military district.

The Namangan oblispolkom spent 12 thousand rubles to send their delegates to their countrymen in the Kiev military district.

Another interesting detail. In the Turkestan military district there are 615 Uzbek officers. True, there are only 186 serving with the troops. The rest are in the military registration and enlistment offices, the civil defense headquarters and in the DOSAAF committees. Three Uzbeks wear the uniform of general.

Space flights are in store for one senior lieutenant.

So we will see his portraits in newspaper columns. However, during the days of the election campaign there were a lot of people wearing military epaulets looking down from photographs in the newspapers.

Of course, it is much more pleasant to write essays on military subjects. But I would like the military to view criticism correctly, without taking offense and to take mandatory measures in response.

Especially since the chief of the political directorate is still reprimanding newspaper reporters from Tashkent for their publications during the summer about attempts by bandits to get their hands on weapons at the Tashkent military prison and in one military unit of the Tashkent garrison. In both cases the lack of vigilance on the part of guards turned into a drama.

We did not get by without reproach that time either. It was as if we were writing about some kind of trivial matter.

Of course, there were far more frightening facts when weapons and ammunition were stolen. We read about that in PRAVDA.

Today articles on military subjects are appearing which earlier probably would not have seen the light of day. Earlier only the heading, "This Is How Our Countrymen Serve," was tested.

Now it is constantly present in newspaper columns, television screens and on the radio. Because, as a rule they serve as a true warrior should.

The Army today not only needs the bayonet but also the pen on an equal footing. In this sense Tashkent journalists also are in the ranks of the military.

Baltic Fleet's Adm Ivanov Interviewed on Lithuania

90UM0514A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian No 13, 26 Mar-1 Apr 90 pp 2-3

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy and Red Banner Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Vitaliy Pavlovich Ivanov by SOVETSKIY PATRIOT Commentator Yu. Grachev: "From Nationalism to Treason Is One Step"]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy and Red Banner Baltic Fleet Commander Admiral Vitaliy Pavlovich Ivanov answers SOVETSKIY PATRIOT's questions.

The arrogance of the latter-day "rulers" of Lithuania does not know any limits. Recently, the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium announced the cessation of the authority of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in violation of the country's existing laws. The President of the USSR's Decree "On Additional Measures to Guarantee the Rights of Soviet Citizens and to Safeguard the Sovereignty of the USSR on the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR" is being sabotaged.

The illegal actions of the Sajudis leaders are akin to the activities of the leaders of the pro-Fascist regimes who, following Hitler's example during the 1930's, whipped up nationalism by infringing [on the rights] of national minorities.

In the words of a Sajudis leader, they are fighting for legitimacy and for compliance with the Constitution but at the same time they are grossly violating the right of the Lithuanian people to express their will.

The conversation with Admiral V.P. Ivanov sheds light on the real state of affairs of the Baltic Republics.

[Grachev] Vitaliy Pavlovich! You have commanded the Baltic Fleet since December 1985. During that time, you have not only studied the maritime theater well but have you also certainly studied life of the Baltic Republics?

[Ivanov] I have had the opportunity to see a lot during my many years of service. And I must say that each people has its own distinctive traits. But industriousness and a love for one's native kray are inherent to all. This

is also characteristic of the population of the Baltic Region. Kind and hospitable people live here. National wealth and culture have been created through their labor. But this is not to the liking of the leaders of the nationalist movements who are gripped by nostalgia for the bourgeois orders that have faded into the past. The measured rhythm of life has begun to be disrupted by destructive phenomena.

We, the military, are on the front line of the ideological confrontation with the most outspoken forces of extremism who have literally organized a crusade against the Army and Navy in the Baltic Region. These forces are not averse to any means from provocative slogans to armed attacks against military facilities and servicemen. I cannot imagine a greater sacrilege than the episode when a Soviet Army soldier's uniform was burned at a meeting of Sajudis supporters. This, as they say, is an undisguised challenge.

Under the guise of a struggle to restore the sovereignty of Lithuania, the leaders of Sajudis, and more precisely the current leadership of the Republic, are attempting to destroy the union of cooperation and fraternal relations between the Soviet Republics, are causing animosity and mistrust among the Soviet peoples and thus are achieving the elimination of the primary achievements of the Lithuanian people during the years of Soviet rule in the economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres.

[Grachev] Vitaliy Pavlovich, these cases have been written about both in the local and central press. Monuments to V.I. Lenin and to Great Patriotic War heroes have been desecrated in certain cities of the Baltic Republics. Is this having an impact on the erosion of the population's defense consciousness?

[Ivanov] Yes, and it is quite significant. I will refer to specific cases. While enjoying the connivance and the definite assistance of the leaders of local government organs and while speculating on the problems of "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts], Sajudis, the Popular Front, and the League of Women have succeeded in imposing a negative attitude toward service in the Armed Forces of the USSR on the population of the Baltic Republics and thereby placing the next draft under the threat of failure. Here they have also stopped considering evasion of military service and desertion as shameful [acts].

Sometimes it creates the impression that the extremists are actually competing to invent the most subtle techniques to compromise our Armed Forces. Recently, Sajudis youth carried a coffin through the streets of Vilnius into which they had thrown facsimiles of military identification cards. This upset many people, but... no one stopped the latter-day storm troopers. And the local media even relished this shameful case. Thus the outlines of the disgusting face of systems that consist of unrestrained nationalism are beginning to manifest themselves.

The separatist forces are also resorting to other methods. For example, we know that some republics have adopted laws about army service only on the territories of their own regions. The creation of national armed formations has also been proposed. All of these are nothing more than conscious attempts to undermine the foundation of our defense capability and an attempt of the so-called leaders of various national fronts to have on hand an armed force hallowed by "law."

And right now when the 3rd USSR Congress of People's Deputies has repealed the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet decision as legally untenable, Sajudis has called on all Lithuanian men from 19 to 40 years of age to sign up as volunteers to defend the "state."

[Grachev] Comrade Admiral, you touched upon the issue of undermining the foundations of our defense capability. As we all know, our defense capability consists of a multitude of factors. One of them is servicemen's social security. Let us say, if they do not pay a salary to an officer on time, do not provide him with housing, and are not concerned about his family, he will also carry out his duties more poorly. Are you as a people's deputy and commander taking steps?

[Ivanov] I posed the following question from the Congress of People's Deputies rostrum: Why are local authorities in the Baltic Republics not allocating housing to servicemen? At the same time, they are not authorizing the Ministry of Defense to build housing, schools, hospitals, stores, and kindergartens on previously allocated sectors of land. Planned deliveries of building materials have been drastically reduced.

Unfortunately, I have not yet received an answer to my question. And instead of improving living conditions, they are becoming worse. Here is a case. The Bank of Lithuania has ceased issuing money to pay servicemen.

Arbitrariness and illegality with regard to servicemen are reaching the limit. Nationalist fever is reducing the situation to the absurd. All of this is being done under the specious pretext of defending the nation's interests and restructuring social relations. However, behind all of this we can clearly see an attempt to usurp power and to remain aloof in our national apartment. How can we otherwise explain the fact that local authorities in the Riga area have prohibited [issuance of] residence permits to servicemen who have been released to the reserve in two homes that belong to the military department. Because of this, they cannot receive a pension, medical assistance, work, or purchase foodstuffs and prime necessities.

[Grachev] Vitaliy Pavlovich, national egoism is a poor adviser in relations between peoples and more so in state matters. Nevertheless, it is being raised to the level of Baltic Republic policy. As a result, could you not explain the December Resolution of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet "On a Draft Law of the Estonian SSR 'on Immigration'"?

[Ivanov] Its essence is reduced to that same national isolation or, to put it more precisely, to self-isolation for the purpose of preserving "racial exclusiveness." This theory is not new. Its apologists have suffered failure more than once.

Now about this draft [law]. It provides for assigning housing to servicemen and their families on a priority basis for fixed periods—up to three years—that are extended until completion of active military service. Upon its expiration, servicemen and their families must leave the Estonian SSR.

This has turned up very little for us. Then the Republic Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities developed an ESSR Council of Ministers draft resolution about assigning office [space] status to housing allocated to the military departments. This means that a servicemen released to the reserve is deprived of housing he previously occupied and must leave the limits of the Estonian SSR.

Consequently, officers and Navy and Army warrant officers released into the reserves cannot freely select their residence location within the boundaries of the state and that is a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and our constitutional right to housing.

[Grachev] Vitaliy Pavlovich, you and I are standing in the Coat of Arms Hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The Coats of Arms of the 15 union republics look down on us from the balustrade. Will all of them remain like they are now in one rank?

[Ivanov] Time will tell. But I am certain that we will arrive at a new democratic union federation. The consolidation of our central power is the guarantee of it. I understand what a great burden and an enormous responsibility to the Soviet peoples and to the entire world Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has accepted and I know that he will be true to his Oath and will do everything to fulfill his obligations as President of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, they are deliberately impeding the perestroika process. This first of all applies to the separatists. They are driving a wedge and attempting to destroy the union of cooperation and brotherhood between the Soviet Republics. For example, under the guise of the struggle to restore sovereignty in Lithuania, the leaders of Sajudis are sowing animosity and mistrust between peoples.

Having posed the question to whose advantage it is for Lithuania to secede from the Soviet Union, let us honestly and openly answer it. I talked about this from the rostrum of the 3rd Congress and I am repeating right now that this is advantageous first of all to the political extremists who thirst for and have already broken through to Party and State power. But in no way to the Lithuanian people. And here political egoism stands in all its magnitude for which nationalism and extremist ambitions became the culture medium and which led to

Sajudis betraying the interests of its own people. This is the betrayal of the living and dead defenders of Soviet Lithuania.

The separatists have inflicted a blow to the Soviet people's back and this is a blow against economic and political reforms in our country, against the fates of hundreds of thousands of people, and a blow against the defense capability of the USSR.

But we, the soldiers of the Army and Navy, want to say once again that we are the flesh of the people's flesh and will always be with them and we will firmly defend their security and will increase our combat readiness.

This perhaps gives me the right not to doubt that the Coats of Arms of the Soviet Republics that have been cut into the granite on the balustrade of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, speaking in military language, will remain in a single formation.

It is noteworthy that we are ending our conversation about the friendship of peoples under the canopy of the Coat of Arms Hall.

Political Workers' Role, Responsibilities Examined

90UM0489A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 5, Mar 90
(Signed to press 22 Feb 90) pp 20-21

[Article by Captain A. Taranov, entitled: "On the Role and the Place of the Political Worker".]

[Text] We are witnesses as to how, after a change in the constitutional article on the leading role of the Party, in a number of fraternal countries the activity of the political organs was legally abolished (in the armies of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

The development of the political situation in our country, just like the attitude toward the political organs on the part of several People's Deputies and by members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, leaves no doubt that the debate on this problem will not escape us, the citizens of the USSR.

But are the sides ready for a constructive, serious talk? I do not think so. In my view, we ourselves should first analyze from all sides the present-day status of party-political work, objectively evaluate its compliance or noncompliance with the demands for today and tomorrow. It is important that all these questions be quietly examined, without emotions, in a totally balanced manner.

And now briefly on my arguments on the benefits of preserving the institution of the political worker in the army and the navy.

The first argument. In the conscience of the majority of Soviet people, the commissars and political instructors are associated with the bravery and heroism of millions

of simple soldiers, who stood up for the independence of the Homeland, with Victory... A denial of the enormous positive role which they played in the defense of the sovereignty of the USSR is simply immoral.

The second argument. Party-political work, in my opinion, has not lost its importance today, even though it does not completely correspond to the requirements of perestroika. In the meantime, one thing is for sure: the center of political-education work is situated in the company; the main personality is the political worker. But what about in real life? How independent is the political worker in solving the tasks of political training, soldier education, and the organization of political work in the subunit by himself? How binding are recommendations, directives, and instructions by higher political workers and political organs, if they do not mesh with real life, do not correspond with the situation? Examples? A few can be presented. But to facilitate understanding and not raise any superfluous questions, open any directive issued from a higher organ, and read it carefully. I am sure you will find a mass of completely unnecessary things. Take the directive on socialist competition. As it seems to me (derived from V. I. Lenin's interpretations), that competition is the creativity of the masses; it is movement from the bottom up. But in life directives are from the top down. Catch the difference? And what about complex arithmetic formulae to determine the results? In daily life these formulae are no good to anyone, but on the other hand... they "are followed".

What am I after? First of all, [that] they untie my hands, not interfere in the fulfillment of my duties and that the evaluation of my work should be made by people among whom I live and for whom I fulfill my duties.

How would I accomplish this concretely? First, it is important to preserve the educational priority of the political worker who works directly with the people. [It is necessary] To create thereby the proper legal, social, and material guarantees, to develop and carry out the new Statute on Political Organs in the Army and Navy, based on proposals by the troops. Second, [it is necessary] to place full responsibility for the organization of political work on the political organs and political workers, including political training, obliging commanders at all levels to lend them assistance and participate in resolving these questions. Third, cadre politics should be decisively changed, beginning with the training of political workers in military educational institutions, where only temporary duty personnel [draftees] are accepted, as well as warrant officers and officers upon the recommendation of party organizations as directed by the political organs. To fail to appoint or to dismiss political workers without approval from the unit's Officer Assembly or its council. Fourth, to hold an Army-wide Conference of subunit, unit, and shipboard political workers for the purpose of working out a political action program under the conditions of perestroika.

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Increasing Success of Military Officers in Local Elections*90UM0421B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 4*

[Article by Col B. Karpov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Captain Leaves...For the Mayor's Office"]

[Text] This event occurred several days ago, at the first session of the people's deputies from the new sitting of the city soviet in Spassk-Dalniy in the Maritime Kray. The communist, Capt Aleksandr Nikolayevich Krikun was elected the chairman of the city executive committee by a predominant majority of the people's deputies. Aleksandr Nikolayevich—and he is not yet 30 years old—is a graduate from the Lvov Higher Military Political School. He has served in remote garrisons. Probably for this reason his election platform which was comprehensible, precise and realistic was supported by the voters. Even among the deputies Capt Krikun was elected to the organizational committee for preparing and holding the first session of the city soviet, and during this he was proposed for the list of candidates for the post of city executive committee chairman by a worker deputy.

"I will not conceal that such a turn of events was the most complete surprise for me," said Aleksandr Nikolayevich. "But, as they say, if duty calls you must be ready. For me, this meant going into the reserves. I had already prepared a request. But at the end of my deputy term, I requested a return to the ranks. Particularly as such situations are provided for in the Law Governing the Status of People's Deputies..."

The past rounds of elections to the Russian republic parliament and to the local soviets in the Far East show the high trust in deputies wearing shoulderboards. Suffice it to say that mandates as RSFSR people's deputies were received by Lt Gens A. Voronin and M. Barybin, Vice Adm B. Pekedon, Lt Col A. Konenkov and Capt 2d Rank Ye. Alayev. For example, 20 serviceman deputies were elected to the Khabarovsk Kray Soviet. And the elections are not yet over.

"How can one explain such trust in the deputies in uniform?" I asked the military council member, the Chief of the District Political Directorate, Lt Gen A. Voronin.

"The electing of the political worker, Capt Aleksandr Krikun as the chairman of the executive committee is not an ordinary event. But it reflected, in my opinion, a respectful attitude for the army and for its better representatives. We should point out, incidentally, that during the preelection campaign we more quickly found a common language with the workers and the toilers of the fields and farms than we did with the representatives of the local authorities. But the response of the voters could be seen in how they were "fed up" with the conceit,

presumptuousness and alienation of certain leaders who began to compare the "going to the people" as some feat.

One other detail: the army and navy, as is known, have been subjected to mass defamation in the mass information media. Because certain voters followed the biased opinion, at the elections last year to the nation's parliament a number of Far Easterners voted against the army representatives. But certain elected deputies who were the former rivals of the servicemen, in the words of the same voters, to put it mildly, have not justified and do not justify the hopes of the Far Easterners. I feel that one of the reasons for the current success of the Army and Navy deputies lies in this realization.

Col Gen B. Gromov on Regiment Conditions, Insufficient Personnel*90UM0667A Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 1*

[Article by Maj S. Kobyshev, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondent, under the rubric "Reports and Elections in the Party Organizations": "Always Remember Your Purpose"]

[Text] I do not want to focus attention once more on the fact that both the nation and the Armed Forces are living through perhaps the most difficult time in their history. Nonetheless, that is so. The turbulent development of public life, the reduction of the Armed Forces, the situation of general instability and tension—these and many more things are fully capable of affecting the progression of the life and work of our units and subunits and the mood and attitude toward the affairs of officers and warrant officers. Let us recall just the flare-up of emotions and discussion in connection with the statement by certain deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the need to depoliticize the army and abolish the party organizations in the Armed Forces. It is a known fact that there are among the officers even today those who support these proposals completely and unconditionally. I am confident that they are in the minority, however. The majority—those who, I suggest, are thinking seriously about the future of the army and the nation—are not so categorical in their conclusions. This is primarily because they understand perfectly well that in the situation of the changes taking place, we will always need the institution of officer/political worker, no matter what form or name it acquires following possible transformations.

All of the speakers stressed the fact that the party committee and its secretary must intervene more vigorously in all aspects of the regiment's life, resolutely defend the interests of the rank and file party members and participate directly in everything relating to the service and life of the officers and warrant officers and to the combat and political training of the personnel.

The situation in the regiment today is indeed a difficult one. A certain number of personnel are lacking. In view of this it was not surprising that the first concern of those

speaking at the meeting was how to keep the subunits combat-ready and go through the combat training missions well with the current manning level.

"Today everything hinges on the cadres," Sr Lt Aleksandr Gromovoy, subunit commander, said in his speech, for example.

The unit Communists have many other complaints about the command element with respect to the organization of the combat training. They include deficiencies in the organization of the training due to poor support for the classes and breakdowns in the system for providing subunits going into the field with spare parts and fuel. Finally, there is our ancient problem with planning. "How can we speak of planning," said Capt A. Shander, Sr Lt A. Zuban and Maj V. Peknyy, "when there are all sorts of things superimposed upon and all kinds of disruptions in the plan outlined? We get out of predicaments at a price of frayed nerves, desperate, all-out efforts and sleepless nights. Look at what happened to Capt A. Shander, subunit commander. Just before the inspection, they have "infused" servicemen who have never handled weapons before. What kind of planned combat training can there be, when his subunit has detail on Monday, Wednesday and Friday and then leaves next week for the field, where it is to participate in a tactical and then a demonstration exercise? In addition to all of this, the subunit is short of officers. But whom do they blame? The officer. When you consider all of this, you conclude that the senior OICs, who are aware of the situation, are exasperated at their own helplessness. At their inability to help their subordinates, to alleviate their service conditions, and their lives as well.

The army today sometimes performs jobs not its own. And this requires both manpower and resources. Clearly, all of this does not make life easier for the subunits. Nor can we ignore the fact that the general climate of ill-will surrounding the army also worsens the status, the service and the life of the officer and warrant officer. The following cases were cited at the meeting, for example. A deputy battalion commander, an "Afghaner," as we like to call them today, roamed around for six months before he found an apartment. A deputy for political affairs and a deputy for technical affairs who have given 18 and 19 years to the service respectively are presently without apartments. A lack of housing has kept a platoon commander from bringing his family to where he is stationed for five (!) years. There is nowhere to put them. All of these officers are from the same battalion. I have spoken with officers who have been waiting seven years or more for housing. And when we add to this the notorious "every other day on detail," we can understand how the people have to feel.

The party committee and its secretary are at the fore here. I have to admit that it has been a long time since I have heard so many kind words about a secretary of a party organization, so many flattering appraisals of his performance as I heard at that meeting. And this came out of the unanimous opinion that the party committee

and its secretary, Maj V. Sorokin, are just the kind of combination of people who can actively influence the life of the unit. First of all, the moral and mental climate in it. This was fully demonstrated at the report-and-elections meeting.

"We must leave this meeting unanimous and as one in action," said Vladimir Dmitriyevich in conclusion. "We have many difficulties and many problems. We are not limiting ourselves to them, however. Even modest praise of the people and their work inspires us to take on new jobs. This is why the regiment Communists are prepared to accomplish the tasks facing them."

Yes, the regiment does indeed have many problems. Including problems with the combat training (that has already been discussed) and discipline. New problems accompanied the arrival of a unit detailed from the Southern Group of Forces. There is concern about the forthcoming inspection and about the arrival of new replenishments. What will they be like. There are concerns of an entirely different kind, though. They were discussed with bitterness and even pain at the meeting. Applications are being submitted, and officers are leaving the army—both young ones who have only begun their service and meritorious officers who traveled the fiery roads of Afghanistan. There are also examples of something else. Sr Lt V. Lutsenko, who ran as an advocate of the Rukh in the preelection campaign, serves in the regiment. Lutsenko is no longer a member of the CPSU, but his case permits us to say that the party committee and its secretary are not finishing the job. Their words and appeals are apparently not getting through to the hearts and minds of the rank and file Communists. One's attention was also struck by the fact that there was not a single NCO and not a single common soldier in the auditorium. One would not like to think that none of the first-term servicemen want to join the party. Most likely, this is one more, not yet exploited area of work for the party activists.

In general, though, the unit collective appeared to me to be a healthy, vital organism, and I am convinced that it will be able to deal with its difficulties.

Hero of the Soviet Union Col Gen B.V. Gromov, commander of the Kiev Military District, addressed the meeting.

Col Gen G.V. Gromov briefly described the public-political situation. Among other things, he said the following:

"The district military council notes with satisfaction that the situation in the regiment is gradually improving. This is reflected primarily in the attitude of the officers toward the service. And this attitude must involve firmly grasping the fact that our purpose is to defend the homeland and be prepared for combat. There is much that is good here, but let us be frank and say that there is

also much which is bad. You say that the party committee must engage in ideological indoctrination. That is true. It must. But why, in that case, are your officers leaving?

"Can there be a party committee isolated from the combat training today? It seems to me that we do not need such a party committee. I believe that a party committee is justified in bringing up matters of combat training only if every member of the party committee has himself mastered the equipment and weapons. "

Col Gen B.V. Gromov then answered questions raised in the speeches. The situation with respect to personnel is indeed a difficult one in many district units. There are simply not enough people. That does not mean that we should halt the training and wait for better times, however. There are always reserves for improving the combat skills. In any case the combat training process should not be disrupted, no matter how difficult things are.

Housing is the biggest problem today, of course. And it is very acute also for the regimental officers. More than 100 of them need better housing, and there are 14 on the waiting list for apartments. The problem will obviously not be resolved with the two buildings under construction at the garrison. The only way out of the situation seems to be that of getting local authorities to allocate the required number of apartments and to cancel the debt. The district commander directed this appeal to Aleksandr Nikolayevich Belichenko, first secretary of the city party committee, who was present at the meeting. It is too bad that those assembled did not hear his opinion on the matter.

Military Delegates to Party Congress Interviewed

90UM0667B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Jun 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview under the rubric "Blitz-Interview": The Congress Delegates Speak"]

[Text] What do you expect from the party congress? What will you say from the speaker's platform if you have the opportunity?

Col Gen N. Kizyun, chief of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin:

I go to the congress with a large package of mandates given me at a conference by Communists of the academy and the military institute. I also have suggestions of my own coming out of my years as a member of the party. In my opinion, the proposed replacement of the existing Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee with the same kind of governing apparatus but with a different name, the Presidium, is just a formal and cosmetic act.

Experience has shown that CPSU congresses and Central Committee plenums should be convened more frequently, increasing in them, incidentally, not the number of chiefs but the number of workers, peasants, engineers

and technicians. I am not afraid of appearing out of date when I say that both these and other suggestions I plan to submit from the speaker's platform at the congress are based on a new reading of the works of V.I. Lenin. If we succeed in renewing his precepts, we shall strengthen the people's trust.

Col A. Komogortsev, candidate of history:

I suggest that the congress should approve a scientifically based program for getting the nation out of the social and economic crisis, one which conforms to the basic interests of the workers.

I suffer with all my heart for the party's prestige. Decisions adopted at the last congress, which stated that the nation is on the verge of a crisis and outlined measures to combat the negative developments, have not been implemented. Why? It is important to get to the bottom of this and provide an honest and well reasoned answer.

A scientifically based strategic and tactics must be worked out for the party at the congress. We must decide where we, the avant-garde party, are leading the people. Into the 19th century with its exploitation and competition or into the 21st century, to which we need to take everything good and progressive which we now have and add to it the best experience of other nations. The party must also support the military reform, which is based mainly on protection of the servicemen.

Lt Col N. Satybaldiyev, secretary of a party commission of a formation political section:

I believe that the congress will be unusual with respect to the scope and the importance of the matters it will decide. I believe that it will arrive at an understanding of the situation in which the party finds itself and thoroughly study the causes of shortcomings and significant miscalculations.

There is talk today about how the party should deal only with its own internal affairs and leave the economy and social policy alone. These are empty words. This will not enhance its prestige. It would more likely lead to the party's elimination. I want it always to keep its eye on the aspirations of the working people. This means both matters of the economy and that market toward which we are being so forcefully nudged today.

If I have the opportunity to speak, I shall talk about the need to reform the Armed Forces and our entire military policy. And, of course, I shall bring up problems pertaining to the removal of our forces from Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, one has the impression that neither the government nor the CPSU Central Committee is dealing seriously with them. As a result, the families of officers and warrant officers returning to the homeland live in poverty, lack housing and suffer various kinds of deprivations.

Col V. Kondratov, doctor of technical sciences:

I expect from the party congress an open discussion and the development of a platform combining everything honorable and wholesome in the party which consolidates the society. I am against factionalism, which is admissible only during a period of change in the party's theoretical and organizational basis.

My heart hurts for the homeland. I wonder why I was elected a delegate.

Our department is jokingly called a "polyclinic, a reference to the fact that all of our instructors are candidates of sciences, one is a doctor and two are about to become

doctors. By this I want to say that we spare no effort in our work. And our nation is engaged in endless discussion, from the Supreme Soviet down to the student auditoriums. The economy is losing its already weak positions, which is having a negative effect also upon the Armed Forces.

If I had the opportunity to speak at the congress, I would ask whether Lenin's doctrine on the defense of the homeland is still important or has it been relegated to the scrap heap of history. And does the nation need us military men?

Lt Gen Klimov on Effective Management for Military Economy*90UM0417A Moscow KOMMUNIST**VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 90
pp 57-62*

[Article by Lt Gen A. Klimov: "Conducting Business Legally and Effectively"]

[Text] About the author: Aleksey Tikhonovich Klimov graduated from military academies of rear services and transport in 1971 and from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in 1980. He served as army deputy commander for rear services, as Northern Group of Forces deputy commander for rear services and as Leningrad Military District deputy troop commander for rear services; he subsequently served as deputy chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services. Since September 1989 he has been the chief of staff of the USSR Armed Forces Rear Services.

And so, we will be talking about unit administrative and support services and facilities. What are they, and what are their content? Unfortunately some officers, especially the young ones, have a very narrow understanding of this term. They often interpret it to mean only "support facilities *per se*"—mess halls, baths, warehouses and so on. However, unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities are a broader concept in military units (aboard ships) and formations. This concept is based on administrative, technical and medical facilities, as well as on the training and material base supporting combat and political training.

When we discuss unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities, we cannot fail to mention the standards which determine the principles of their organization and management, or the responsibilities of officials concerned with planning administrative activities and monitoring them. Let me note that there are many documents pertaining to this area. For that reason I would like to list the principal ones. They are the Interior Service Regulations, Navy Regulations, the Statute on Unit (Ship) Administrative and Support Services and Facilities of the USSR Armed Forces, the Statute on the Quarters and Utilities Service and Quarters and Utilities Supply in the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Statute on Financial Services of the Military Unit and others.

It would not of course be difficult to lose oneself in the abundance of these documents. Nonetheless officials managing unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities have to know them from A to Z. Otherwise we can't count on their effective and competent management.

This is especially important if we consider that unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities exist primarily in behalf of maintaining the constant combat readiness of formations, units (ships) and subunits, ensuring normal life of the troops (naval forces)

and the life of military collectives strictly according to regulations, and creating the appropriate conditions for their swift transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture. Hence it is clear that these complex and multifaceted objectives primarily require timely and comprehensive satisfaction of the continually growing—that should be emphasized specially—material, personal and spiritual needs of the personnel, and with preserving and improving their health.

Another pertinent question would be this: What is the legal basis for the activities of the officials of military units (ships) and subunits responsible for organizing and managing unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities? It seems to me that in our answer we should primarily keep in mind that the state of these services and facilities predetermines the combat readiness and fighting capability of the troops (naval forces) to a significant degree. It is precisely for this reason that their management is assigned to the unit (ship) commander.

Let's look at the draft Interior Service Regulations. They state (Chapter 3, Article 70): "The regiment (1st rank ship) is the principal tactical and administrative unit of the USSR Armed Forces. In peacetime and in wartime the regiment (1st rank ship) commander bears full responsibility: for the combat and mobilizational readiness of the regiment (ship); for the organization and conduct of alert duty and successful fulfillment of other combat missions by the regiment (ship); for the combat and political training, indoctrination, military discipline and political morale of the personnel; for interior order; for the state and safeguarding of armament, equipment, ammunition, fuel and other military property belonging to the regiment (ship), and for technical, material, medical, trade, personal and financial support to the regiment (ship)."

What does this imply? That the commander must constantly know and strictly monitor the availability of everything necessary in the unit (ship), verify the lawfulness and correctness of expenditure of material and financial resources allocated to it, take the appropriate steps to maintain armament, equipment, quarters, barracks and other structures and facilities assigned to it in serviceable condition, and conduct all administrative and economic work effectively and, what is of some importance from my point of view, competently in legal respects.

There is something else that is clear from this as well: It can be said without exaggeration that these are highly complex problems of enormous volume, and they are not within the means of the commander alone, no matter how competent he may be. There is good reason why the Interior Service Regulations also specify the responsibilities of other unit (ship) officials in regard to this direction of work, and define their responsibility for its status and the lawfulness with which it is carried out. It states the following on this account. All unit (ship)

officials bear direct responsibility for storing, maintaining in combat ready state and conducting repairs and maintenance (preventive and current) on equipment and armament, organizing its proper operation, and organizing the motor pool service and maintenance of motor pools, the security and fire safety of technical and other facilities, and comprehensive (within the law) material and financial support to the measures that are implemented.

I would like to emphasize the following thought in this regard. The administrative and economic work of every unit (ship) official must be planned and organized in the most meticulous fashion. Much depends here as well on the commander of the particular unit (ship), on his deputies, on the chiefs of the corresponding services, and on the staff as a whole. Their responsibility includes determining the need for material and financial resources, assigning specific tasks to specific executors, maintaining clear coordination between them, and strictly monitoring fulfillment of plans (including effective and lawful expenditure of allocated resources).

It stands to reason that party and Komsomol organizations cannot remain on the sidelines of this work. Active party and Komsomol members, every communist and every Komsomol member are called upon not only to explain the importance of the missions to fellow servicemen but also mobilize them through personal example to attain a high end result in carrying out the plans. It is important in this case to orient oneself not on gross, quantitative indicators but on quality, on economy—in other words, on effectiveness.

Here as well the problem of comprehensively supporting measures associated with maintaining the unit (ship) in constant combat readiness rises to its full height. I am referring to timely creation of the prescribed stockpiles of the appropriate material resources in every unit (ship). This is what the administrative bodies of the rear and other services are required to do. However, the depth of the task is not exhausted by just the creation of such stockpiles. The main thing in my opinion is to reliably safeguard everything, to protect it from spoilage and misappropriation, to use all materiel appropriately. It would also be suitable to show some concern for the possibilities for transferring the created reserves to any region to which necessity requires the unit to go. And these reserves must be ready for immediate issue at the new location to arriving subunits.

Another no less important task carried out within the framework of unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities is comprehensive and uninterrupted support of the combat, political and special training of unit (ship) personnel. The units (ships) possess the appropriate training material and equipment base for this purpose. As a rule this base is tailored to the specific training required by the personnel. Its orientation is determined chiefly by the tactical, special, technical, fire, physical, drill and other forms of troop combat training. Hence logically follows the assortment

of the materiel and equipment with which the training base is supplied. It is the task of unit (ship) commanders, their deputies and staffs to organize competent, highly effective and economical use of this training base in every specific case, and to show thoughtful concern for constantly strengthening and improving it, and promptly repairing and renewing it.

The necessary financial and material resources are allocated to the units (ships) for this purpose. These resources must be expended wisely, carefully. We would very much hope that the times of thoughtless actions have faded irreversibly into the past. And every ruble we spend of the people's money must be accounted for in accordance with the law. This is why it is important for every unit (ship) commander and his deputy and staff to learn to integrally plan the economic affairs of all facilities of the personnel training base, and ensure unfailing implementation of these plans.

I should note that this pertains not just to facilities of the training base alone. All elements of unit administrative and support services and facilities require maintenance in serviceable condition, prompt repair, and constant improvement and renewal. Here again the appropriate officials have to be assigned to them. Because such facilities cannot be "nobody's." Otherwise they would inevitably become unusable prematurely, they would be pilfered, and they would be used by certain morally indecent persons for their own interests. There are firm rules pertaining to this, documented in the Equipment and Property Accounting Manual. These rules must be followed unfailingly by officials responsible for monitoring the safeguarding of every element of administrative and support services and facilities and for the lawfulness and correctness of their use, for raising their effectiveness in the course of personnel training, and for attaining end results of high quality.

Thus the personnel combat and political training measures of units (ships) require especially clear planning. This makes it possible to utilize available resources in the principal directions of troop training, to exclude redundancy of training subjects and exercises, to consequently make more effective, sensible use of financial and material resources, and to achieve higher quality at lower outlays. Let me cite an example. While for example just a year or two ago 36 tons of fuel were expended in the Central Group of Forces for just a single exercise conducted by units of a tank formation, following more precise determination of the goals and objectives of such exercises, and more careful preparation of each problem, including introduction of the use of trainers, this figure decreased by almost a factor of two. Moreover not only did the quality with which the programs of such exercises are carried out not suffer: It even made a forward stride.

The one disappointing thing is that for the moment such examples are few in number. Questions concerned with economizing resources when organizing combat and political training are often beyond the attention of unit

and rear service commanders. Thus on the eve of a tactical exercise in a certain formation of the Far Eastern Military District, the units and subunits received an order determining, among other things, the types and quantity of armament and equipment to be brought to the field. A spot check of the assignment's completion revealed that certain commanders unjustifiably inflated this number in a desire to ensure themselves against all possibilities. Such waste is typical of a large number of units in other military districts as well.

We are also aware of cases of improper requisitioning of materiel for combat and political training needs, incomplete crediting of property obtained from supply organs, and concealment of such property at storage sites. This is despite the fact that all materiel supplied to the units (ships) and all buildings, structures and land assigned to them are state property subject to mandatory accounting and lawful use. Understandably we can't condone such cases. Persons allowing such things to happen must be punished with the full severity of the law.

An important place is also reserved in the great complex of tasks carried out by unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities for comprehensive and complete support of the daily life and activities of the units (ships) and for organization of the life of the personnel in each of them, strictly in accordance with the regulations. We know that the necessary moral, political and fighting qualities are imparted to soldiers primarily with the assistance of various forms of training and indoctrination. But in many ways the moods, feelings and thoughts of the personnel depend on the completeness with which their diverse physiological and spiritual needs are satisfied—for rest, food, medical, trade, personal and financial support, clothing and footwear, and organized leisure time. And the absence of just one or several of these conditions creates a sense of discomfort, of something lacking, of incompleteness in the servicemen, which directly influences their attitude toward their official responsibilities, and in the final analysis, combat readiness and discipline.

This is why unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities have to have a lot of things in order to carry out their tasks: the necessary barracks, quarters and communal structures, mess halls and field kitchens (galleys, petty officers' messes), bakeries, personal service centers, baths and laundries, medical institutions, trade and consumer service enterprises, clubs, officers' clubs, libraries, gymnasiums (athletic fields), and other social, cultural and personal service facilities. Their purposeful management has the objective of ensuring effective operation of these facilities, their timely repair and improvement, and when necessary, construction of new facilities.

Unit (ship) deputy commanders (senior watch officers) for rear services are the immediate organizers of these tasks (in correspondence with existing statutes). Their responsibilities are broad and multifaceted. The responsibilities of deputy commanders for rear services include

organizing—personally or by way of the chiefs of subordinated services—uninterrupted support of the personnel with all forms of supply. Moreover this must be done on schedule and with high quality.

I think that we need to recall in this connection that instructions of unit (ship) deputy commanders (senior watch officers) for rear services concerning the general problems of planning administrative activities, bringing up materiel, providing medical and housing maintenance support, fire protection, and maintenance of the natural environment are binding upon all subunit chiefs of services and commanders. At the same time, as required by the manuals, regulations and other guidelines, commanders and superiors of all the ranks must maintain a constant awareness of the supply level in the units (ships) and subunits entrusted to them, show concern for the quality of food, for material and personal support and for the health of the personnel, monitor maintenance of exemplary appearance and bearing by servicemen, and inspect the administrative activities of subordinates. What this means ultimately is that practically every commander and superior makes his particular contribution to the work of unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities.

As I already mentioned above, clear planning and no less clear organization of the functions of unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities by the unit (ship) commander and his deputies and staff are a reliable foundation for effective management. Daily experience tells us this is so. Good results have been achieved, for example, in the unit in which Officer L. Marchenko is the deputy commander for rear services. Exemplary company administrative and support services and facilities have been created in every subunit. The barracks, mess hall, supply depots and other facilities are well equipped. Materiel reserves are maintained in a strictly prescribed volume and are promptly rotated. There have been no losses or misappropriations for a long time.

Special attention is devoted in the planning of a unit's administrative activities to maintaining the subunits at constant combat readiness, to their comprehensive and complete support, to creating the best material and personal conditions for the personnel, and to ensuring the most economical and expedient use of material and financial resources. All of this has a favorable effect on combat readiness and military discipline.

Next I would like to dwell on the role and place of company administrative and support services, which are intended for direct support of the combat and political training of the soldiers and for satisfaction of their material, housing and other personal and cultural needs. To begin with, I cannot fail to mention the following characteristic detail: All personnel participate in the work of company administrative and support services and facilities. However, they are directly organized and

managed by company (battery) commanders by way of their deputies, senior technicians, platoon commanders and first sergeants.

It is also important in my opinion to note the following: One unique feature of company administrative and support services is that they represent the end point of the movement of materiel from the state to the specific serviceman. On one hand this presupposes high responsibility on the part of company officials for maintaining organic equipment and armament at constant combat readiness, for safeguarding materiel, and for getting it to the personnel or for using it to satisfy appropriate needs. On the other hand it presupposes no less material and disciplinary responsibility on the part of compulsory-service servicemen as well as reservists called up for periodic training for proper use of allocated resources (and only for their intended purpose).

An example of good results in management of company administrative and support services can be found in the subunit under the command of Officer A. Nazarov. All company facilities are constantly maintained in exemplary condition, and no losses of materiel occur. The personnel have done much to make the barracks a cozy soldiers' home, where after a hard day of military life one can enjoy some cultured rest and restore clothing and footwear.

The sleeping area is subdivided by ornamental partitions into cozy cubicles. Everything is clean, neat and beautiful.

The storeroom is equipped with built-in floor-to-ceiling cabinets. It has become more spacious, and consequently more orderly. It is pleasant to spend time in the break area. This is a place where one can always read recent newspapers and journals, listen to some music, or sit at the chessboard.

All of this makes it possible to relieve the fatigue accumulated during the day, and to restore physical and moral strength.

And what is important is that you will not see any expensive construction materials in the barracks. Ordinary lumber, expendable materials and so on were used.

I would like to say in conclusion that economizing in the great and small, maintaining a careful attitude toward allocated material and financial resources and ensuring their lawful expenditure make up a priority direction in the activities of military personnel. The importance of this should not be forgotten for a single minute. Because implementing economical practices is at the heart of all economic work carried out within the framework of unit (ship) administrative and support services and facilities of the units (ships) and subunits. This is why every commander and superior must plan his economic work and account for its specific results on an annual basis.

I would not be revealing any special secret if I said that keeping equipment and armament serviceable and

improving the professional training of specialists have great significance to economization. It has been calculated for example that a motor vehicle with a faulty fuel feed system consumes 20-30 percent more fuel than a vehicle with a normally operating system. And stopping a leak equal to two drops per second can save over 1.3 tons of gasoline per year. Hitting the target with the first of the three standard shots of an artillery gun firing conventional projectiles can also save a great deal of the people's money. And increasing the time of operation of a tank without medium repairs until the moment of its overhaul results in a savings of over 6,000 rubles.

But obviously these simple truths have not been assimilated by everyone yet. There are units in which administrative activities are still looked down upon by certain officials. For example when they assess the actions of subordinates, many field exercise leaders for some reason fail to consider the sort of materiel that had to be expended in order to attain a particular result. And were they to make the calculations, they might persuade themselves that this result was attained at the price of double and triple the standard expenditure rate. However, I can't seem to recall a case where someone was seriously punished for overconsumption. It must be asserted, unfortunately, that significant reserves for economization remain unutilized in the units (aboard ships) and subunits.

In this connection I would like to lay special emphasis on the role played by various trainers in questions of economy. The troops are now beginning to receive more and more trainers. This creates objective conditions for significant economization of engine life. We know for example that use of trainers in motorized rifle and tank units reduces expenditure of engine life by not less than 30 percent. An even larger impact is achieved in aviation, where the cost of 1 hour in a trainer is seven to nine times less than the cost of an hour-long training flight. Hence it is clear that the possibilities of trainers must be utilized to their full capacity.

Maximally utilizing all known sources of economization and constantly seeking new ones play an important role in economization. Experience shows that such sources are present in every unit (aboard every ship), in every subunit. It is important simply to turn the attention of party and Komsomol organizations and the army and navy public to this. And place the corresponding stimuli into motion. Then the impact will surpass all expectations.

One final thing. In order that we could acquire the necessary information on the state of unit administrative and support services and facilities, unit (ship) and subunit officials must maintain constant control over administrative activities, as is required by the existing statutes. The main tasks here are to inspect the correctness and promptness with which laws and decrees of the USSR government, orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense, his deputies and other officials,

manuals, regulations, guidelines and instructions regulating the organization of unit administrative and support services are carried out, and to provide the necessary assistance in properly managing these services.

Providing comprehensive support to the life and activities of the troops, it is necessary to remember that unit administrative and support services and facilities are an inherent part of the country's entire national economy, which is presently converting to new conditions of operation. This makes it necessary to restructure its work and to find ways to improve the system for supporting the units (ships) and subunits—ways oriented on economization, on lawful use of material and financial resources, on attainment of high end results.

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New Appointment: Lt Gen V. F. Popov

90UM0417B Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 90
p 87

[Article: "Lt Gen Vasilii Fedorovich Popov Appointed Chief of the Main Motor Vehicle Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] Lieutenant-General V. F. Popov was born on 7 January 1931 in the village of Maraza, Marazanskiy (presently Shemakhinskiy) Rayon, Azerbaijan SSR, to the family of a Baku oil field worker. He went to work at a young age. Following his father's death at the front, at an age of 11 years he went to work in a kolkhoz, attending secondary school concurrently. He graduated successfully in 1948 and then worked for a year in the school as the senior Pioneer leader.

In 1949 he entered the Guards Kharkov Tank School. It was there that he was accepted into the CPSU. He began service as an officer in 1952 in the Kiev Military District as tank platoon commander; then he took command of a training platoon. Training in the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport followed after that. Then he served in the Transcaucasian Military District as chief of a unit and formation motor vehicle service. He subsequently served in various positions, up to chief of the district's motor and tractor (motor vehicle) service.

Since 1982 Popov has been working in a Directorate of the Central Motor and Tractor Directorate (as of 1983, the Main Motor Vehicle Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense) as a deputy chief and the first deputy chief of this directorate.

In 1986 he graduated (as a correspondence student) from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov.

Popov is a Russian. The rank of engineer-major general was awarded to him in 1978, and the rank of lieutenant general was awarded in 1983.

Popov has received three orders: the Order of the Red Labor Banner (1979) for successful fulfillment of a government assignment to transport grain and other agricultural products of the 1979 harvest; the Order of the Red Banner (1984) and the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces," 3d Degree (1987) for successfully fulfilling an assignment to render international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan. He has also earned many medals, including foreign ones.

He was married in 1945 in the city of Baku. His wife is Russian, and a teacher by education. There are two sons in the family, both officers of the Soviet Army. The elder graduated from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, he is married, and he has two children. The younger is studying in the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin.

Sketches for a Portrait (Words From Fellow Servicemen)

"Communicative by nature. Hardy."

"Persistent, consistent and principled in his work, displays reasonable initiative and independence."

"Distinguished by high diligence and good organizational capabilities."

From Responses to a KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Questionnaire

[KVS] What is the greatest joy in your life?

[Popov] The birth of my sons—Sergey and Igor.

[KVS] Whom do you take as your model in service?

[Popov] Army General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov. When I was working in the district, when in Afghanistan, and now. Highly demanding of his subordinates, he never diminishes personal worth.

[KVS] What do you value in people most of all?

[Popov] Honesty and courage. These qualities are closely related. When a person's courage fails, he resorts to deceit and begins to look for easy ways out. It is impossible to work with such people.

[KVS] What are your favorite newspapers, journals and books?

[Popov] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, NASH SOVREMENNIK. Books by A. Chekhov, M. Bulgakov, V. Mayakovskiy, S. Yesenin, V. Pikul and V. Rasputin.

[KVS] What would you wish for young officers?

[Popov] That they complete this difficult time of their officer career honorably. They must begin their road in very, very complex conditions. It is important not to break down, not to lose one's way, not to make incorrectable mistakes. And one other thing. To carry on perestroika together with the party, together with the people.

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Military Efficiency Undermined by Field, Construction Work

90UM0402A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 1, Jan 90
pp 37-41

[Article by Maj V. Mukhin, unofficial correspondent: "A Shovel Instead of an Assault Rifle?: Do Soldiers Always Do What They Are Intended For?"]

[Text] There is an abundance of tables, diagrams and graphs in Lieutenant Colonel A. Ivashchenko's office. They reflect the results of the soldiers' combat training in the preceding period. Looking at the straight rows of numbers in the columns labeled "Pledges Adopted" and "Pledges Fulfilled," one unwittingly turns attention to the fact that there was no growth in the combat training quality indicators of some of the subunits.

"The emphasis on quality parameters should also change the approaches to organizing the training process," said Lieutenant Colonel Ivashchenko. "But in reality this requirement is not yet being fully satisfied. As an example over 30 percent of Lieutenant Colonel A. Depuyev's subordinates received satisfactory grades in the examinations, while in the communication battalion in which Major Ye. Smetanin serves this indicator was 76.5 percent."

In their interviews the officers cited various reasons for the situation. They noted that only nine percent of the subunit commanders had become outstanding soldiers, even though one out of every four had adopted the pledge to do so. And after all, these are the people who organize the training process, conduct the lessons and teach the subordinates. And one other thing. The training of the soldiers is sometimes organized in conditions that could hardly be termed close to those of real combat: Concrete-lined foxholes and communication trenches, well-traveled trails at gunnery ranges and tank driving ranges, the same old ways of showing targets. As a result any unplanned scenario input in an inspection not in keeping with the "sterile" conditions has an unfavorable effect as a rule on the assessment of the soldiers' actions.

Here is another urgent problem that was discussed. Each day a certain number of people are pulled away from their lessons in every subunit. Assigned to all kinds of temporary duty, they escort railroad freight and harvest cereal crops, potatoes and vegetables—that is, they do everything but combat training.

"The subunit under my command is supposed to support the training process," said Lieutenant Colonel V. Shimkov. "What does this mean? Supplying equipment and instructors to training on a regular basis. The equipment is available, but when it comes to instructors.... Over 10 percent of the servicemen in the battalion are what we call 'dead souls.' For example warrant officers A. Savitskiy and M. Breyev, who are infantry fighting vehicle driving instructors, were appointed

unofficial inspectors of the garrison's motor vehicle inspection and transferred to temporary duty with the commandant's office. Warrant officers V. Titov and A. Butenko are working as chauffeurs. Junior sergeants S. Proskuryakov and A. Tishechkin, who hold positions as IFV driving instructors, are also serving out of their specialty. One is working with the garrison's procurator, and the other is working in the club. And there are many others like this."

The temporary duty described by Lieutenant Colonel V. Shimkov is only a small part of the problem created by pulling personnel away from the training process. In my work in military collectives I have noticed that a rather large quantity of servicemen are assigned to various housekeeping and other jobs. And another thing. Almost every other order from the command having to do with rear support to the military units foresees the use of personnel currently undergoing combat training. All of these orders are based on corresponding instructions from higher headquarters. And at first glance, the number of personnel pulled away from training in each individual order does in fact seem small. What is it to the unit if a few persons are diverted for example to a construction project, or to prepare the housing for winter, or to take part in the filming of a motion picture? But ultimately the figures are impressive. This is what Officer R. Mustafayev had to say in this regard:

"Last year we had to carry out construction and installation work with an estimated cost twice greater than in 1988. Around a hundred persons were assigned to this, and the same quantity of people were allocated to prepare the barracks, housing and communication facilities for winter operation; plus 66 persons (24 of them being officers and warrant officers) were sent out to harvest cereal crops; plus personnel had to be prepared to harvest potatoes and vegetables, plus.... There were many such pluses. As a result one out of every four privates and NCOs was diverted to construction and housekeeping jobs of one sort or another in the fall-summer period. Is this a little or a lot? If we answer the question in relation to the problems of troop combat training, it's a lot. But if in relation to the volume of the work, it's a little. Let's add it up. What does it mean to assimilate over 700,000 rubles in construction? If we consider that a soldier's labor is unskilled (a soldier assimilates only around 7 rubles per day), then in order to carry out construction and installation work valued at the indicated sum, over 300 persons—that is, almost three times more than are allocated—would have to be kept constantly at construction sites for a period of 9 months. In order that construction would be completed on time, either the labor productivity of the soldiers would have to be increased (which is improbable), or the manpower would have to be regularly supplemented by pulling people away from their training. And this is precisely what we often do in order to deal with difficult situations."

And how much time do staff officers have to spend organizing construction, housekeeping and other work not associated with the daily training of the soldiers? As an example, each day Colonel Ya. Tasoyev spends almost an hour and a half on capital construction matters. Officers R. Mustafayev and A. Depuyev spend a fifth of their work time on such matters. And in the race to meet the plan, it is somehow forgotten that many officers assigned to construction work are specialists with combat qualifications. Diverted from their primary official responsibilities, they become *de facto* shop directors, forwarding agents, job bosses and foremen. Captain V. Yatsenko, the commander of an antitank guided missile battery, has already been serving a long time as the senior officer at a certain facility under construction. I noticed how expertly Major N. Borodinov, chief of the regiment's medical service, uses all kinds of construction terms. I asked him where he picked up such knowledge. It turns out that he had to spend two years building the medical aid station, wasting around 70 percent of his work time each day.

Diversion of soldiers to all kinds of jobs not associated with their training is most often the product of objective circumstances. It is the result of conflicts between all of the various orders and instructions transmitted from above, the existing organization of troop training and service, and the socioeconomic problems, which have now remained unsolved for a long time in our country.

Even simple arithmetic would show that the largest number of soldiers diverted from combat training are used in construction based on the so-called self-help method. What sort of method is this? A short economic dictionary offers this definition: "The self-help method of construction is one of the organizational forms of construction and installation work in which a facility is built through the efforts of the enterprises themselves, without calling in contracting organizations." In our case we are dealing with military units rather than enterprises. It is assumed here that such construction is carried on in the presence of complete material and equipment support. But that's the textbook definition. What is it like in real life?

In real life it means diverting even more soldiers to do all kinds of jobs as compensation for whatever might be lacking. These jobs, many officers noted, are for the most part illegal. Lieutenant Colonel A. Depuyev described the following cases. The regiment needed several I-beams for a trestle on which to install washing equipment in the IFV motor pool. In order to acquire them, 15 soldiers had to work without pay for 20 days at a metallic structures plant. Here's another example. There was an urgent need for concrete at one of the regiment's construction projects. A certain construction and installation organization agreed to sell it. But with the condition that 12 tons of scrap metal would be collected for it. A team had to be hastily formed in the regiment to fulfill the terms of the "merchant."

I had an occasion to watch Officer R. Mustafayev work in his office. The three telephones never stopped ringing; he even managed to answer questions from subordinates coming into his office, and give them instructions. He was scrounging plumbing fixtures from the district's housing maintenance directorate for yet another construction project that was slated to become operational very soon. "How about some tubing? At least give us the tubing! We'll manage with the rest on our own!" He spoke impassioned into the telephone.

Manage on our own? That would mean releasing soldiers from their training once again, and "loaning" them to a "hot" construction project. Once again a crash campaign.

And what position do the political organs and the party and Komsomol organizations occupy in relation to these problems? As we know, party-political work is oriented on support of combat training. This means that concern for good organization of the training process in the subunits, for the quality of troop training, and finally, for fulfillment of adopted socialist pledges is not only the concern of commanders but also a direct concern of political workers and all communists. But what are things like in real life?

At first I was assured in the formation's political section that not a single young soldier was being used in construction and housekeeping jobs. But at the very first construction site I visited I was introduced to some young soldiers who had been called up into the army just a few days previously. They were supposed to be learning how to clean weapons, but instead they were committed to earth-moving work. It was all quite simple: Sergeant V. Doskadesku "borrowed" them from training leader Sergeant S. Babenko to accelerate the construction work. The political officers assured me that there was nothing seditious in the episode I described.

The political section deputy chief explained: "Sometimes it happens that we do assign people to housekeeping jobs, but only after training is finished." How, then, do we interpret a certain order from the formation commander spelling out in black and white the requirement to allocate soldiers from several of the subunits to harvest potatoes and to keep them working from 0800 to 1200 hours—that is, during training time? As it turned out, the political section workers learned of this order at the same time I did, and even so, after it had already been carried out. To some, this might not seem to be a big deal. But from my point of view this incident belies the position of the political section in regard to problems involving diversion of personnel away from their training. Workers of the political organ are of course striving to exert an influence which would upgrade the quality of the daily training of the soldiers. As an example they attend the training lessons themselves, and analyze their effectiveness. Sometimes steps are taken to correct revealed shortcomings on the spot. But these are but partial measures, as they say. How do things stand in general?

Active party members in the battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V. Shimkov expressed their concern to me that no one paid any attention to their appeal to the regiment party committee or to the reports they gave at drill inspections concerning the large numbers of personnel diverted to other jobs. The political section is also aware of these things, but matters are not changing for the better. Nor could the political organ have been ignorant of the fact that soldiers of the communication battalion were working at the city's enterprises to earn bricks for the new checkpoint, since the facility was not foreseen by the capital construction plan. This was done on the initiative of the unit leadership. This is even in light of the fact that over two-thirds of the subunit's graduates finish with mediocre grades. What is the reaction of the battalion's party bureau and the political section workers to this? To be frank, it is unique. I was assured in the political section that the checkpoint was old and that it had to be rebuilt. It was simply something that had to be done. But the problem is that soldiers had to be assigned to the work.

There is one other thing here that needs to be accounted for in my opinion. Illegal construction projects and unplanned housekeeping jobs sometimes lead to a situation where the law is broken and our morality and party ethics are violated. Thus Junior Sergeant D. Ovdeyenko was sent from the communication battalion to the commandant company on temporary duty. He is the son of the director of a large enterprise possessing considerable amounts of construction resources. The company commander had seen Ovdeyenko only a few times, and the soldier never did acquire his driver-mechanic's certificate, even though this was officially supposed to be his specialty. Senior Warrant Officer V. Marin, the subunit's first sergeant, is still puzzled: Wherever Ovdeyenko spent all of his work time, whether it was at home or someplace else, for the entire time that he was officially assigned to the subunit Private A. Cheban picked up his pay for him. The question is this: What sort of hold was this that Ovdeyenko had on the formation's headquarters and administration, in the building of which, according the deputy chief of the political section, all he ever did was diligently scrub toilets? I think that it isn't really all that hard to find the answer.

Here is another question we might ponder: Why did Major L. Kizilov, the secretary of the party bureau of that same communication battalion, take construction material earned by the soldiers to build his own summer home, and use a truck to carry it to the needed place, "forgetting" to pay the financial unit for personal use of an official vehicle? The unit's communists did of course tell the party member that this was contrary to the law. Kizilov was compelled to explain his actions to the construction unit, pay for the use of the motor vehicle, and return the materials to where they came from. But fact remains fact. A party secretary made an attempt to take something which did not belong to him. He was of course punished in the political section. But in what manner, to what degree? He was scolded, and he was told

not to do it again. But shouldn't the active party member have been subjected to the full severity of punishment? And for shortfalls in the combat training of the soldiers as well?

It must be said in all fairness that from time to time the party committee does examine the personal affairs of communists who use soldiers to build personal garages and summer homes. As an example, Lieutenant Colonel V. Lozovskiy, Senior Warrant Officer M. Kizitskiy and other communists had been subjected to party punishment for such actions. But at the same time Lieutenant Colonel N. Fesyun, secretary of the formation's party commission, never could recall in an interview with me a case in which active party members punished a CPSU member for initiating construction of some facility in the unit or repair of a building on his own, unlawfully diverting subordinates to this work. The rule of the stagnant times is still in effect: If you find some reserves, if you are able to get, push through or build something, then you're a good man. And no one will ask the price you had to pay for what you got. Only at an inspection, when it is revealed that the personnel are poorly trained, might you be scolded, but no one will ever blame it on a construction project. But who, if not the party members, are going to put everything back in its place, put an end to the diversion of personnel from the training process, and do everything to raise the quality of the soldiers' combat skills? Concern for combat readiness, after all, is of vital importance to army communists.

I can't help recalling the words of communist executive Colonel Ya. Tasoyev in this regard:

"The situation which is now evolving in the army in connection with assignment of combat subunits to various housekeeping and construction jobs is not in keeping with the spirit of perestroika. It disperses manpower and resources, reduces the effectiveness of combat and political training, and generates numerous negative problems in the social and moral aspect.

"Motorized rifle and tank subunits often do the work of troops intended specifically for such purposes. For example, self-help construction takes away directly from construction subunits; freight escort takes away from special railroad battalions that are supposed to safeguard military freight while en route, and so on. Of course, we are not carrying out such functions because we want to: There is a shortage of resource and manpower in the country. But I feel that we could build, safeguard freight and carry out self-help projects more sensibly.

"For example in order not to pull personnel away from training, perhaps it might make sense to introduce subunits and services into the units which would deal specially with the problems of capital construction and other housekeeping jobs."

Each must do his own thing. Only then can we attain real professionalism in military affairs. Executives of higher staffs apparently understand this. After all, they analyze the quality of combat and political training, propose and

organize measures by which to upgrade it, and publish orders containing reprimands for ineffective use of training time in a particular unit, almost on a monthly basis. But unfortunately, the situation is being rectified too slowly, because in parallel with all of this, superiors write orders requiring the units to organize all sorts of construction projects, work teams and so on. I think that this conflict will disappear only after a fundamental change is made in the principles on the basis of which the life and the activities of the troops are organized, after the army begins to emphasize qualitative parameters not just in words but in deeds.

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Deputy Chief of Finance Directorate on Draft Law on Pensions

90UM0365B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Maj Gen N. Bay, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by Maj I. Ivanyuk, under the rubric "We Discuss the Draft Law of the USSR on Pensions for Servicemen": "Based Both on Work and on Merit"]

[Text] Maj Gen N. Bay, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, comments on letters from readers.

[Ivanyuk] Nikolay Maksimovich, many people would like to know why we need a separate Law on Pensions for Servicemen?

[Bay] I shall begin by mentioning that in addition to the Ministry of Defense, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, the Ministry of Finance, Gosplan, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the USSR helped develop the draft Law on Pensions for Servicemen. It was done by government assignment and in accordance with decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. After all, it involves approximately three million pensioners consisting of first-term and extended-duty servicemen, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, officers, lower-ranking and administrative personnel of internal affairs agencies and their families.

The draft law is now ready. After coordinating it in the USSR Council of Ministers, it was sent to the military districts, republic, kray and oblast military commissariats for discussion in the military collectives and at meetings of pensioners. We are summarizing the proposals received for their discussion by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In general our draft is based on common principles of Soviet pension law.

The terms of the military service and service in internal affairs agencies are defined by the corresponding laws and the military regulations, however. I do not believe it is necessary to prove that this entails certain difficulties

and depravations, sometimes the risking of one's life. Because of this the labor law norms do not apply to the people in uniform.

Naturally, we must have special regulation of the material support and pensions for those who have chosen the military service as a career. In most nations, incidentally, pensions for servicemen and their families are regulated by separate legislative acts.

Or take this example. The law encourages blue- and white-collar workers to work a long time, even after they have reached pension age. This principle is totally unacceptable for the military service, however, which involves enormous physical and mental stress. Experience has shown that the line officer in the army, in the modern aviation or in the fleet is capable of enduring it without detriment to the service or to his health until the age of around 40-50 years.

Due to this and certain other circumstances, the matter of pensions for military cadres and their families was removed from the overall system of pension legislation in our nation in 1926. There are no reasons for changing this in the future.

[Ivanyuk] Upon familiarizing themselves with the draft All-Union Law on Pensions, reserve officers N. Korniyenko, F. Kutorov and V. Nikitin, WO (Res) M. Bykovskiy and others have expressed concern that the "military" pensioners will find themselves with less social protection than civilian pensioners.

[Bay] First of all, let me say that our draft takes into account all of the basic norms for providing pensions for blue- and white-collar workers but is adjusted for the conditions both of the military service and service in internal affairs agencies.

Based on the procedure specified in the draft Law of the USSR on Pensions for Citizens of the USSR for calculating old-age pensions for blue- and white-collar workers and existing pension norms for military personnel, the draft specifies a pension for the latter for serving 25 years in the amount of 55% of their pay and allowances (60% for those retired for reasons of age or illness). The current procedure for designating pensions in the amount of 40% of pay and allowances (45% for those retired for reasons of age or illness) continues in effect for those who have served 20 years. In addition, there is no change in the existing procedure for increasing pensions for each year of service over and above 20 years by 3% (but not to exceed 75% of pay and allowances).

The draft stipulates that the USSR Council of Ministers determines the types and amounts of pay and allowances used for calculating pensions for servicemen and their families.

It is proposed that pensions for line-unit servicemen be increased: by 20 rubles in the case of pensions for length of service amounting to less than 200 rubles per month

(but to no more than 200 rubles). Pensions for length of service not exceeding 120 rubles per month are presently being increased in the same way.

Just as for designating old-age pensions for blue- and white-collar workers, it is planned to increase pensions for length of service for disabled military and war veterans, to provide increases for the care of single pensioners requiring outside help and for disabled family members who are dependents of non-working pensioners who have reached pension age.

[Ivanyuk] Many letters have been received from Great Patriotic War veterans. Former front-line fighters Ye. Kurkin, S. Nazarov, D. Golub and many others comment that the principle of socialist justice is not yet always observed with respect to those who carried a weapon to defend our homeland's independence. Are their pensions going to be increased?

[Bay] This year our nation commemorates the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is our duty today to do everything possible to provide social guarantees for the homeland's defenders.

It is planned to increase pensions for length of service by 25% over the minimum old-age pension established by the Law of the USSR on Pensions for Citizens of the USSR for officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and extended-duty servicemen, lower-ranking and administrative personnel of internal affairs agencies who have served in the active army or in partisan detachments and formations or who took part in combat operations in the fulfillment of their international duty, if they are not disabled war veterans.

The draft law also calls for an increase in pensions for war veterans and for those with service-connected disabilities, including fightingmen/internationalists. Pensions for the disabled in categories I and II will amount to 75% of their pay and allowances or wages, 50% for the disabled in category III. Disability pensions for servicemen who were disabled as a result of a general illness contracted while they were serving are to be based on the same norms as those for blue- and white-collar workers. That is, 55% of pay and allowances or wages for the disabled in categories I and II; 30% for those in category III.

The draft calls for establishing minimum disability pensions based on the minimum wage, with the addition of a number of increments: for dependents and for the care of those who require outside help. It is planned to increase disability pensions for servicemen awarded the titles Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor, those awarded the order of Glory or the Order For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR, all three degrees, and those with honorary titles of the USSR.

[Ivanyuk] Readers V. Gorokhov, L. Ivanchenko and others ask what the draft law provides with respect to

social protection for the families of the homeland's defenders who lost their lives?

[Bay] As we know, some things have already been done in this area in accordance with a decision of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. The draft calls for further improving the financial situation of those families.

Among other things, it is planned to designate pensions for the families of the deceased in the amount of 40% of pay and allowances or earnings for each disabled family member for the families of those killed and 30% for the families of those who died (up to 100% of the total), which is significantly greater than the current norms. Minimum pensions for loss of breadwinner will be established for the families of servicemen as well as for the families of blue- and white-collar workers, calculated for each disabled family member and based on the minimum wage.

Overall, these steps will make it possible to increase pensions for the families of servicemen who have died or been killed by 30-40%.

[Ivanyuk] This is a letter sent to the editors by Col (Ret) P. Pavlov: "During the war," he writes, "I commanded a regiment. I went all the way to Berlin and was wounded five times. My pension is 183 rubles. My son recently transferred to the reserve—also as a colonel—and receives 250 rubles. Is that fair?" Similar questions are asked by Lt Col (Res) V. Boyev, Maj (Ret) V. Litvin, Col (Ret) A. Fedorov and many others. I consider these to be reasonable complaints. Is this matter taken into account in the new law?

[Bay] The draft specifies that when the law goes into effect, all pensions previously designated for servicemen and their families will be recalculated in accordance with the norms contained in this law. It is also planned to increase pensions annually in connection with changes in the cost of living index and wage increases. Compensation needs to be paid to pensioners living in the northern and eastern regions of the nation by establishing regional coefficients for the pensions.

With respect to calculating length of service, the terms for payment of pensions for length of service for working pensioners and a number of other provisions have been placed under the jurisdiction of the USSR Council of Ministers.

This was done, in the first place, in order not to encumber the law with excessive details. In the second place—and this is more significant—due to the dynamic development of the Armed Forces, pensions for servicemen need to be constantly improved. There have been 18 amendments in and supplements to the these legislative acts in the past 8 years, for example.

The shifting of legal regulation of certain matters pertaining to pensions for servicemen and their families to the jurisdiction of the government will make it possible

more efficiently to resolve problems which arise, particularly during the reduction of the Armed Forces. This is in no way in conflict with the draft general Law on Pensions for Citizens of the USSR, which contains similar measures.

[Ivanyuk] Just when will the Law on Pensions for Servicemen take effect? How much additional funding will it require?

[Bay] It is planned for the new law to take effect in 1991. The additional outlays required will amount to approximately 1.5 billion rubles annually. This amount is included in the 29 billion rubles necessary for effecting pension reform in the nation. I want to point out that around a billion out of this will be used for increasing pensions for war veterans and disabled, soldier/internationalists, disabled first-term servicemen and families of servicemen who were killed.

I believe that the draft Law of the USSR on Pensions for Servicemen should become a part of a special program of social support for servicemen and for officers and warrant officers discharged into the reserve and their families. The need to set up such a program was pointed out at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Notice of Kiev Military District Exercise

90UM0365C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Mar 90 First Edition p 1

[Notice: "In the Armed Forces of the USSR"]

[Text] An operational-tactical exercise by troops of the Kiev Military District will be conducted in the area of Belaya Tserkov, Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy, Grebenka, Shchors, Loyev and Vyshgorod in the Ukrainian SSR from 16 to 23 March for the purpose of improving the field training of the personnel and practicing command and control and interaction.

Units and formations of the Ground Forces and Air Forces will be involved in the exercise.

In accordance with the document issued at the Stockholm Conference the government of the USSR has invited observers from all states which are members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Gromov Appeals to Republic Leaders on Desertion

90UM0659A Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Nagoryanskiy: "Deserters—Face Your Responsibility"]

[Text]

"If I violate this solemn oath of mine, let me be subjected to the severe punishment of Soviet law and the universal hatred and disdain of the laborers." (From the Military Oath).

Giving a lecture in the state conservatory, just yesterday the current chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet attempted to evoke high emotions in the students. So that they might study music in, let us say, an elevated mood, with inspiration.

Today V. Landsbergis (and together with him, other members of the supreme organ of power, and Lithuanian Council of Ministers Chairman K. Prunskene) is attempting to evoke emotions not in the university this time, but from the podium of the republic's parliament. This time he is discussing not Tchaikovsky and Chyurlenes, but affairs of state. And it must be admitted that in a number of cases the Lithuanian leadership did manage to raise the people into an emotional state. Not just residents of the republic itself, but also its young people serving military duty outside the Lithuanian SSR. As we know, they have been urged to abandon their units and return to the republic, to leave the "army of occupation." This appeal was heard in our district as well.

Many soldiers of Lithuanian nationality are serving in its units and subunits. In their overwhelming majority they are conscientious, diligent, disciplined soldiers. And it is no surprise that many of them have been rewarded, including with short home leaves. As things turned out, some of them visited their homes during these anxious days. And they returned to their units without yielding to any attempts at persuasion (our newspaper featured them last week). But not all. Private K. Sharunas stayed in Lithuania.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General B. V. Gromov, the district's troop commander, sent V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskene a telegram on this account. It stated in particular that the anticonstitutional actions of the Lithuanian leadership and the policy it is pursuing are encouraging desertion and placing young people in a difficult position. It is in such a position that K. Sharunas, who went away on leave for personal reasons and did not return to his unit, has found himself. The commander also states that criminal proceedings had been initiated against the soldier who violated the law.

Colonel General B. V. Gromov was also compelled to send a similar telegram to the leadership of the Armenian SSR. The failure of G. Khudoyan to return from a short leave was the cause. He was obviously caught up in the emotions evoked by the present situation in the republic and by the unceasing conflict centering on Nagorny Karabakh.

Musicians follow the music. People live according to the law. Soldiers serve according to duty. Can things be otherwise? And he who plays a sour note—at a concert or in life—risks a great deal. It's a pity that not everyone understands this.

Thoughts on Non-Military Incentives for NCO Corps

90UM0494A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by reserve Lt. Col. A. Beskurnikov: "Incentives For A Sergeant"]

[Text] For some reason on the issue of the military professionalism of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and master sergeants, discussions often do not go beyond the question of money. Is the issue really money? You cannot find many volunteers to work at the "construction projects of the century" anymore even in return for high salaries.

But what if you do this...choose from among the new recruits the best qualified candidates for sergeants and master sergeants based on educational and physical qualifications and give them as an incentive the opportunity to learn this or that occupation during their time in the service. The choice of which occupation can be quite broad: specialists in communication equipment, automobile and bulldozer repair, radar operators, specialists for Aeroflot and foreign cruises, computer operators and television repairmen... These are all professions which can be acquired directly in the army and navy. It might be possible to give sergeants and master sergeants the opportunity to study in evening and correspondence higher educational institutes and technical schools. I think that a salary of 120-160 rubles per month along with free housing, food and uniforms, is better than a stipend of 35-40 rubles.

And why not arrange for sergeants to live in separate rooms in the barracks during the first two years of service and in a sergeants' dormitory for two more years? Regulations regarding permission to leave the unit's location after the work day as well as guaranteed vacation need to be defined. Perhaps, after completion of the course in the training unit, the graduate who has enlisted for 3-4 years should be given a 10-day leave and then guaranteed leave after each year of service. In addition, we need to arrange things ahead of time for these people when they are discharged into the reserve and provide them the opportunity to choose the place where they want to work.

Of course, we need to introduce this kind of method of staffing the noncommissioned officer corps in stages so that the NCO candidates will be able to appreciate its advantages.

Private Fatally Wounded By Attack On Guardpost

90UM0494B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Colonel V. Kuzhilin: "A Guard's Heroic Feat"]

[Text] This occurred at one of the facilities in the Leningrad Military District. Two unidentified individuals made

their way surreptitiously to a protected zone and attempted to steal the guard's weapon. At 0250 at neighboring guard posts two separate shots were heard and then a burst from an automatic weapon. Immediately the alarm was sent to the security office. In a few minutes the duty guards had arrived at the scene.

At the guard post they found Private Sergey Batagov already dead from his wounds. The criminals had not been able to take his weapon and they had fled from the scene probably in an automobile.

The picture of what had happened cleared up after questioning the guards of the neighboring posts and examining the scene. The criminals fired almost at point blank range and, apparently, were sure that they had killed the guard. However, Sergey Batagov, having been mortally wounded (the bullet entered his body near the heart), was able to answer with a burst from his automatic weapon. Meeting resistance, the criminals decided not to get into a shoot out and made a hasty retreat. They probably had no idea that the soldier was fighting on his last gasp. By the time the duty guards had arrived with the guard commander, Sergey Batagov was already dead. His automatic weapon lay beside him with an empty magazine.

The next morning the version about the criminals having used an automobile was confirmed. It turned out that the two unidentified individuals, having attacked a taxi driver, tied him up, locked him in the trunk, and used the car in order to get to the base. After their unsuccessful attempt to steal the weapon, the unidentified individuals threw the taxi driver out and disappeared. Neither the criminals nor the car have been found yet. The procurator's office in Leningrad is conducting the investigation.

Private Sergey Pavlovich Batagov was born in the village of Makarino in the Velskiy rayon of the Arkhangelskaya oblast. He was born in 1971 and has a younger brother and sister. Sergey Batagov was drafted into the army in the fall of last year.

For courage displayed in an unequal encounter with criminals, Private S. Batagov was decorated posthumously with the Order of the Red Star by the okrug military council.

Supreme Soviet Deputies Inspect Nuclear Test Site

90UM0659B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
15 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by L. Kruglov: "Nothing But the Truth About the Test Range"]

[Text] "A picture is worth a thousand words"—a common but lasting truth. It was precisely with this in mind that a get-acquainted and, to some extent, an inspection trip to Kazakhstan was recently conducted at the initiative of 11 USSR Supreme Soviet deputies from

the "Soyuz" group. Together with experts in atomic energy, medical radiologists and representatives of the armed forces they visited the Soviet nuclear test range at Semipalatinsk. They recently shared their first impressions with reporters at an impromptu press conference in Moscow.

Whenever any sort of conflict arises, the arguments of both sides need to be heard. Everyone is well aware of the actions of participants of the "Semipalatinsk-Nevada" movement headed by writer O. Suleymenov, broadly publicized by the mass media. Thousands of people living in areas near the test range and in other oblasts of the republic are openly protesting against continuation of arms tests, and most importantly, they are resolutely demanding that the test range be closed immediately. The grounds for this are not at all unwarranted. Various specific diseases, a higher frequency of births of deficient children and their high mortality are evoking alarm in the people.

But things aren't all that simple in this world. Tests of the latest models of nuclear weapons are chiefly in the interests of the country's security, since the Pentagon is continually conducting underground nuclear bursts in the state of Nevada, and improving mass destruction weapons. On the other hand the explosions beneath Semipalatinsk are evoking a sharp negative reaction from local inhabitants.

What were the participants of the trip able to reveal? Their first and most important conclusion is this: Far from all woes—social, economic and ecological—that have afflicted the region can be blamed on underground nuclear testing. The entire infrastructure of Semipalatinsk Oblast is at an extremely low level. There are not enough schools, hospitals and housing. The supply of food and consumer goods to the population is as bad as it can get. The test range has essentially become a kind of "lightning rod" for all of the social problems which the local inhabitants perpetually encounter.

An extremely grave ecological situation has evolved in Semipalatinsk itself. According to data of the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment, this city is among the country's 66 industrial centers in which chemical indicators reveal the atmosphere to be the most highly polluted. Most coal-fired boilers are not equipped with ash filters here. Many harmful substances, including carcinogenic ones, are present in the air, exceeding all permissible concentrations. Untreated industrial sewage is sent into the Irtysh. Could this not be the cause of illness among people?

Since 1963 the USSR, USA and Great Britain have been conducting only underground nuclear tests according to a treaty. Any releases are excluded in such testing, USSR Council of Ministers representative Lieutenant General S. A. Zelentsov asserted at the press conference. The radiation background in the district is at its natural level—15 microroentgens per hour. Not a single case of radiation sickness has been recorded here. This is what was communicated by USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Corresponding Member A. F. Tsyb, director of the Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology.

The deputies and specialists came to this conclusion: People must not be kept in constant fear of the future. The results of the investigations conducted here need to be widely publicized. The people must know the truth concerning whether or not the test range is having an influence on the health of the population. This was declared by deputies N. S. Petrushenko, Yu. Yu. Sokolova and others.

Nonetheless we cannot forget the fact that between 1949 and 1963 nuclear tests were conducted at Semipalatinsk in the open. The health of the tens of thousands of people who lived then in nearby areas must be examined comprehensively, including at the genetic level.

Participants of "Semipalatinsk-Nevada" movement, USSR Supreme Soviet deputies and scientists must unite their efforts in order to improve the ecological situation that has evolved in the region. We must have nothing but the truth about the test range! This was the conclusion reached by participants of the press conference.

Shortage of Aircraft Mechanics Reducing Readiness, Flight Training

90UM0492A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col G. Korolev, military pilot 1st class, Air Defense Forces: "Where Is Aircraft Equipment to Be Had?"]

[Text] The weathermen promised some complicated weather patterns for the next day. To be honest we had been waiting for such weather for a long time, because even experienced pilots needed day and night training flights in cloudy weather, since otherwise they might be credited with an interruption in certain types of flying in adverse weather. Flying in adverse weather was also necessary to young aviators so that they could obtain higher class ratings. This is why excitement reigned in the preflight preparations classroom. Together with their flight commanders the pilots planned what sort of exercises would best be conducted in the next flying shift.

On the background of this excitement, the concern written on the face of squadron commander Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Pronin was patently obvious. This concern was understandable to me: Because fulfillment of the flying shift's planning table and growth of aviator proficiency depend precisely on the number of available warplanes, how was he to "wrest" more airplanes from the regiment's engineer?

Ideally, of course, it would be desirable for every pilot to be assigned a fighter for the flying shift. But unfortunately there is a great shortage of airplane technicians in the regiment. Some of the aviation specialists are serving on details. If we add to this the ones that are sick and the ones who are gone on temporary duty or a routine leave, it becomes clear why some of the fighters may not take off. And this has to be troubling.

I know that such thoughts trouble not just me alone. And not only the squadron commanders of our fighter air regiment of the Air Defense Forces. The fact is that the shortage of aircraft technicians is significantly taxing the combat readiness of many subunits, and that the air training of interceptor pilots is suffering from this.

There was a time when our problem was solved by so-called two-year officers who worked as aviation specialists in the regiment. But most of them have already been discharged into the reserves. And I know that the rest are intending to do the same in the next few months.

It cannot be said that the regiment and squadron commanders and political workers had not attempted to keep graduates of civilian institutes in the army. Not all, of course, but ones such as senior lieutenants V. Belous, A. Smirnov and others among those who recommended themselves in the best way possible. I am certain that many of them could have become excellent regular officers and aviators. Take for example Senior Lieutenant A. Ertner, who is making ready to be discharged into the reserves.

However, is it really possible to hold onto a person who works, as they say, "from dusk to dusk," in rain and in snow, in heat and in cold, often without days off, simply with promises that are impossible to fulfill? I let the reader judge for himself.

The civilian VUZ graduate senses the hopelessness of career growth from the very first days in a fighter regiment: He is given a senior lieutenant's position. The road to the next higher position, as flight chief of the technical maintenance unit, can be several years long. But even in this position he remains a senior lieutenant.

The position of squadron deputy commander for the aviation engineer service, in which he could become a major, is vied for by a couple of dozen aircraft technicians from his own subunit, plus experienced specialists from other squadrons in the regiment. But besides this, there is also the possibility for getting a "Varangian" or a military academy graduate.

Meaning that even a "two-year officer" with an excellent record has very little chance of becoming a major. Although I know from my own personal experience that the absolute majority of institute graduates who have served for some time as aircraft or maintenance group technicians have a fully sufficient volume of knowledge and skills for work on aircraft equipment.

This also pertains by the way to officers graduating from secondary aviation-technical schools. Their prospects for career growth are similar. And there are not all that many opportunities for training for an aviation technician: One or two, or a maximum of three slots are assigned to a regiment annually for higher school and academy. And if the technician is a graduate of a secondary military aviation school who is unable to enter into the training pipeline within the two or three years allocated to him, for reason of age he automatically yields his place to younger colleagues. Commanders release aircraft specialists for study in a civilian institute very reluctantly.

This is one of the reasons for the light competition for admission to secondary aviation-technical schools and for the reluctance of officers called up from the reserves to make a career of it.

But this, I repeat, is only one of the reasons. Another I see is that the daily work of an airplane or maintenance group technician is physically hard, and far from creative: During flying, every aircraft specialist performs the same operations several times a day, albeit ones requiring a certain skill level. And so it goes on day after day. No initiative is permitted in this matter as a rule—such are the requirements of flight safety.

In a word, the work of a specialist servicing a modern aircraft complex does not in my opinion require engineering knowledge. What difference would it make, for example, who fuels the fighter or places protective covers over the intakes—a warrant officer-mechanic or a lieutenant with a higher education?

And when it comes to inspecting a fighter, this job is fully within the means of not only a specialist with a technician's diploma but also a well-trained mechanic who has a certain amount of experience working with the given combat equipment and who has the rank of a warrant officer or an extended-service serviceman. He can detect faults on turbine blades or cracks on fastening brackets, loose bolts, oil or hydraulic leaks and so on just as successfully as an engineer.

On this basis I feel that professionally trained mechanics could solve the problem of the shortage of aircraft technicians to some degree. Our aircraft specialists agree with me in this. With this approach, an officer-technician could service two fighters during a flying shift. Incidentally, this had been done before in our fighter regiment, and as I recall, it is not forbidden by the documents regulating the work of aircraft specialists.

Of course, the load borne by a technician servicing two airplanes increases, although a significant part of the work will be carried out by the mechanics of each airplane. In this situation it would be good to find a possibility for extra pay for the higher volume of work, as is done under civilian conditions.

Nor can I avoid the matter of quarters. It is a painful one for all aviators, but as we know, for practical purposes technical personnel receive housing space on last priority. And by the way, quarters are not the only thing which people preparing aircraft systems for flying receive on last priority. Honors are another thing. I for example saw only a few specialists in all my years of service who received state decorations for their difficult work.

For various reasons it is very difficult to reward a technician by awarding him a rank one step above the position he occupies, even though a corresponding order foreseeing such a reward does exist. We in the regiment, for example, have "lobbied" for many years to promote to captain our best aircraft technician—master-rated Senior Lieutenant Petr Andreshchenko. Our petition languishes in one office after another. Nor can we do anything for other leading technicians for the same reason.

But it would be impossible to list in a single article all of the shortcomings of this sort having to do with the work of aviation technicians. They certainly diminish the prestige of an occupation so greatly needed by aviation. All the more so because young people know about them, and therefore they are reluctant to enter military aviation-technical schools. This means that the problem must be solved without delay.

Why are these issues being raised not by an aircraft specialist but by a pilot? Because I have a stake in who prepares my fighter for an intercept mission—a person rattled by personal problems or a well-rested officer who knows that his family is secure. Yesterday's mediocre student who applied to an aviation-technical school only because it was easy to get in, or a competent specialist

who sees a good future before him. And also because given today's approaches, we will not be able to correct the shortage of aircraft specialists for a long time. That is something clearly not to the advantage of the combat readiness of air defense units, and something that troubles me, a communist, very much.

Impact of Baltic Situation on PVO Subunit

90UM0625A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko: "Service in the Baltic: How to Normalize Conditions Under Present Circumstances?"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The problems being experienced by the PVO [Air Defense] troop units discussed in the article are more or less typical for most military units. However, in the Baltics they have assumed increased importance as a result of the changing political situation in that area. This requires a special approach to their resolution.

Senior Lieutenant Oleg Sukharenko and I were walking in a meadow that was thickly strewn with dandelion blossoms. Old brick buildings located in the distance came into view.

"That is headquarters," said Oleg as he waved his hand in that direction. "It is located several kilometers from the local bus stop. But I prefer to walk. This way I can enjoy nature and relax."

Sukharenko is a native of Tallinn. He is concerned and upset by the events occurring in the republic. This is his homeland, the home of his parents. What will happen to it tomorrow? How to resolve the difficult situation developing in Estonia? The closer we approached headquarters, the more the conversation dealt with service problems. Later I was to see that little is said about politics in the unit. What is this—some kind of taboo or is it indifference?

"Neither one nor the other," shared with me Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Aleksandrovich Telegin, deputy chief of the unit political section. "Much of what is happening at times disturbs the servicemen more than the native populace (as you will soon see yourself). However, there simply is no time to gather together and discuss this. Every serviceman carries an extra load. There recently has been an increase in reconnaissance flights by NATO aircraft, which fly near the Estonian shore of the USSR border. The personnel are working an exhausting schedule."

Working in his office, Lieutenant Colonel V. Tishevskiy, the unit chief of staff, was holding two telephone receivers to his ears while analyzing drawings, diagrams, and tables. He was shouting out brief orders to his distant listeners in his hoarse voice. He had an unbelievably tired look: bags under his eyes and drawn cheeks.

He was called three times from bed to respond to an alert occasioned by NATO reconnaissance aircraft flying toward the USSR border, in the area of the Estonian shore. He would rush to the command post and make the necessary decisions. Just then an alarm signal sounded via the selective circuit communication.

"Target detected in the area," reported the operations duty officer. "Headed for the border... Speed...Altitude..."

Tishevskiy gave the order, which seemed strange in this kind of situation:

"Call the kindergarten. Tell them that someone should stay with the children and that they will be picked up later by the bus. But for now, tell it to go to headquarters as fast as possible; the specialists must be stationed at the command post."

My vehicle braked abruptly at the base of an earth mound. I could see a metal door through dry and withered bushes. There was a steep stairway leading deep into the earth into a room the size of a rather large athletic gymnasium. There were enormous screens with red lines delineating the Baltic shoreline and the border of the USSR territorial waters. A red broken line indicated the 50-mile zone.

"We have spotted 150 targets in 24 hours," reported operations duty officer Major Yakov Krinitskiy to the chief of staff. Two of them represent a threat."

One of them was being tracked for several minutes. A white line, the same as a vapor trail, intersected the 50-mile zone line and formed a perpendicular with the territorial waters.

Tishevskiy established contact with the headquarters of other units. Data on the target were fed to surface-to-air tactical control systems, aircraft, and superior command posts. Quickly following was a presentation of the characteristics of the reconnaissance aircraft and the assumed intent. The craft executed several maneuvers, flew parallel to the USSR border for a long time, and turned away to depart. Tishevskiy ascended the stairs to exit for a smoke. His shirt was dark with perspiration.

"There is nothing with which to compare the responsibility our specialists carry with respect to accuracy and timeliness of actions," said unit commander M. Butenko. "And the conditions under which they work! We have quite a bit of old equipment in our unit and not enough spare parts to keep it operating. The manufacturers have changed over to economic accountability, you see, with the result that they do not see a profit in making 'cheap' spare parts. The equipment is breaking down more frequently. The aerial border situation is becoming more tense with each passing day, necessitating improvement in all our work. But on what basis? Enthusiasm? Many persons have reached their limit! Reports show increasing numbers of discharges into the reserves. People are running away from this kind of life."

Listening to the officer, I was struck by the thought of the profound gratitude due those who stick it out! Those who through thick and thin pull their weight and much more.

Located several dozen kilometers from the command post was the "point"—the independent radar operator subunit. It occupied a small area protected by a barbed wire fence. Standing there were simple and austere buildings constituting the barracks, mess hall, and bath houses. Once again I saw a small mound with a metal door at the base: a bunker housing equipment and operational systems.

Major Viktor Volobuyev, the subunit duty officer, showed me the simple accouterments of the radar operators, then related with some humor and irony details of their everyday life.

"We used to work an 8-hour day, i.e., from 8 to 8. Along with perestroyka came the 7-hour day—7 hours before dinner and 7 hours after dinner."

The officers' families live in wretched, decaying, and rickety "Finnish" small houses. Standing next to them are luxurious single houses of the local populace.

In spite of this social disparity, the Estonians and Russians live amicably here and exercise mutual respect. Is this because the waves of political storms have not penetrated so deeply? The settlement is involved with the trout economy, in which the Russians and Estonians work shoulder-to-shoulder. Since there have been no gatherings to discuss issues, production is continuing rather nicely.

Nevertheless, the first sign of socio-political changes, bearing a minus sign, has shown up here also, on the very day of my arrival. The local post exchange was in receipt of a decree signed by V. Dubeykovskaya, acting chief of the 574th Commercial Department, stating that it is now forbidden to sell groats, flour, sour cream, tea, butter—36 items in all—to anyone not in possession of a calling card, which is issued only to persons who are registered. How then are officers' families to live, being that the local organs of authority simply do not register them, even though they belong to a military unit?

"Now let me show you the living quarters of some people whose shoulders bear the burden of the air defense 'umbrella' over Estonia," said Lieutenant Colonel Tishevskiy, as the skin drew tighter over his cheeks and became whiter from boundless anger or resentment. We were standing at the entrance to the basement of a five-story building. The door was unlocked. We entered a windowless room with a concrete floor furnished with couches and chairs that should have been discarded long ago and a rickety table. Ropes strung out at the ceiling level held drying officers' shirts. There was a pervasive odor of dampness and decay peculiar to cellars. I was introduced to the inhabitants. Major Nikolay Smirnov has been living in the cellar for four years. He has two children, but he has no place to bring them, so he pays them short visits once a month. There are no hopes

whatsoever of obtaining an apartment. Captain Yuriy Dubovoy, a former "Afghan," has been sharing this fate for three and a half years. He also has two children from whom he must live apart.

The cellar holds a total of seven officers. They all serve as operations duty officers at the command post. They bear the most responsible burden of protecting the USSR border. Where else can you find another example of a society treating its protectors in such a manner?!

Also used as "living quarters" was a wing of the headquarters building. Each family was assigned an office. The most spacious office was made into a kitchen, which was furnished with gas ranges fueled by rechargeable cylinders. Since there were no water pipelines, it was necessary to wash the dishes in—of all places!—the bathroom. However, the people did not complain: They were glad to live in what they had. Families in which there were tiny children had a more difficult situation. They had to be bathed in the bathroom—the only room provided with water.

These people are not entitled to medical care. They also cannot shop in stores, even grocery stores, since anyone who is not registered in Estonia is not issued the calling card, which is necessary to purchase items as simple as milk.

Why does no one come out in defense of officers and see to it that the local organs of authority respect the decrees issued by the Soviet government? Can it be that Moscow is not aware of the discrimination against officers?

"They are aware of it," said Tishevskiy in an irritated tone of voice. "All kinds of commissions have been sent here—from district headquarters to the ministry. They all promise to help by getting to the bottom of the difficulties with registration, calling cards, living quarters, equipment, and spare parts for the equipment. Then they go away, and everything remains the same."

Perhaps the officer is too emotional in his pronouncements, but I think that he is right in the main. In any event, the decisions that are made are not in tune with the constantly changing situation, and they do not go far enough. I discussed this topic with Lieutenant General Viktor Fedorovich Miruk and Major General Leonid Yakolevich Shkodin.

"PVO units are on duty not only in Estonia, but also in Lithuania and Latvia as well. The problems are the same everywhere," reasoned Lieutenant General Miruk. "We have been reporting them to Moscow for some time. Some measures have been taken. However, not all problems can be resolved at the Ministry of Defense level alone. The idea is to ascertain who is responsible. For example, in Estonia the prohibition on building a residential house for the military is traceable to the ispolkom level in each case. Both the USSR first deputy minister of defense and the PVO troop commander have made numerous written and verbal requests of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the ESSR asking for a

resolution to this problem. Although there have been no negative replies, conditions are always imposed: If you do erect a house, also build a kindergarten, a store, roads. The allocations we receive do not permit anything like this, of course."

The same situation obtains in every case at the ispolkom level involving refusal to register servicemen and their families, with all that that implies: loss of entitlement to health care, shopping in stores, etc. Requests made by military leaders of higher levels of the Estonian SSR are largely ignored. The reason for this is easily seen, since the local authorities base their decisions on a decree issued by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet that declares USSR state power in Estonia to be "illegal." This means that all the resolutions passed by the USSR government relative to the military stationed here are more or less "null and void." There lately has been action on a presidential ukase dealing with annulling the parliamentary decisions passed in Latvia and Estonia that contradict the USSR Constitution. This measure is important to having the Soviet laws once more "come back to life." Only then will the edge be removed from our problems.

"It is presently difficult to predict what kind of political resolutions will be made a reality in the Baltic republics. In any event, servicemen must do their duty. All the problems we have mentioned must somehow be resolved by the military authorities. Are such resolutions being sought," I asked the general.

"Of course," he answered. "For example, we started to build housing near Leningrad. The apartments will be assigned to our reserve personnel presently living in the Baltic republics, while the living space they surrender will be reassigned to officers and warrant officers who have nowhere to live. Relative to providing servicemen's families with food items, the leadership of the Armed Forces Rear Services has given permission to place them on rations at military units. That is, in the near future there will be organized a 'system of rations,' the same as in hardship areas.

After returning from this trip, I made inquiries at two more levels about how the above problems are resolved there.

Major General N. Borovkov, a representative of the Main Armaments Directorate of PVO Troops, does possess a general knowledge of the problems the "border troops of the sky" are experiencing.

"If the truth were to be known," he said in response to my questions, "I have not received any requests for spare parts from Butenko's unit."

I telephoned Butenko: How could that be? He told me what he thought: The requests are forwarded through channels, starting with Colonel P. Shebetun of headquarters. Is it possible that they become hung up there? Shebetun spoke without reservation.

"That unit asks for too much. We cannot fulfill all their requests, for various reasons. Let them make better use of their equipment, then they will not need so many spare parts."

This kind of strange logic, to put it mildly, did not satisfy me. I spoke once more with Major General Borovkov.

"If you call Butenko again, tell him to send his chief engineer here," he finally acquiesced. "I will help him."

In a word, in this case the newspaper fulfilled a supply function. Is it possible that there will be no more spare parts problems in the unit?

The chief of the Capital Construction Organization and Planning Directorate, Ministry of Defense—Major General I. Chernyshov—told me that planning in his "area" as yet does not make provision for peculiarities of the Baltic region, particularly Estonia. ("When will such provision be made?", one may ask.) He advised me to direct inquiries to the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate; it may be that something is already being done there. Major General N. Kotylev, first deputy chief of the GlavKEU [Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate] also had nothing encouraging to say:

"The plan for 1990 calls for erecting eight buildings. That is all we can do at the present time."

One does not have to be a specialist to realize that this is insufficient to resolve the problem. If you take into account the construction inefficiency and the opposition to housing construction for the military on the part of the local organs of authority, you can see that there is little prospect of rapid changes.

One cannot help but agree with Lieutenant General V. Miruk that only a political resolution can bring about a fundamental change in the situation existing in the region, with much here largely dependent upon decisions to be made by the USSR Supreme Soviet and President of the country. Servicemen honorably carrying out their duty in the Baltics have every right to expect passage of measures that adequately deal with the local changing situation. However, our governmental levels are in no hurry; the respective offices of the Ministry of Defense should do all they can. On an urgent basis, without delay.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Problems of Defense and State Security has recently debated issues of financing the Air Defense Troops and development of capital construction and the social sphere of this armed service. Included were the PVO units stationed in the Baltics. One hopes that the near future will bring substantial progress in the resolution of problems facing servicemen in the Baltic republics.

A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military Perestroika

90UM0671A Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 5, 1990 pp 23-26

[Article by Georgiy Melorovich Sturua, candidate of historical sciences, IMEMO AN SSSR [Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences] sector head, and commentator for ME i MO [MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA] Magazine under the USSR Supreme Soviet: "A View on the Navy Through the Prism of Military Perestroika"]

[Text] Military reform is one of the problems of all-Union significance which has not yet been given due attention by our legislators. Many current deputies have spoken about its necessity in their preelection platforms. The question of military reform was raised fairly sharply during consideration of D.T. Yazov's candidature for the post of Minister of Defense. Hearings on this subject have started in the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security but, unfortunately, they are being held in an atmosphere of total secrecy, also excluding other people's deputies. At the second Congress of People's Deputies, in the speeches of General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, academicians G.A. Arbatov and V.I. Goldanskiy, Lieutenant General A.I. Ovchinnikov, and Colonel V.N. Ochirov, deputy chairman of the Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, we heard distant reverberations of those peals of thunder which evidently await us when broad discussion on all aspects of military reform gets under way in the Supreme Soviet.

Obviously it will touch upon the structure and composition of the Armed Forces, methods of manpower acquisition, the mechanism for financing, military industry, and much more. In short, reform is necessary because our approach to military policy is radically changing and significant shifts are occurring in the general situation in international relations. There is one other consideration: we are counting on the fact that a reduction in the military budget will help us to fulfill our plans of economic perestroika. In all countries of the world, the Navy is considered to be an "expensive" branch of the armed forces. The construction of warships and naval aircraft and the creation of a base infrastructure presupposes the allocation of many millions and even billions of rubles. Provided that the country's genuine defense needs are satisfied, savings in the military and naval sphere would considerably help to overcome the social and economic crisis in which the country has found itself today.

During the second Congress of People's Deputies, one of its participants, Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, shared with me some of his views on the fate of perestroika in the USSR Navy. In particular, he noted that what he expects from the People's Deputies is "not only reasonable sufficiency in

determining the country's defense needs, but also sufficient reasonableness in their approach to this question." From his point of view, although the Armed Forces, along with the whole of society, are in need of perestroika, they have been least affected by the negative phenomena of the past and it is precisely in the military sphere, as in no other, that great successes have been achieved.

Of course it will not be easy to implement military reform. There is a paradox in the fact that, from the point of view of certain formal criteria, any big changes in plans for the utilization of Soviet Navy organizational development and training could appear to be wholly inexpedient. Let us turn our attention to what two military leaders—one Soviet and one American—have had to say. General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev concluded from an analysis of the balance of forces that the U.S. Navy had "substantial superiority" over the USSR Navy. Vice Admiral G. Mastin [name as transliterated], U.S. Naval Headquarters deputy chief of staff and the individual responsible for operational planning, in summarizing the results of the buildup of Soviet naval power, spoke of the fact that the Soviet Navy "as before, is defensively oriented."

One should take account of the fact that, compared with the combined military and naval power of all the NATO countries, the balance of power is changing still less in our favor. Furthermore, the country's unfavorable geostrategic situation (warships have to access the open sea through straits and narrow channels which are outside of our control) and also the necessity of having the Navy dispersed in regions which are far apart (the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean) have an adverse effect. All this, according to the logic of things, compels the USSR Navy to place emphasis on defensive tasks.

Nevertheless, it seems that the perestroika of Soviet defense policy on the basis of reasonable sufficiency and the need to release resources and funds for the accelerated social and economic development of the country compels us to look more closely at those functions which have been traditionally assigned to the USSR Navy.

Obviously, it will be difficult to understand why we have such a navy as we do unless we look at its history. The latter has many blank spots, which is not surprising, as the history of military organizational development over the last 40 years has been covered in a veil of strict secrecy. Available sources enable us to arrive at only a very incomplete and sketchy reconstruction of the evolution of the USSR Navy.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that, when the task was set of creating a Soviet ocean fleet in the prewar and immediate postwar years, the corresponding programs were based to a large degree on a mechanical transfer of the experience of the naval powers to our conditions. The idea of acquiring supremacy at sea ostensibly

inspired the authors of these plans. As a result, unrealistic projects were developed, such as the first postwar ship construction program, which, despite the collapse of the economy, was aimed at bringing into service nine battleships each with a displacement of 75,000 tons, 15 aircraft carriers, 12 heavy and 60 light cruisers, and more than 500 submarines.² It is not surprising that this program remained unrealized.

Furthermore, according to the opinion of Western researchers, those in charge of Soviet military and naval organizational development in the first years after the war were guided by a false prognosis—influenced by the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily and later in Normandy, the Soviet command was preparing to thwart amphibious operations in the event of war with its recent allies. Meanwhile, the “amphibious” threat did not materialize as a result of a 90-percent reduction in the number of American amphibious warfare ships.

The second stage in the development of the Soviet Navy began in the mid-fifties. The change in political leadership at that time gave scope for creative searches in the matter of naval organizational development and of overcoming the deadlock which naval organizational development had reached as a result of the orientation toward qualitative parameters and foreign experience. A number of factors influenced the subsequent course of events: scientific and technical progress, the dynamics of a foreign threat, the evolution of Soviet foreign policy and military strategy, and the personality factor.

A young, 46-year-old S.G. Gorshkov was assigned to the post of Commander in Chief of the Navy in 1956. The commanders of the other branches of the Armed Forces were repeatedly replaced but S.G. Gorshkov continuously commanded the Navy Department for 30 years. N.S. Khrushchev, who nominated him to this position, had known S.G. Gorshkov since the Great Patriotic War. The Commander in Chief, who was deputy commander of the Novorossiysk Defensive Region during the war, was still closer to L.I. Brezhnev. The skeptical attitude of military “non-seamen” toward the navy that is prevalent in many countries would certainly have had far reaching consequences if S.G. Gorshkov’s energetic nature had not withstood it. In a definite sense, his role turned out to be similar to Admiral H. Rickover’s role as “father” of the U.S. Nuclear Navy. The fundamental reconstruction of naval forces rearmament during the postwar decades presupposed the appearance of authoritative leaders who were capable of defending costly projects.

S.G. Gorshkov headed the Naval Command during a quite complicated period for the Navy. In 1954, a decision was made in the USSR on construction of an ocean-going nuclear missile navy.³ The sensible thought that we could not succeed by attempting to compete with Western countries’ navies in traditional directions lay at the basis of this decision and its subsequent realization. Furthermore, the USSR had weapons available that in

many ways neutralized both the quantitative and technical superiority of the Western countries’ navies. A nuclear warhead accurately delivered to a target from onboard a small ship actually made it equal to a cruiser or even to an aircraft carrier. The USSR Navy already had nuclear weapons in its inventory in 1954.⁴

Saturating the navy with modern submarines permitted us to sharply increase its strike capability. During the second stage of naval organizational development, attention was concentrated on construction of precisely this component of the Navy that presented the greatest threat to enemy naval forces.

At the same time, the USSR Navy began its rapid mastery of other combat equipment—cruise and ballistic missiles. Their installation on ships provided the capability to inflict strikes on the enemy from greater and safer distances. It also provided another important advantage. The selection of targets that were within the range of nuclear retaliation increased. The build-up of the number of nuclear weapons platforms by using naval ships and primarily submarines, advanced the Navy forward to new positions in the Armed Forces structure, although not immediately. The process of reducing U.S. nuclear superiority accelerated with the nuclearization of the Navy. And the Soviet Union determined that accomplishing precisely this mission was the state’s number one priority.

The development of long-range missile-carrying naval aviation became another Naval direction to which they decided to devote increased attention.

However, the innovative view on the navy had a reverse side. Views began to be disseminated that negate the significance of surface ships in the nuclear missile age. They were considered to be vulnerable to nuclear strikes. It was not clear which missions surface ships could carry out in warfare, given the existence of weapons of mass destruction. N.S. Khrushchev criticized the Navy for building these ships and called it the insatiable consumer of iron and steel. Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, N.S. Khrushchev openly asserted that naval surface warships and along with them the navy in general had lost their previous significance.⁵ Literally several months earlier during a visit to the U.S., the head of the Soviet Government had shared with representatives of the American press his plans to reduce the number of cruisers in the USSR Navy by 90 percent.⁶ These plans were not destined to be realized. The irony of history consists of the fact that replacement of the Commander in Chief of the Navy in 1956 that had been caused by the approval of the new concept of the navy’s role and the aspiration to turn its structural development into a completely different channel brought a man to this post who exerted quite a bit of effort toward the development of a navy that has at its disposal a substantial number of both submarines and surface ships, including major surface ships.

The approach to the surface element of the Navy endured changes with time, but its development was initially held back. One finds the assertion in the Western literature that total displacement of new vessels annually transferred to the USSR Navy was reduced by 60 percent during the second half of the 1950s and that released production capacity was handed over for construction of non-military ships.⁷

In the absence of precise data, we can hardly provide a true assessment of the zig-zags in military ship construction during the second half of the 1950s—beginning of the 1960s. It is obvious that S.G. Gorshkov primarily had this period in mind when he wrote: "...Development of a navy requires serious and profound scientific research. Manifestation of voluntarism and subjective methods are absolutely inadmissible here." We would like to stress that the study of military reform associated with the name of N.S. Khrushchev still awaits its own researcher who will undertake the attempt to separate the wheat from the chaff. Really today we sympathetically recall N.S. Khrushchev's efforts to raise the level of material sufficiency of the Soviet people at the expense of optimal military organizational development. Reduction of Armed Forces strength, emphasis on development of strategic missiles, and not long-range aviation, the advantage assigned to construction of the navy's submarine and not surface forces—these were all proper concepts that obviously were not too well thought out and were too impulsively implemented.

Various military political circumstances, but especially our country's involvement in straight-forward competition with the U.S., facilitated the change in the attitude toward surface ships and the navy as a whole. The trend toward transformation of the entire planet into an arena of this competition objectively operated toward restoration of the navy into its own as the one branch of the Armed Forces that can create and maintain battle groups at constant combat readiness in any area of the world. The policy of providing military assistance to third world countries to liberate them from colonialism and neo-colonialism, as it turned out, inexorably drew us toward that fatal boundary beyond which direct armed participation in local conflicts began. The establishment of strategic parity obviously gave us great confidence in the confrontation with the U.S. in the Third World. In 1974, Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko stated: "At the current stage, the historical mission of the Soviet Armed Forces is not limited only to their function of defense of our Homeland and other countries of socialism. In its foreign policy activities, the Soviet State aggressively and purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle, and decisively opposes imperialist aggression in whatever remote region of our planet it manifests itself."¹⁰

We think that it is no accident that S.G. Gorshkov's articles began appearing precisely in the beginning of the 1970s and that later a separate book "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva" [Sea Power of the State] appeared in

amended and supplemented form. Its author expressed his own point of view which is not shared by everyone. Nevertheless, we can assert that the contours of a response to the social order of the time appear both in the articles and in the book when an infatuation with the confrontation with the U.S. formed a superpower mentality. An analysis of the participation of imperialist states' navies in local wars is conducted in a separate chapter of S.G. Gorshkov's book. It follows from the general context that the navy's capabilities to conduct wars of this type were essentially advertised in the chapter. While characterizing the interventionist activities of Western navies in the Third World region, S.G. Gorshkov pointed out in the conclusion that the USSR Navy serves as an instrument of the "policy of suppressing imperialism's aggressive aspirations and a decisive counter to military adventures and security threats from Imperialist powers."¹¹

The persistent refrain of S.G. Gorshkov's work openly reveals one more motive that latently impacts this approach to the navy. This motive also was not alien to N.S. Khrushchev's policy. This concerns increasing the prestige of the State by supporting an ocean-going navy, by deploying military ships in remote maritime areas, and by arranging their access to foreign ports. The former Navy Commander-in-Chief's wording is quite indicative: "to have a navy worthy of the Soviet State and its great ideas" and "the need to have a powerful navy that corresponds to... the political importance (of our country—G.S.) as a great world power."

Accentuating the postulate that they will allegedly spend more time considering us if we have a major navy at our disposal struck a sensitive chord of our political psychology that began to form during the period of nonrecognition of Soviet Russia and the disdainful attitude toward its economic and scientific and technical potential. Pursuit of prestige and the aspiration to attain appropriate recognition of our equality from our rival created a favorable climate for development of the Navy and especially major surface vessels. First of all it is they, and not unseen submarines, can make the proper impression on foreign observers and act as eloquent proof of the grandeur of [our] economic successes and the accumulation of respect instilled for military force.

Regular deployment of ship groupings into remote areas beginning from the middle of the 1960s undoubtedly entailed a political-psychological impact. Use of the Navy in peacetime, according to S.G. Gorshkov's characterization, could become a "weighty argument" in disputes with rivals.

The USSR Navy's access to the expanses of the world ocean was, however, mainly caused by the increase of the threat from oceanic and sea axes. If in the 1950s it consisted of aircraft carriers whose carrier-based aviation could destroy targets using nuclear weapons, in the 1960s the scale of the nuclear threat increased with the accelerated construction of ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) in the U.S. In 1961, the Kennedy

Administration increased the rate of implementation of the Polaris Program and already several years later the U.S. had 656 ballistic missiles on 41 nuclear submarines.

The value of surface ships as antisubmarine weapons platforms began to be recognized in disputes surrounding them. They could accomplish a dual mission: combating the enemy's missile submarines and simultaneously ensuring deployment of the USSR Navy's similar submarines. The "rehabilitation" of surface ships was confirmed by S.G. Gorshkov's statement that was published in a 1963 article in which he explained that the Navy, aside from primary long-range strike forces, must have at its disposal, for example, the surface ships needed both "for active combat with any enemy within the limits of the defensive zone of a maritime theater and for comprehensive support of combat and operational activities of the Navy's primary strike forces."¹² The idea of balanced development of the USSR Navy that was defended by the Navy's leadership gradually began to be confirmed in its own right.

Reflection of the discussion surrounding the concept of the Navy's role in the 1960s can be found in the three editions (1962, 1963, and 1968) of the fundamental work "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy] that was published and edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy (it is symptomatic that there is not one representative of the Navy among the collection of authors). The differences between the first and third editions are quite noticeable. Thus, the last edition discusses the partnership of missile submarines with the Strategic Missile Forces in conducting global nuclear war. If in the first edition combat with the enemy's navy was called the primary mission of the navy in modern war, in the third edition inflicting strikes on coastal targets had been moved into first place (It is true that in another chapter the order remained as previously). In the 1968 edition, we can encounter a more precise indication of the capability of major amphibious assault forces that not only ground but also naval forces must be prepared to thwart.

As a whole, the circle of missions of the USSR Navy in the work "Voyennaya strategiya" appeared as follows: "Inflicting nuclear missile strikes against coastal targets, defeat of attack aircraft carrier task groups, combat with submarines and first of all nuclear missile submarines, interdiction of enemy maritime transport, support to ground forces, and conduct of anti-amphibious assault operations and mine warfare."¹³

Although the authors had already noted in the first edition that military operations in maritime theaters are an independent type of strategic action that will acquire large scale in a possible war, nevertheless, a certain doubt is sensed in the work: but why is there all of this naval activity if the primary "work" will be accomplished by other branches of the armed forces in a future war? As Admiral V.A. Alafuzov, one of the book's first critics from the "naval side" justifiably pointed out, naval issues "are poorly reconciled with the general theory that concerns strategic war with a ground force enemy."¹⁴

S.G. Gorshkov's concept was an attempt to overcome the gap between views on the role of the Navy and views on a future war. Moreover, he went quite a bit farther in the proposed concept while proving the advisability of creating precisely the major Navy not only from military strategic positions but also taking foreign policy requirements into account. The following are the main theses of the concept that was viewed in a rather aesopian manner by the author of "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva":

- the Soviet Union needs a Navy, as stated above, if only for the reason that the USSR is a great power;
- the significance of the Navy for our country is not limited to the fact that it is assigned combat functions, but is determined by its inherent capabilities for exerting political and psychological influence in peacetime;
- the construction of a large navy is conditioned by the fact that the USSR is confronted by a coalition of sea powers, and also by the increased threat from the oceans;
- the USSR must pose an equal threat to an enemy in order to restrain his aggressive ambitions;
- for a power which is dependent upon maritime lines of communications and which has a sizable navy, the loss of advantages in the world's oceans can be tantamount to defeat;
- victory over a powerful enemy can only be gained through the common efforts of all the branches of the Armed Forces;
- owing to the presence of nuclear missile forces in the Navy, the latter will have an increasing influence on the course and overall outcome of a war;
- the Navy's actions against the shore have acquired a first-level importance, but, at the same time, they are indissolubly linked with the traditional mission of combating another navy;
- balanced development of all arms of the Navy will guarantee that its combat effectiveness is maintained at a high level.

This concept was formed within the framework of that military doctrine to which the Soviet Union adhered before it embarked upon the perestroika of its entire defense system in the second half of the eighties. From the strategic point of view, in the "pre-reform" period, the Navy had to contribute to the following missions which faced the Armed Forces: repulsing an aerospace attack, suppressing the enemy's military economic potential, and destroying its armed forces groupings.¹⁵

As a result of efforts made since the mid-fifties, the Soviet Union has created a truly powerful navy whose principle offensive weapons are its submarines and its naval aviation. The Navy's strength level was stated for the first time in the first edition of the pamphlet "From Whence the Threat to Peace" (1982). From the figures given in this brochure, it becomes clear that coastal ships and vessels predominate in the USSR Navy. This should be remembered when assessing the Navy as an ocean-going fleet.

The latter data on the complement of ships in the Navy was presented by competent Soviet organs in December 1989. It follows from it that the USSR has 157 large surface ships (aircraft-carrying [aviansushchiy], cruisers, destroyers, large antisubmarine warfare ships, amphibious warfare ships with a displacement of 1,200 tons and above) and 260 submarines (in addition to strategic ballistic missile submarines), including 113 nuclear-powered submarines.

It is difficult to compare the figures for 1982 and 1989 as different principles were employed in giving a breakdown of the composition of the Navy by categories. However, it would probably not be far from the truth to conclude that there has been a slight decrease in the numerical strength of the Navy in the eighties. What are the reasons for this reduction? Have the tactical-technical specifications of naval weapons been improved, thus enabling the same missions to be fulfilled but with fewer forces? Have the missions themselves changed? It is logical to suppose that weapons must have become more effective. Obviously, views on the use of the Navy have also started to change.

However, possible amendments to naval policy could have been even more substantial. I will venture to give my point of view on this question.

Obviously, it was possible to argue about the priority of certain missions of the Armed Forces, and about the availability or lack of forces for their fulfillment. However, the character of our "old" military doctrine dictated the setting of precisely such a complex of missions. Today, as we adapt ourselves to the new political thinking, there has been a radical transformation in our views on the possible forms and consequences of a future war and on what kind of defense is needed. Let us recall the tenets that have enriched our conceptions in the military sphere:

- nuclear war—would be a global catastrophe which would bring about the destruction of civilization and it can have no winner;
- the consequences of a conventional war on the European continent, linked to which is the threat of the destruction of nuclear electric power stations [AES] and chemical enterprises, would bring us nearer to a global war involving the use of weapons of mass destruction;
- a conventional war in a Europe saturated with nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors will inevitably be transformed into a nuclear war;
- a limited nuclear war is impossible;
- superiority over the enemy is unattainable, and attempts to achieve it destabilize the strategic situation.

How do these tenets correlate with the Navy's traditional missions, missions which were ostensibly still assigned to it in the eighties?

An aerospace attack can be launched from the sea or ocean by means of ballistic and cruise missiles and also

by carrier aviation. The very formulation of the mission of "repelling" it contradicts the idea of rejecting the attainment of superiority, for if one side had the potential to repulse such an attack, or at least the potential to limit the damage, it would be endowed with weighty strategic advantages.

Now let us consider the technical side of the question. In the light of the accident at the Chernobyl AES it is more than obvious that a salvo from one missile-carrying submarine (approximately 200 warheads with a power of 100 or more kilotons) is enough to cause irreparable damage to the other side. Meanwhile, groupings of USSR and U.S. SSBN's are not a very vulnerable part of the strategic forces. According to Soviet and Western specialists, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is at present capable of destroying all its enemy's strategic submarines with one surprise attack, and it is hardly likely that they will ever be able to do so.

In theory, SSBN's could be neutralized in the course of a protracted war. New military strategic postulates exclude the necessity of examining this possibility within the framework of a nuclear war scenario. Let us take a different case in which military operations involving the use of conventional weapons become protracted, although it seems fantastic to suppose that any side will submissively accept the methodical destruction of all its SSBN's, one after another, in the course of a few days, weeks, or, if you like, months. Furthermore, tracking SSBN's is fraught with such a risk of escalation that, if it is to be carried out, it should only be in a war with high stakes, such as one between coalitions in Europe. Therefore, this variant is also not worth considering if one adheres to the above-mentioned views on war on this continent: either its consequences will be catastrophic even without the use of SSBN's or the whole scale of military operations will prompt the use of missile-carrying submarines while they still remain in commission.

If there is no reliable protection against submarine launched ballistic missiles, the costly preparations for repulsing attacks by means of cruise missiles and carrier aviation lose their rationale. They would be wholly reasonable if the attacks were mounted with these weapons alone, that is to say if a limited nuclear war were possible.

The suppression of the enemy's military-economic potential by means of naval assets and weapons in the form of a first strike has no sense, as nuclear retaliation is inevitable. If we understand this mission to mean preserving the capability to destroy in retaliation the enemy's armed forces and economic targets, this is a legitimate and effective means of deterrence.

Intercontinental ballistic missile submarines are best suited to implementing the mission of deterrence. They can inflict a retaliatory strike from any area of the world's oceans selected for their safe combat patrol. The short-range capabilities of cruise missiles complicate the

implementation of a retaliatory mission as their platforms, in order to occupy effective launch positions, would have to be installed closer to the enemy's borders and thus enter a zone well-defended by him. Sea-launched cruise missiles would not only be wholly unable to strengthen the situation of deterrence being created by, among other things, the USSR's deployment of ballistic missile submarines but, on the contrary, could even undermine it. Groupings of Soviet warships equipped with cruise missiles patrolling off U.S. shores would sooner give rise to fears that the USSR was preparing to launch a first strike. Furthermore, the maintenance of a forward presence of warships carrying cruise missiles would necessitate enormous expense.

Let us now examine another hypothetical scenario—a war in Europe, in the course of which the Navy is simultaneously involved in implementing the missions of the military economic suppression of the enemy and the **destruction of groupings of its armed forces**. Having begun, let us say, with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, it inevitably develops into a global war with the exchange of intercontinental strikes. Therefore, this variant in the development of events is oriented first and foremost toward the deployment of SSBN's and ensuring their combat stability. I would like to note here two circumstances. First, in the analysis of the nuclear factor which can be found in S.G. Gorshkov's work, we note the presence of a strange contradiction: On the one hand, protest is expressed against excessively increasing the capabilities of nuclear weapons in military actions at sea and against corresponding unfavorable forecasts about the Navy's future. On the other hand, it is precisely nuclear weapons which are seen as the "great equalizer" between a large navy, one which includes aircraft carriers, and a relatively weaker navy. Second, believing in the possibility of a limited nuclear war, the American command considers such a war to be extremely disadvantageous for its general purpose naval forces. Fearing that they will be too vulnerable, the U.S. naval command proceeds in its planning mainly from the need to prepare for a conventional war. The attitude of the United States to the problem of general purpose naval forces is conveyed by the fact that it is now reducing its arsenal of naval tactical nuclear weapons and has halted their modernization programs.

In view of our well-founded suppositions regarding its possible consequences, a large-scale conventional war does not represent an individual incident. If it is nothing more than an episode of nuclear war and only forestalls it, it is clear that all the complex and costly preparation for crushing the enemy's naval groupings completely loses its purposefulness. This is not to mention how realistic the formulation of such a mission really is, given the existing balance of forces at sea.

Therefore, the principle mission of the Navy should be to deter a nuclear war by maintaining the capability, even after the first strike, to cause irreparable damage to the enemy in cooperation with the Strategic Missile Forces and bomber aviation. At the same time, it will

also indirectly deter the outbreak of a conventional war as a possible prelude to a nuclear war. In the military balance, the state of which can prompt the enemy to initiate aggression with the aid of conventional weapons, the correlation of general purpose naval forces assumes secondary importance. The other branches of the Armed Forces will bear the main burden for staving off an attack on our country in the context of a conventional war. The protection of sea borders and the defense of the state's interests in the economic zone would remain another important function of the Navy. The complete change in views on foreign policy, a reduction in the part played in it by the military complex, a strengthening of the principle of freedom of choice, and emphasis upon the diplomatic regulation of regional conflicts are, in their turn, also altering the concept of the Navy as an instrument of foreign policy.

As a result, reserves, perhaps considerable reserves, are emerging for making cuts in the Navy. The planned reduction in the military budget and in expenditure on the purchase of military equipment indicates that cuts will be made. This means that the USSR will not be able completely to replace the ships and vessels withdrawn from service upon expiration of their normal service life—according to certain Western estimates, these will number 400 by the year 2000. Special scientific elaborations are needed to determine the optimum size of the Navy. Therefore, I will only touch upon one circumstance.

In my view, the naval command has not managed to avoid the temptation to start building expensive multi-ton warships. During the last 20 years, the Navy has received antisubmarine-warfare cruisers of the "Moskva" type, aircraft-carrying ships of the "Kiev" and "Tbilisi" types, and guided missile cruisers of the "Frunze" type. The construction of aircraft-carrying ships is particularly surprising following the tirades which were launched against them in S.G. Gorshkov's publications in the sixties. Views can change, particularly as technology is continually developing. The excessive cost of aircraft-carrying ships is something which never changes. We clearly cannot afford this type of warship given the ruinous state of the economy. I believe that military political reform cannot offer an argument in favor of their construction which is even remotely convincing.

I can foresee the following objections: what about the adoption by the United States of a "new naval strategy" aimed at a first strike against sea and land targets? What about Washington's desire to maintain its superiority at sea, and its unwillingness to enter into negotiations on limiting naval weapons? This strategy understandably gives cause for concern but, without going into detail, I would recommend that a more realistic assessment be given of its destabilizing parameters. The strategy is dangerous not because it increases the United States' chances of victory in a war between coalitions, but because it sustains illusions with regard to the possibility

of achieving such a victory. There is no unity in American military political circles with regard to the question of the extent to which the "new naval strategy" conforms to U.S. security interests. Furthermore, its origins owe much to criticism which argues that a large navy is unnecessary. The formation of a "new naval strategy" was a kind of counteroffensive by the U.S. naval command in the bureaucratic grab for a piece of the "budgetary pie." Putting psychological pressure on the USSR also entered into the calculations of the command when presenting this strategy.

I would now like to say a few words about the unwillingness of the United States to compromise in defending its position with regard to negotiations on naval weapons. The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, which should lead to the creation of ground-based structures that remove the threat of sudden attack and of the conduct of large-scale offensive operations, are a serious new factor in the present-day military and political situation. If the negotiations end in agreement, the need for the United States and NATO to maintain an offensive potential in European waters is objectively reduced. Of course, the West did not enter into negotiations in order to simplify for itself the mission of launching a sea attack against the Warsaw Pact. At a certain stage, reductions in NATO's ground and air forces will lead to a review of the bloc's strategy. In the final analysis, the process of transforming U.S. and NATO strategy, which reflects an end to the cold war and the expansion of constructive cooperation between the East and the West, will spread to the naval sphere.

Returning to the above-mentioned deliberations with regard to the correlation of new doctrinal postulates and views on the use and preparation of the Navy, I will emphasize that it is, of course, possible to disagree with them. Just like any reflections on the "unthinkable"—scenarios of nuclear and conventional war in a nuclear and space age—they are vulnerable to accusations of speculation. They should be viewed only as a working hypothesis, as an invitation to discuss what functions may be assigned to the Navy in present-day conditions. Furthermore, I would only welcome constructive criticism, let us say, from representatives of the Navy who, as yet, have not expounded their views on the missions of the Navy, taking account of the principle of reasonable sufficiency which is being proclaimed by the USSR and the other tenets of its new military doctrine.

Today, the naval command should be ready to convince those civilian experts and Supreme Soviet deputies who approve the budget, including expenditure on the Navy, that its views on the needs of the Navy are correct. The deputies who accept, reject, or amend the naval command's requirements will have to bear real responsibility before the electorate, something which was not the case in the past. Thus, discussions on military questions will inevitably extend beyond the walls of military headquarters, which is what is happening in all civilized democratic states.

The proposed analysis of the Navy's missions is an attempt to interpret the new defensive military doctrine as applied to the naval sphere. The approach that has been adopted by the Soviet Union to defense organizational-development opens up the prospect of solving the dilemma which our country has encountered in creating a modern navy, a dilemma which it has not been able to completely resolve. A short excursion into the postwar history of the Navy shows that life has constantly forced us to seek an answer to the following question: how are we to combine the policy of building an ocean-going fleet with limited resources, preparations which are primarily geared toward a continental war, and the inability to repulse a nuclear attack? It is not by accident that the precarious well-being of the Navy has often given way to a struggle for its existence.

It should be stated that our Navy is not alone in this respect. Even in such naval powers as the United States and Great Britain, the atmosphere surrounding naval organizational-development has not always been unclouded. When the United States was moving toward a limitation in military expenditure as, for example, is happening now, naval programs were one of the first victims, their cost being considered too great. Under the Carter administration, wholly serious study was given to the prospects of limiting the missions of the Navy and of making significant subsequent reductions in the fleet.

The transformations in our military doctrine and strategy are directing the Navy toward fulfilling missions which are well within its competence even if its composition were smaller than that at present. The present military reform is perhaps not so topical for any other branch of the Armed Forces as it is for the Navy, since its problems are assuming crisis proportions.

Strictly speaking, people have already started to speak openly about a crisis, although on a slightly different plane. In April 1988, the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" sank. A few months later, in June, there was again a serious accident on another submarine. These are not isolated occurrences in the Navy. In October 1986, a submarine carrying ballistic missiles was lost in the Atlantic. The Soviet press has reported other incidents which have occurred on naval ships in recent years.

As is becoming known today, combat ships are being constantly delivered to the fleet unfinished and with obvious defects. For example, on the cruiser "Baku," the system for transmitting data to aircraft does not function and ultra-shortwave stations which have no antijamming protection are being used instead. Fire control radars do not link up [stykovat] with the weapon system and often break down. The "Komsomolets," which was tragically lost, was accepted from industry after serious reprimands had been made, but was included as part of the fleet's effective combat strength. Several hundred workers and engineers corrected the equipment on a guided missile cruiser which has recently entered service, something which has already long become standard practice. Many millions of rubles are being spent on

eliminating production defects, which do not prevent ships from being accepted by the fleet.¹⁶

However unpleasant it may be for departmental self-esteem, accidents and other troubles also testify to the fact that the Navy urgently needs to reorganize its activities. Military reform is the key to resolving many painful questions. It is disposing us to finally stop "hastily producing gross output" ["gnat val"] and to start worrying more about "waging war not with numbers but with know-how."

Footnotes

1. See SEA POWER, June 1988, p 22.
2. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No. 2, 1989, p 78.
3. See KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, July 26, 1954.
4. See S.G. Gorshkov, "Morskaya moshch gosudarstva," [Sea Power of the State], Moscow, 1979, p 261.
5. See PRAVDA, January 15, 1960.
6. See R.W. Herrik, Soviet Naval Strategy, Fifty Years of Theory and Practice, Annapolis, 1971, p 67.
7. "Soviet Naval Influence, Domestic and Foreign Dimension," New York, 1977, p 662.
8. S.G. Gorshkov, op. cit., p 270.
9. "Voprosy istorii KPSS" [Issues of the History of the CPSU], Moscow, 1974, Vol 5, p 39.
10. See "50 let Vooruzhennym Silam SSSR" [50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR], Moscow, 1968, p 522; A.A. Stokov. "V.I. Lenin o voyne i voyennom iskusstve" [V.I. Lenin on the War and Military Art], Moscow, 1971, p 175.
11. S.G. Gorshkov, op. cit., p 371.
12. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 7, 1963, p 16.
13. See "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], Moscow, 1968, pp 362-368.
14. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 1, 1963, p 94.
15. N.P. Vyunenkov, B.N. Makeyev, V.D. Skucharev. "The Navy: Its Role, Development Prospects, and Use." Moscow, 1988, pp 34-42 [The preface to this book was written by S.G. Gorshkov].
16. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 May 1989.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya". 1990

Shortage of Warrant Officers in Pacific Fleet

90UM0509A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain Lieutenant A. Ivanov, BOEVAYA VAKHTA Pacific Ocean Fleet Newspaper correspondent: "Naval Warrant Officer Down on His Luck: Why the Fleet Is Losing Specialists"]

[Text] On Pacific Ocean Fleet ships, especially on those that I encountered in the Persian Gulf, I often had the opportunity to hear the following during conversations with ship captains and combat unit commanders:

"We do not have enough warrant officers on the crew. And those we do have are far from master-rated personnel. The lack of warrant officer personnel is our most serious problem."

Warrant Officer Shnyder whom I know well came to mind. He has spent 18 years on a submarine. A professional and master-rated with a capital M. I recall that when I asked, did he not consider himself, a man blessed with many capabilities in life, cheated by life, Submarine Warrant Officer in Charge Genrikh Aleksandrovich Shnyder answered:

"I grew up in a modest rural family where we did not have conversations about careers or jobs. When I completed my compulsory service, the military unit commander suggested that I stay. I stayed. And I am not complaining. It is true that I have cursed this boat more than once: All my muscles are exhausted. I planned to go ashore. But I cooled down and, looking at the boat, I thought: Where will you go away from it, your home?"

But, for example, how do warrant officers who have graduated during the past year characterize their ship? You would be interested and you would not feel well. It is deplorable that the fleet has few such selfless warrant officers. Those like Genrikh Shnyder are currently few. But who is following them? Mainly rank amateurs.

It is a typical fleet paradox: "Die-hard" warrant officers have not been able to train more people like themselves. Natural selection is not good for the fleet.

Captain 2nd Rank B. Barchevskiy said that he had Warrant Officer Aleksandr Komarov as a subordinate. On his discharge day, he "owed" his coworkers more than 900 rubles, had an enormous shortfall in his area of responsibility, and was convicted of machinations with submariners fur jackets.

One more of Barchevskiy's subordinates is Warrant Officer Sergey Petrov. This one has clearly abused alcohol.

On January 1, 1990, there were only 15 percent master-rated personnel in the fleet like Warrant Officer Shnyder. Forty seven percent of the warrant officers were specialists 1st or 2nd class. The situation did not develop suddenly or unexpectedly.

As documents recommend, the selection of candidates for warrant officer must be conducted with the greatest severity. In fact, it is being replaced by delivering quantity. Yes and here requirements are not being satisfied. And "recruiters" are attempting to meet the plan. At any price. Others pay for it afterward. That is why "to fashion" a warrant officer from a man who may turn out to be unsuitable to be a seaman is a great risk for everyone besides those who do this. But however, should we rant and rave at, let us say, Voyenkomats [Military Commissariats] if, having sampled the delights of our Navy life style, seamen are not too willing to remain on ships? Captains and political workers try to win them over by the dozens but few people opt for the vital selection of warrant officers shoulder boards. For example, the last technician school graduation provided only two warrant officers who have gone through compulsory service and who have only some experience behind them.

"And why get into a hopeless yoke?" Seaman G. Solomennyy, an excellent radiotelegraph operator, asked with surprise in the Persian Gulf when we started talking about his future. "To not get out of the radio room for days and to be eternally to blame? You know this is not for me. Warrant officers are not respected anywhere...."

The prestige of rank. It is better to be quiet about it. Just the combination of the words "prestige" and "warrant officer" causes a smirk.

For the sake of the truth we must point out that warrant officers are themselves to blame for much of this. Having abruptly moved from the strictly regimented life of a training unit to shipboard outlaws, they release the brakes and it is as if they are catching up on what they have missed. And then the crew already sees not neat but blind drunk Warrant Officer S. Kanavets who, having forgotten about the existence of deference to rank, says everything that comes up to the military unit commander. It is hard to believe that the officer has any respect for his subordinate after this. But Kanavets has already begun to cry by the next morning: He said, did he really get drunk because of the good life? And that is the truth: His family is roaming the corridors and his daughter is ill. They live—they are getting by. Although drunkenness is not justified here.

"I escape to the ship to get away from family problems. And then my heart begins to ache: How is my family? Are you asking me about the ranking?"

But, let us assume that there are still romantics whose spirits are tied to the Navy despite all of this adversity. However, here is the opinion of this respected Warrant Officer A. Yakovlev who arrived in the Indian Ocean on a tiny ship:

"A warrant officer's duty is a sweatshop. For a small initially invested sum of knowledge, they sap the energy out of you for five or more years. You end up under the press of numerous duties and you can seriously pay for each blunder. Not everyone finds the strength within

himself to learn in an atmosphere of constant stress. But in order not to get the reputation of being an ignoramus, you are compelled to hang around and to resort to trickery. Therefore, the majority live in anticipation of the end of their contract period. And only a very few people remain to serve further and become master-rated."

"Does it turn out that five years is not much for this?"

"Not much," answered Yakovlev, "if specialists are seriously trained. But what does a warrant officer's day normally consist of? Training?"

What they say there is that a warrant officer frequently performs 'give me—bring me—get me' duties. And this is hardly to everyone's liking.

For us, 1989 turned out to be unusually productive in [the number of] discharged warrant officers. Not one hundredth of the men left the fleet and of them, one fourth were for misdemeanors. Only 146 warrant officers were awarded decorations and medals last year.

And what is going on with housing for warrant officers in the fleet? For example, let us take that same task force where Captain 2nd Rank B. Barchevskiy serves. Here 20 warrant officers do not have housing. Among them are Warrant Officers N. Kazantsev, K. Portnov, and others. Twenty five warrant officers are on the list for improvement and many are on the preferential list. This, as they say, is already an extreme situation. Thus, Warrant Officer Yu. Tadzhibayev has the right to the preferential list because his wife is disabled, Warrant Officer A. Astafyev is a soldier-internationalist, and Warrant Officer A. Bezdolnyy's family consists of seven people. Altogether today in the Pacific Ocean Fleet there are about 8,000 warrant officers with families do not have apartments at all. These are only families! Bachelors are not figured into the calculations at all. And so, does a single warrant officer really not have the right to have his own corner?

Just what is going on? Does the fleet need professionals? Without a doubt. But how do you persuade people to perform difficult service and without a practical guarantee of a comfortable life? No type of persuasion will help here. That is why there is a chronic shortage of warrant officers in the Pacific Ocean Fleet today.

Problems of Dismantling Old Submarine Reactors

90UM0588A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 May 90 p 3

[Article by A. Mozgovoy: "How Submarines Are Seen Off: The Threat that Nuclear Wastes Will Poison the Planet Becomes Increasingly Real"]

[Text] Nuclear submarines are very complex structures. They are very difficult to build and even more difficult to dismantle.

At the Rosayt [transliteration] naval base in Scotland, the Dreadnought, the first English submarine to have a nuclear reactor, sits rusting away at its mooring place. Several years ago it was decommissioned. And since then no one has been able to figure out what to do with it. The problem is complicated by the fact that nine more aging nuclear submarines are waiting in line (meaning that they are to be removed from operational use in the near future).

The main question tormenting English specialists is how to dismantle the reactors and where to bury them? After all, these units, which are potential sources of radioactive contamination, weigh nearly 1,000 tons. Three possibilities exist.

The first possibility is to sink the worn out nuclear submarines to a great depth in the Atlantic Ocean. First their hulls would be filled with concrete in order to decrease the likelihood of radioactive elements being released. The proponents of this idea assert that this is the "safest and least harmful method of long-term burial." They refer to the precedents of the Soviet and American nuclear submarines that sank, which, under pressure of deep water, are "behaving quietly" and are not threatening the environment.

But what will happen with these nuclear reactors after hundreds or dozens of years, when corrosion will have eaten away at the metal? No one knows clearly. Recent radiation measurements in the vicinity of the sunken American nuclear submarines, the Thresher and the Scorpion, show the presence of a "small amount" of Cobalt-60 in the water. The amounts are minimal at present. But their detection is cause for reflections which are not at all optimistic in nature. In April 1959 the U.S. Navy sank an unsuccessful nuclear reactor from the nuclear submarine, the Sea Wolf, in waters some 120 miles from the Atlantic coast of the United States of America. At that time this action caused a worldwide storm of protest. The intolerance of such burials was raised as an issue. Finally in 1972 in London several governments signed an international convention forbidding the sinking of radioactive and toxic wastes to the bottom of the seas and oceans.

Efforts are now underway to reexamine the statutes of the convention which deal with sinking worn out nuclear reactors in deep water. It is unlikely that these efforts will be successful. The international ecology movement is decisively opposed to lifting the ban.

Two other options differ only in details. In the first instance the nuclear reactors are to be cut out of the hulls of the submarines and buried in special underground storage facilities. And in the second option this same operation is accompanied by first breaking the power units into smaller pieces. It is true that this last option was rejected almost out of hand because in carrying it out the workers doing the dismantling work would be

subjected to excessive risk. However, the idea of creating storage facilities is not met with particular enthusiasm. Municipal authorities in Rosayt and Plymouth, where such facilities are to be built by the year 2000, have spoken out against converting these English cities into nuclear dumps.

The nuclear submarine is one of the most devilish inventions of the present century. Filled with powerful weaponry, the nuclear submarine can not only sink ships but can also destroy entire cities and nations. And even when "dead," like the legendary "Flying Dutchman", it is able to inspire fear and horror. Judge for yourselves.

In the USA, nuclear submarines, which have been taken out of service, have been accumulating over a long period of time at the Bremerton Naval Base. They did not know what to do with them there either. However, it seemed, that a solution was found. At the Bremerton shipyard they set to work cutting out the reactor units from the outdated submarines. They were loaded onto barges which were towed up the Columbia River, which separates the states of Washington and Oregon, to Hanford, where in an area of 570 square miles they had placed a nuclear center with underground storage facilities for radioactive wastes. The reactors were thrown into a deep well and covered over with brick.

But a few days ago the manager of the Hanford complex, M. Lawrence, announced that in the strict sense of the word a "dangerously explosive situation" has evolved in the vicinity of the center. The amount of hydrogen has increased sharply within the underground storage facilities. All efforts to eliminate the emergency situation are failing to produce results. The hydrogen may explode at any moment which would lead to the release of radioactive substances into the atmosphere. "We have done everything we could think of, but I can give no guarantees," admitted M. Lawrence. We do not fully understand the processes that are taking place.

And what is taking place here? It is known that outdated Soviet nuclear submarines also are being removed from service in the Soviet Navy. According to data from the English handbook, "Janes Fighting Ships," more than forty percent of Soviet nuclear submarines have been in service for more than twenty years. This means that in the near future it will be necessary to write off ships on a large scale. Are there any plans for dismantling them?

Answers to these questions must not be hidden behind a veil of secrecy. They concern citizens of the entire world. The Chernobyl catastrophe has shown that there are no outsiders in such matters.

Judging from all the evidence, we have managed to put aside the threat of destruction by nuclear war. But another disaster has come along to replace it—the threat of poisoning the planet with nuclear wastes. This is why it is necessary to come up with strict international rules for the dismantling and burial of nuclear reactors.

Lack of Medical Support for Dependents

90UM0347A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Maj A. Bugay in the column: "A Problem Requiring Solution": "Missing in the Table of Organization"; last paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA comments]

[Text] A cursory examination of the child, who was barely a year old, convinced Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service A. Korzun that he was in dire need of a pediatrician's attention. The patient was immediately taken to a hospital. Physicians did all they could, but they could not save the infant.

An autopsy indicated that the cause of death was a congenital pathological condition. The child had required constant attention by a pediatrician, which would have made it possible to disclose the undetected development of the illness at an earlier stage. Alas! - the table of organization of the medical facility in the OBATO [separate airfield technical maintenance battalion] headed by A. Korzun had no slot for a pediatrician.

I heard a complaint about medical care in another Air Force garrison from - of all people! - the chief of the medical facility, Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service V. Pevnev, who said:

"It is nearly impossible to continue to work under these conditions! Last year I asked an inspecting officer the question: 'Is it possible to organize quality medical care under our conditions?' No, it is not, agreed the colonel from Moscow. He promised to help. But, well..."

The health of a pilot is an element of combat readiness. An unsatisfactory state of health in a pilot is looked upon by superior officers as an extraordinary occurrence. For this reason, the health of military pilots is guarded by a well-organized system of health care. But what happens if illness befalls a pilot's wife or child? This kind of situation does not obligate the commander to such things as searching for medication for a child exhibiting a high temperature or providing transportation for a woman who is about to give birth to a child.

As stated in the group of forces, medical treatment of military dependents in the Union as a rule is the responsibility of institutions that come under the Ministry of Health. If your child takes ill, go to the children's polyclinic located at your place of residence. In a group of forces, this is a horse of a different color. In the case of Air Force garrisons, the OBATO medical facility is charged with the entire responsibility of medical care of personnel present, on the basis of a table of organization that is approximately the same as that of an aviation technical unit stationed within the confines of our country. As explained by the medical service chief of the Northern Group of Forces, Colonel of Medical Service V. Shumakov, this "almost" means that four additional pediatric slots were established to service all the aviation

garrisons of the SVG [Northern Group of Forces], after numerous complaints had been made. This is the maximum number of personnel the commander could have assigned without detriment to the other medical facilities of the Group of Forces.

"We do have a pediatrician who is not listed on the table of organization," said Pevnev. "However, I do not envy Galina Yevgenyevna Stasyuk, who attends to more than a thousand kids. She holds sick call in the facility until 1200 hours. Then she makes house calls. She also is responsible for making house calls on a regular basis to attend to newborn babies. Having children here is not an object of complaint, since the military personnel are young."

Someone who has an even greater workload on post is the stomatologist. However, the most serious problem is medical care for women. There is no gynecologist in the garrison: The OBATO medical facility staffing has no provision for one. Until recently, pregnant women were forced to travel to the closest hospital for consultation on a "space available" basis. Now a bus makes two trips a week to the hospital. However, at times the bus does not show up. If this occurs twice in a row, there is no telling what consequences some women may suffer.

"As the new year was setting in, we heard a rumor to the effect that a new table of organization had been approved," continued the medical facility chief. "However, our hopes were in vain, since this does not solve the problem."

I visited Colonel of Medical Service Ponomarev for an explanation. He said:

"Pevnev has no cause for complaint. He has only a half-hour drive to the hospital. It is more difficult for his colleague A. Mamayev. He has to travel 300 kilometers to the closest medical institution. There is no pediatrician at the medical office. The gynecologist issue is at a standstill."

As the situation now stands, all the separate garrisons, including those of the Air Force, are tied to group hospitals. Specialists in the hospitals are supposed to render medical services to the residents of the military installation. They are obligated to receive patients on a regular basis in each particular locality.

However, life is life: Some physicians are away on temporary duty; some are on leave; others do not have a car; still others have no gasoline, etc. The garrison where Major of Medical Service V. Shchetina heads the medical facility, located 70 kilometers from the base hospital, is visited once or twice a quarter by a pediatrician and a gynecologist. Women about to give birth are taken to Polish hospitals. Urgent medical care is not denied, but you will agree that a request for assistance that can sometimes be obtrusive cannot fail to cause dissatisfaction on the part of specialists in the host country. For this

reason, attempts are made to resolve problems at the personal contact level, so to speak, in exchange for medications.

Only one aviation garrison school is staffed with a physician. In all the others, physician duties are the responsibility of the OBATO medical office doctor. That is the case on paper. In reality, the school children receive no care. This is not due to irresponsibility on the part of medics. They are so burdened with regular duties that they are physically unable to take on the school duty. Fortunately, there have been no extraordinary occurrences so far.

The absence of regular gynecological services has already been a source of conflicts. Two years ago women complained so much that a commander of a group of forces found a gynecologist slot for the Air Force garrisons. It was divided into two half-slots and did reduce the severity of the problem, but in only two installations.

An indication of the severity of the problem is the fact that it has attracted the attention of USSR People's Deputy General of the Army S. Postnikov, to whom voters had appealed a number of times. At his request, the SVG medical service, acting jointly with subordinates of Colonel of Medical Service S. Ponomarev, conducted a survey of medical care available to dependents to write a report pointing out the necessity to improve service in OBATO medical offices by adding the needed specialists. The report was submitted to the Central Military Medical Directorate.

It seemed that the ice finally started to move. Colonel of Medical Service S. Ponomarev received a telephone call from Moscow: A decision was about to be made. After that the matter came to a standstill.

"Half-measures will not solve the problem," commented Colonel of Medical Service S. Ponomarev at the end of our discussion. Two or three additional physician slots will not effect appreciable improvement in any particular post gaining the slots. It is evident that staffing of medical offices should be based not on a previous schedule, but rather on the actual situation existing in a particular unit. I do understand that changing the table of organization is not a simple matter. But why not endow chiefs of aviation unit medical services in groups of forces with the legal authority to reassign personnel, while staying within the limits of the established tables of organization? We are in a better position to know in which garrison two physicians will be able to cope with the work, which garrison office should be strengthened, where another therapist is required, and where a single pediatrician will suffice. This will make it possible to remove people's dissatisfaction."

Indeed, why not follow this course of action?

Editors: The problem is unfortunately not limited to Air Force garrisons of the Northern Group of Forces. Military dependents of other groups of forces have complained to the editors about medical care a number of

times. The causes are the same: no pediatricians, gynecologists, or hospital in the vicinity. The events occurring in Eastern Europe are an indication that in time the problem will resolve itself, of course, in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

However, the above prospects are no comfort to persons who require medical care today, not tomorrow or next year.

Military IL-76MD Converted to 'Flying Hospital'
*90UM0485A Moscow SEMYA in Russian No 13 (117),
1 Apr 90 pp 1-3*

[Article by A. Kusurgashev and V. Maltsev: "Conversion—For Children: Today the USSR Ministry of Defense's Ultramodern IL-76MD Transporter, Tomorrow the Soviet Children's Fund's 'Aybolit' Flying Hospital"]

[Text] The Children's Fund helped juvenile casualties in Armenia, in the Bashkir ASSR and in other regions; this assistance got there in the first days and even hours of tragedy. But it was extremely difficult to provide this assistance skillfully and quickly: The sluggishness and even the clumsiness of our medicine (this, alas, is not so much its fault as its misfortune!) made it necessary to display literally superhuman inventiveness in order to save a child.... And perhaps it was precisely then that the dream of creating a "quick response" that would be quick not only in name was born in the Children's Fund. Today this dream has become reality, and tomorrow it will come to life.

This dream is called "Aybolit"—a specially equipped IL-76MD airplane that the USSR Ministry of Defense is transferring to the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin. It will be able to deliver to a disaster area a medical team and the necessary equipment for qualified assistance to children on-site, and to evacuate casualties to the country's therapeutic institutions. Emergency care can also be provided on board. In the necessary cases the flying hospital could also be used for various therapeutic and preventive functions.

Collaborating with the Military Institute of Medical Technology of the USSR Ministry of Defense, a working group of the Children's Fund and the USSR Ministry of Health has basically completed development of the medical and technical conception of the "Aybolit" flying children's hospital of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin.

And the society, while striving to better itself, is unfortunately not ensured against natural disasters and catastrophes. The accident in Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia, and the explosions in Arzamas, Sverdlovsk and in the Bashkir ASSR reveal that a special emergency care system is needed if we are to safeguard and save children caught in an extreme situation. It is something we need quickly, it is something that is absolutely

necessary right now! And finally the first component of this system is being created—the “Aybolit” flying hospital.

Now a word from specialists taking part in this unusual project's implementation.

Inga Grebesheva, Chairman, Bureau for Medical and Social Protection of Childhood, Soviet Children's Fund

Soviet children's public health is very poorly equipped with special medical equipment today. Every time children have had to be rescued in the aftermath of a natural disaster or catastrophe, we have found that equipment was in short supply or totally lacking at the site of the incident. It took a great deal of time before all of this came into the possession of doctors. And yet prompt, qualified medical assistance, both on-site and en route, can save a large number of children's lives.

What will the “Aybolit” flying children's hospital be like? It will be a specially equipped airplane—a prototype of today's “Scalpel,” the official airplane of the USSR Ministry of Defense. But in contrast to the “Scalpel,” which is intended for the needs of military medicine, “Aybolit” will serve Childhood—the interests of children's public health. Its interior, which consists of removable modules, will undergo major changes. The most up-to-date medical apparatus will be installed in these modules, by which a seemingly hopeless child could be saved both in the air and on the ground. The accent will be made on foreign clinical and diagnostic equipment, because domestic apparatus is ill-suited to such extreme conditions, and in many instances it is not even produced by our industry.

A question that may arise in the reader's mind is probably this: It is not every day that accidents such as the one in the Bashkir ASSR happen in our country. Does that mean long periods in which expensive equipment will be idle and doctors will be paid for doing nothing? First of all, we don't even foresee such periods of idleness. “Aybolit” will not have to wait around for accidents or disasters—Lord, if only they would never happen! It will be put into permanent operation, you see. For example to deliver doctors of an airborne medical force to republics of Central Asia, where as we know, child mortality peaks in the summer period, or to conduct planned medical examinations of children in the country's most remote regions. And secondly, even if the airplane takes off not for an accident or a disaster, but only to provide emergency medical care to a single child, and saves its life, would the money spent on its creation and operation be wasted? Who would take it upon his own conscience to calculate the cost of a human life, and all the more so a child's life?

I would like to believe that the work schedule—and it is rather tight!—will be adhered to, and “Aybolit” will be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Children's Fund in the first quarter of 1993.

Aleksandr Shmorgunov, Colonel, Department Chief, Military Institute of Medical Technology, USSR Ministry of Defense

During the First Congress of People's Deputies Army General D. Yazov, the USSR minister of defense, promised that one “Scalpel” airplane from the first lot produced on a large scale will be transferred for the needs of children's public health. An experimental model of the “Scalpel” created out of an IL-76MD transport airplane is presently being used in support of the interests of the armed forces medical service. This airplane possesses good performance characteristics, and it is capable of delivering outfits of self-contained medical modules intended for surgery, resuscitation and evacuation of casualties.

We have now reached the opinion that “Aybolit” needs five modules, five unique medical wards: surgical, resuscitation, intensive therapy, clinical-diagnostic. And the last—evacuation.

Depending on the situation, three modules may be carried by the airplane simultaneously. The medical complex will be serviced by a special team of physicians composed of civilian doctors. And I think that military pilots will fly the airplane.

The “Aybolit” flying children's hospital will be registered to Sheremetyevo Airport or to a military airfield near Moscow, where special hangars will be built to store its internal fittings—its special medical apparatus.

We have already begun building the IL-76MD to be fitted out as the “Aybolit” flying children's hospital. The total cost of the project is 15 million rubles. Of this amount, 12 million come from the USSR Ministry of Defense—this is our contribution to the Children's Fund, and three million are provided by the Soviet Children's Fund itself.

Radiy Popovskiy, Chief Designer, Special Design Office imeni S. V. Ilyushin

It was no accident that we selected the IL-76 to create a “flying hospital.” This model possesses fabulous characteristics. Its capacity is such that a large number of casualties and the necessary quantity of medical apparatus can be accommodated aboard. Using professional terminology, the short take-off and landing distance will allow the craft to render immediate assistance in remote and poorly accessible locations, and evacuate casualties when necessary. This monster can land on and take off from not only special concrete pavement but also a country road or field. All compartments are air-conditioned in the air and on the ground. I could name many other merits, but I think that the ones I have already listed are sufficient to persuade the reader that this airplane is unique and irreplaceable.

Of course, some might suggest that it is not a good idea to provide children with such an “imperfect” model—last year, after all, two IL-76s crashed in Leninakan and not far from Sumgait. I can assert with full responsibility

that those accidents occurred not due to design errors or imperfections, but for entirely different reasons. No airplane model is ensured against disaster, which can happen due to a convergence of unfavorable circumstances or pilot error.

I think that the decision of the USSR Ministry of Defense to provide a military airplane to the Soviet Children's Fund not only confirms the correctness of the biblical exhortation to "beat swords into plowshares" but also serves as a real example of true conversion, in contrast to the often hasty and showy "restructuring" of military production operations. In this case we can see military equipment beginning to serve peaceful purposes. What can be more noble than safeguarding children's lives?!

Aleksandr Baranov, USSR Deputy Minister of Public Health

We doctors have dreamed for a long time about such a complex. Had it been available to us earlier, I think that we would have saved more than just one or two precious human lives of both children and adults. At the moment we are not confident that we would be able to help casualties in time, since the airplanes furnished to medical aviation do not possess special equipment. But "Aybolit" will be equipped with everything needed to save children.

The medical complex will be serviced by special teams consisting of top-class medical assistants and physicians—surgeons, reanimatologists, toxicologists, neonatologists, therapists.... The requirements on the physicians and medical assistants who will be working aboard the "Aybolit" are serious. These people, you see, must be not only rated specialists but also—if I may be so bold to say—selfless and courageous people ready to come to the airfield and take off on an assignment at any time of the day or night.

Questions concerning how the work of doctors that will service "Aybolit" is to be organized is presently being discussed. Most probably they will remain with their own clinics. But I think that a special duty schedule will be set up such that one or several medical teams will constantly be in full readiness. Some thought will have to be given to wages, since the effort cannot be sustained only by naked enthusiasm.

We already have applications from those whom we plan to include in the medical teams for work in the complex. These specialists have already recommended themselves well in the aftermaths of recent accidents and disasters. But additional manpower will still have to be called in to service "Aybolit."

"Aybolit" may be employed not only here in our country but also for assistance to juvenile casualties in other countries. In this connection the Children's Fund is asking representatives of foreign companies accredited in Moscow and in other cities of the country to take part in the financing of the new project.

Your voluntary dues and donations may be paid to account No 70700001 at the USSR Foreign Economic Bank. Account No 707001 of the Transactions Office, USSR Zhilsochbank [not further identified], MFO 29909, supports the services of Soviet citizens and organizations deciding to become sponsors.

Medical workers of the city of Moscow desiring to take part in the work of emergency assistance teams should provide brief information about themselves (occupation, position, place of employment, home address, telephone, practical experience and time of service).

Send your letters to the following address: 101963, Moscow, Armyanskiy Pereulok, No 11/2a, Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin. Don't forget to write "Flying Hospital" on the envelope. If you are depositing money into the fund's account, make the same notation on payment documents.

Problems of Defense Conversion in Ulyanovsk Oblast

*90UM0468A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
10 Apr 90 p 2*

[Article by S. Shmelev from Ulyanovsk: "Not Presented on a Tray; Why Ulyanovsk Oblast Is Poorly Utilizing the Free Capacity of the Defense Enterprises"]

[Text] It has always been difficult for the local agroindustrial association to place orders at the Ulyanovsk plants for manufacturing equipment. This is particularly so at the defense enterprises. These enterprises found any hitch to refuse including the absence of specifications, the disadvantage of switching complicated lines and conveyors to producing spare parts and individual assemblies and pieces, particularly in small batches.

Of course, serious arguments impelled them to do this. For example, the story of producing under a subcontracting arrangement the KSS-2.6 silage-harvesting combine which they produced, as they say, on the side. The cost of this very necessary but handmade machine was much higher than even its contractual price.

It was becoming obvious that there would soon be an end to dominance from a position of strength. The Dimitrograd Scientific Research Nuclear Reactor Institute refused to deliver preassembled parts for these combines. The Ulyanovsk Air Industry Complex was producing less of them than was needed.

But conversion was going to arrive nevertheless. Just last year, due to the loss of military orders, the Ulyanovsk enterprises were forced to reduce the total production volume by 116 million rubles. One-half of this fell on the aviation complex and 36 million on the Machine Building Plant imeni Volodarskiy.

And so now the agroindustrial association is readying its own packet of proposals for them: on freed capacity to begin production of 26 types of complicated equipment for the food and processing industry. The range of the

articles is such that after saturating the internal oblast market with them, they could also be sent to other regions. Vacuum fillers, stuffing mixers and electric meat grinders.... In Ulyanovsk Oblast alone, hundreds would be required for the network being established of subsidiary processing shops on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In a word, this proposal would guarantee the defense plants a rapid recovery of all financial losses. For facilitating the process, the agroindustrial association even intended to provide them with allocations for metal and introduce higher contractual prices for the readymade machines. It would have been advantageous but the plant leaders as yet have not made any choice. For the current year, according to the forecasts, production will continue to drop for them. It will reach 148 million rubles.

But the fine-appearing program for proposed collaboration and which I was acquainted with by I. Nagornov, the chief engineer from the department of sponsorship ties and coordination at the oblast agroindustrial association, still remains on paper. The reasons are the same which led to the collapse of all previous analogous programs.

The problem is that they were based upon arbitrary decisions by the bureau and plenum of the party obkom and which had no legal strength and were not provided with resources. No matter how strange it might seem, in the search for new ways of collaboration with the plant workers the oblast agroindustrial association has again set out on this well-trodden path. "It is our job to inform the oblispolkom on the needs. Let it take the decision and the defense plants give some thought on how it is to be carried," is how the association specialists reason.

The lack of trust by the plant workers for the decisions of the local bodies is not devoid of reason. Several years ago, at the insistence of workers from the agroindustrial complex, the party obkom forced them to produce on a subcontracting basis the Fregat irrigating units. Finally, when everything was set up and it would be possible to increase output, it turned out that all of a sudden no one needed the Fregats. The obkom again flippantly took a decision. But this time to halt production. And on the enterprise balance sheets there hung rather large supplies of unnecessary preassembled parts....

The oblispolkom could not influence the plant workers. The government had given it the right to place with the enterprises only a limited amount of orders for manufacturing nonstandard equipment for the institutions supported by the local budget. The agroindustrial association had never been such an institution. On the other hand, it would have been possible to influence the forming of the product range and the volume of produced consumer goods. Certainly equipment for the food and processing enterprise also does not relate to these.

One way out remained and that was to link the interests of the enterprises which were to be converted to the interests of the consumers of their product. I feel that at

present they would show understanding to such an initiative by the oblast leaders. All the more as this would be backed up by a concrete, sound program for the series output of new machines.

"We would have done this," agreed the chief of the Coordinating Department of the Oblispolkom Yu. Butyrin. "But the leaders of the agroindustrial association were very late in making their proposals to us. Conversion has been underway for two years now and they are just getting started."

"The executive committee informed us only recently that it would be possible to draw up orders. And we drew them up in the shortest period of time," parried the representatives of the oblast agroindustrial committee.

Should we look for extremes? No, it would be better if now the forces were spent on using for one's own interests at least what is being developed or what has already been accepted for production by the plants.

In the future it is essential to work to satisfy the processing sectors. While the agroindustrial association hesitates, the defense plants have actually begun to work out in individual instances to serially produce many types of scarce equipment. Although the emphasis was put primarily on filling the orders of public health, they did not forget the needs of the agroindustrial complex.

The same Plant imeni Volodarskiy has begun series production of several units of equipment for small-capacity shops processing meat. And the Kometa Plant is producing the automatic spaghetti unit which successfully produces both articles from kneaded dough and dumplings. I am confident that buyers could be found for those machines which were developed in previous years but were made piecemeal. For example, the automatic machine for producing cutlets. Here there is no need for any designing or development and they can merely be taken and put on the line. After adjustments it would also be possible to specialize one of the plants in the production of the same silage-harvesting combine. But now on a serial basis and not part by part.

But in a single city with the presence, you will note, of dependable telephone communications the potential partners cannot find one another. And the result is lamentable. The same Plant imeni Volodarskiy last year had to cut back on the previously planned production volume for a new scraper to remove bristles from hog carcasses. The reason for this was the absence of any demand. Although this equipment is required on the subsidiary farms of each oblast kolkhoz and sovkhoz. In the same manner for now there has not been a single order for the spaghetti machine from the agroindustrial association.

It is a paradox and just so: the oblast agroindustrial association cannot receive the new lines from the plants because they are produced in small series. And they are produced in such small numbers due to the lack of orders from the same association! Who if not the two recently

established coordinating departments of the agroindustrial association and oblispolkom can resolve these puzzles?

"What our defense plants are presently producing for the countryside we do not know," I heard at the agroindustrial association. "We did not know that the executive committee had a list of such products. No one showed it to us."

"But they did not ask," they whined at the oblispolkom.

These are the bureaucratic games that are played. How can they manage not to know anything if last year they specially organized an air journey to the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements] for the production workers and representatives of the oblast agroindustrial association, where they were able with their own hands to feel the machinery produced by the Ulyanovsk enterprises for the countryside and this year there was an excursion to the plants themselves?

Just what is this, our age-old inefficiency or the inability to run things effectively or departmental isolation? Some continue to be concerned with paperwork while others continue to rush about the country spending money on searching for what they long ago could have made at home.

Conversion Products at Komsomolsk-na-Amure Aircraft Plant

90UM0468B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by A. Tsvetkov: "New Additions to Conversion"]

[Text] In traveling rapidly over the virgin snow, an originally designed device can be seen during these spring days on the Shargol Channel not far from Komsomolsk-na-Amure. Here they have conducted running trials of small-sized airsleds, a new product from the Aviation Production Association. The light two-seated vehicle can reach a speed of 100 km an hour. In contrast to the 'Buran', it has an enclosed cabin and consumes less fuel. After mounting special floats, the device can move across shallow water and swampy terrain.

With the start of conversion, the aircraft builders have paid great attention to producing consumer goods. During the current year they have begun series production of the Mikro yachts, delta gliders and bicycles, as well as household appliances.

Readers Debate Utility of Pre-Draft Training

Praise, Criticism

90UM0412A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 12

[Comments from readers' letters, telegram, under the rubric "Crossroad: Does the School Need Initial Military Training?": "Measure Seven Times"]

[Text] The article "The School 'In Arms '!'" (No 8) and the selection of articles "Is Initial Military Training Necessary in the School?" (No 9) published in UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA brought numerous responses. As one could have expected, the opinions differed. The military inspectors fervently defend the need for defense and physical culture training for the draft-age and pre-draft youth. Many teachers, however, are dismayed at the trouble and the cost which the forthcoming reorganization of initial military training promises to entail.

We continue the discussion.

Excerpts From Letters

Telegram:

Completely agree with author of article "The School 'In Arms '!'" Consider initial military training in program disgrace to school. Telegram sent per instructions of conference of directors of schools, vocational and technical schools, city of Oktyabrskiy, Buryat ASSR—K. Mochalov, director, Rural School 18

As a former commander of a military unit, I can attest to the fact that the youth who have completed the initial military training course fit into the formation of our homeland's defenders more easily and rapidly, and I also take off my hat and express great thanks to all the military instructors, school directors and teaching staffs who helped me.—Ye. Khristolyubov, Tomsk

I took over the school in August of 1985 and a cavalcade of vehicles arrived literally the next day: the instructor of the rayon CPSU committee, the rayon military commissar, the DOSAAF chairman, the chairman of the rayon trade union committee and an inspector from the rayon [rayon public education department]. I was immediately asked: Where is the shooting range? Where are the weapons stored? Show us the initial military training office! Where is the obstacle course? Only my sense of humor saved me. I fought them off.

The work got into full swing in September. Parents and children gouged out and removed earth from the basement on volunteer Saturdays for two months. They removed it in buckets. Three years after first entering the basement I still had stomach cramps from the work, but we opened the shooting range in December of that year. It met all the specifications: 75 meters long, 1.5 meters high at the entrance and 0.5 at the opposite end.

We set up an obstacle course in the spring of 1986. Everything was just as the military commissariat demanded. The guard post and drill square was a snap compared to this. The initial military training office had been set up the previous winter. We found a room for storing the weapons, enclosed it in 6-millimeter metal and set up an alarm system. We now have all 10 components.

We also have a military instructor. He completed 10 grades and entered a military school. He flunked out.

But do you know what is the most absurd thing? Last academic year we had one boy in the 10th grade, four in the 9th. Here is the result of a firing test on 6 May 1989: one of the four 9th-graders received an excellent rating; three received unsatisfactory ratings.

It is the opinion of the rural school director that the school does not need initial military training.—N. Ukolova, Orenburg Oblast

I was drafted into the army in the spring of 1968. When I arrived at the assembly center I knew only two ranks: a bare shoulder board meant a private; one service stripe indicated a private first class. The next day I knew all of the ranks up to major. A month later I was dismantling and reassembling my weapon with my eyes closed. I could fire fairly well, knew how to dig in and camouflage myself, and I knew the regulations by heart. That is, after a month of general military training, the Ministry of Defense had a finished soldier in me.

I served at one of the military schools from 1973 to 1985. For 12 years I worked with high-school graduates who had only "fours" and "fives" in their records for initial military training. Nobody pays serious attention to these "fives", however.

It is annoying! The young men will never make up those hours taken from the school by the Ministry of Defense, which should have been spent on physics, mathematics and astronomy.

It is only natural to ask why pay twice for military training—at the school and during the first month in the army.—military employee B. Yermenko, Achinsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray

Initial Military Training Thwarts Initiative

90UM0412B Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 2

[Article by L. Melnikova, honored school teacher of the USSR and director of School 609, and Ye. Blekhan, senior instructor of physical education and outstanding educator of the RSFSR, Zelenograd, Moscow Oblast, under the rubric "Crossroad: Does the School Need Initial Military Training?": "Physical Culture at Attention?"]

[Text] We talk so much of late about the school: about its imperfect programs, about how far removed it is from

the children. How frequently we hear ominous reports on the physical condition and illnesses of the youth at conferences on all levels. Alarm, concern.... But a ray of hope flashed before us, it seemed. Every school could operate according to its own plan, discussed and approved within the collective, could experiment, think creatively, work with a long-range view.

As we worked out our plan we recalled L. Tolstoy's remarkable statement: "One absolutely must get in shape physically in order to be healthy morally." We decided to schedule three physical education classes (1 game hour and 2 with scheduled programs) for classes one through eleven by coordinating the programs by subject.

We have a good athletic base (two gymnasiums, two training classrooms and a sports complex at the school) and we tried to organize our work so that all 3 hours were utilized effectively and helped to improve the physical condition of the school children.

This year it was planned to form a special 10th-grade class (the teaching of physical culture) with students desiring upon graduation to enter the oblast Pedagogical Institute imeni N.K. Krupskaya or the TsGOLIFK [Central State Order of Lenin Physical Culture Institute] in order to schedule a daily physical education class in the primary school next year.

One would so like to see the children cheerful and full of life, to teach them physical culture, to make each of them feel the need for it.

But this is not to be! You may rest easy about that. What new plans have been hatched up?! To turn over 20 hours of the physical education for initial military training (with a new name)! Whom did they consult? How was this decision made? It makes one mad! We had just spread our wings and were about to take off. But no, one born to crawl should not fly. Here you have your "Be creative. Be resourceful. Try things."

And how does the USSR Ministry of Health and the State Committee for Education view this? Or have they too raised their hands above their heads and surrendered under the onslaught of the military?

Military Training in School Criticized

90UM0412C Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 2

Article by Ya. Penkov under the rubric "Crossroad: Does the School Need Initial Military Training?": "How Many Times Can One Get Burned"]

[Text] More than 30 methods experts in initial military training and members of the city Voenruk Club gathered at the Moscow IUU [Institute for the Advanced Training of Teachers] to discuss pressing problems. They also invited me, the author of the article "The School 'In Arms'?"

The planned discussion did not take place, however. I was forced to answer questions for an hour and a half: How, why and for what purpose did the aforementioned article appear in the newspaper, an article which, in the unanimous opinion of those assembled, discredits the profession of the military instructor and defames the Soviet Army? They asked me whether the author was qualified, whether he had a moral right to engage in this sort of judgement of the defense and physical culture training.

But excuse me, respected specialists in military training in the school! I have lived to the age of grey hair, and although I did not smell any gunpowder, I served in the airborne troops, worked as a fitter at a plant and graduated from the school of journalism at Moscow State University. I have written for the teachers' press going on 17 years. I have been familiar with the school reform since its inception. Eleven billion [rubles] were pumped into it, and the pedagogical train still stands there. It could not move forward in the situation of command-style administration, on the old beaten path of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, hobbled by ministerial instructions.

The plan appeared to be a good one: to prepare workers-and-specialists, an untouched reserve of labor resources, at the school desk. The concept on which the reform was based was a failure, however. The school could not provide its graduates with the full range of professional training. And the implanted job training, which consisted mainly of the monotonous operations involved in hammering boxes together, ultimately evoked in the adolescents a feeling of revulsion and a fierce disinclination to work in industry.

I do not want to draw any parallels between labor indoctrination and the young fightingman's course of study within the school. I am confident, however, that the modernization of initial military training being hastily prepared by the USSR Ministry of Defense is another swing from one extreme to the other. How else does one explain the fact that such an important department persistently resists submitting the draft documents and the defense and physical culture training program to the teachers and the community for glasnost and discussion? The important ukase and law, the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers and orders from the USSR minister of defense and the chairman of the USSR State Committee for Education have already been prepared. It remains only to number and date them and obtain the signatures.

But first permit me to look at the substance of the mandatory state subject.

The physical training (12 hours) includes practical classes in hand-to-hand combat (10 hours) and negotiation of an obstacle course (2 hours).

Hand-to-hand combat? Practical exercises: bayonetting (jabbing with the barrel), side thrusts with the butt, parrying with the semiautomatic rifle, blows with the

hands and feet, strangulation from behind, escaping from the enemy's hold, and so forth and so on.

The firing training (21 hours) involves learning the combat features and the arrangement of the Kalashnikov semiautomatic rifle and fragmentation hand grenades and the rules for firing at stationary and pop-up targets.

The tactical training (13 hours) consists in learning the features of combined-arms combat, the soldier's duties, types of fire and maneuvering, methods of conducting reconnaissance, the combat features of the main tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters of the NATO nations and the rules for firing at air targets.

The tactical, engineering and other kinds of military training have been worked out within this extremely narrow framework of specifics. And the comprehensive defense and physical culture classes (40 hours) are to reinforce and improve theoretical and practical knowledge and skills.

This is the expected pattern of militarization. In the era of restructuring and democratization of our society, however, it will hardly conform to the real objectives and tasks of public education. And our entire world, so to speak, needs to think seriously about whether it is worth including military affairs in this form in the school's educational process. Let the elective departments, special groups and clubs prepare the youth to serve in the army on an extracurricular basis.

Military Encroachment on School Hours Scored

90UM0412D Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Lyakh, head of the Scientific Research Laboratory for the Physiology of Children and Adolescents of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, under the rubric "Crossroad: Does the School Need Initial Military Training?": "Into Retirement!"]

[Text] I was prompted to write this article for UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA by the proposal put forth by the USSR Ministry of Defense that we institute a new subject within the public education system, defense and physical culture training for the draft-age and pre-draft youth, and by the article in the newspaper.

What is the Ministry of Defense proposing? Nothing more and nothing less than converting the initial military training course of 140 hours into the subject of defense and physical culture training (160 hours), removing 20 hours from the physical culture classes for the upper-grade students. At least three questions occur to one: 1. Is the USSR Ministry of Defense aware of the restructuring trends presently underway within the public education system? 2. Is it aware of what their intervention in the school has produced and is now producing? 3. Is it correct to call the subject "defense and physical culture training"?

A study of the draft firmly convinces one that the Ministry of Defense is apparently little familiar with the concepts and trends of the restructuring of public education in our nation.

Otherwise, it could not fail to notice that democratization and humanization and the concept of all-around spiritual and physical development of the individual and other trends which have developed not just within the public education system but in our society as a whole absolutely do not mesh with the new plan for defense and physical culture training for the draft-age and pre-draft youth and are essentially a covert attempt to further militarize the school.

A study of the initial military training shows that even the current 140 hours allocated for this is to a significant degree an unproductive waste of time and effort, primarily on the part of the military instructors, who have extremely weak pedagogical and sometimes, even professional, training and overall culture.

At the present time school directors and teachers of physical culture do not have social protection against interference on the part of the military department, which, as it makes its unqualified inspections, is reducing even more the number of hours for physical culture and reducing it to all those fairly primitive physical conditioning norms (chin-ups, grenade tossing, endurance running and so forth). The result is a disruption of the training and indoctrinational process, a further deterioration of the children's interest and their alienation from physical exercises.

Accomplishing the defense and physical culture preparation of the youth by forcibly imposing upon it physical culture classes in the upper grades seems like another perfectly unjustified (and illiterate!) undertaking totally in conflict with the concept of restructuring public education in our nation.

No one would argue that the development of patriotism, morality, a readiness to defend the socialist homeland and an awareness of the need to perform one's military service as an honored duty of citizens of the USSR are important. We need substantially to restructure the entire system of indoctrination in the school, however, and not farm it out exclusively to the military department. Many years of experience has demonstrated that the accomplishment of these things by the military alone produces directly opposite results.

Discussion of Difficulties in Administering Draft

90UM396A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian No 10, 5-11 Mar 90 p 13

[Article by Nikolay Zhichkin under the rubric "Hup, Hup, Left!...": "The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty: Is the Law a Shaft?"]

[Text] At the end of last year I had the opportunity to visit a unit of the Air Defense Forces. I talked with soldiers just

coming off guard duty. The fellows looked fairly tired. Guard duty is not a piece of cake.

"That is not what makes it hard," one of the soldiers complained when the discussion turned to the difficulties. "Every other day we have to put on the harness. It is one detail after another. There is no time to rest...."

"Why is that?"

"There are not enough men."

I recalled this conversation when I became familiar with certain aspects of the work involved in inducting the youth into the army. I talked with draftees, their parents and veterans of the army. I met with workers from the military commissariats. It is here, at the military commissariats, where the rivulet of replenishments which flows into the army stream has its source. Is that rivulet not drying up?

"It has not reached that point," I was told by Col A. Petrov, military commissariat for Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon. "There are some obstructions, however. We do not have any cases in which draftees have burned their military service records, as was done in the Baltic area, to be sure, or in which they have openly refused to serve in the army. However... last year for the first time we were unable to provide the Armed Forces with the our quota of recruits."

"A demographic 'pit'"?

"It is more than that. There are several causes."

The colonel (and also a number of letters to the editors) listed as one of the main causes the aspiration of a certain part of the youth to become a student at any VUZ, even the most non-prestigious, by hook or by crook. It makes absolutely no difference whether they like their future specialty. The main thing is that an institute enables them to receive a draft deferment and avoid serving in the army. This is done within the shadow of the law, to be sure, but the consequences are no less troubling for that. Not just with respect to manning the army, but also in the social sense.

"If a certain portion of the youth do not serve, while others are required to go on active duty, there are those people among the "obligated" who will ask: 'Why just me? Why is my peer, who has the same rights as I, not bearing equal obligations?' And it is just a step away from this question to practical attempts to achieve equality."

"This is how it is manifested," said Maj Yu. Kirilenko, an officer with the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, pointing at a pile of personal files of draftees. "These are all people evading the draft. There are 65."

There are "dodgers" also in other rayons—more in some, fewer in others. Young people sometimes do not report to the military commissariats after receiving two or three notices. Ivan Mikhaylovich Lapin, an artist by

occupation, for example, reached the age of 27 years without having been in the army. While enjoying all the rights of citizens, certain youth have completely forgotten about their duties to the state and the society. More accurately, they have not forgotten but have shifted them, like parasites, onto the shoulders of their peers.

We talk a lot about a rule-of-law state. We sometimes whine that we do not have this or that law. Everything is clear in this case, however. We have it, the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. Why is it not obeyed? Perhaps the military commissariats indulge those who shirk their military duty? I, for one, have not encountered cases of this.

"We do everything we are supposed to," Maj Yu. Kirilenko said. "But just look at the run-around we get from the rayon procurator's office! Specifically? Take Igor Minin. He evaded the draft during the spring of last year. The case was sent to the rayon procurator's office, requesting that the steps specified by the law be taken. We heard not a thing from there. We repeated the request; once again, not a word. Not until 27 November 1989 were we informed that criminal charges had been filed. The fall induction passed and we began preparing for the spring draft. This was now the third date for Minin. Then we received a report from the procurator's office: "...the criminal case against I.V. Minin was dropped due to lack of evidence.—S.A. Kildyashev, investigator with the procurator's office of Moscow's Oktyabrskiy Rayon."

"What now?"

"We shall write more letters. In almost every such case we have to contact the procurator's office several times. Ordinarily in vain."

"Does the law perhaps provide loopholes for such actions?"

"I do not believe so. The law does need to be improved, but the hitch lies not in the law. Those who are supposed to enforce the law do not have the proper sense of civic responsibility. Even the most perfect legislative acts have no force if they are not carried out."

One has to agree with this statement. The issues of military reform, the adoption of a more precise legal definition of the functions of the Armed Forces, improvement of the system for manning them, the possibility of alternative service and so forth are being extensively and universally discussed in the society today—from smoking-rooms to the meeting hall of the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, it is acknowledged that even today the state needs a powerful army capable of protecting the nation. And until something new is provided, the old can certainly not be abolished. We have already felt the negative effects of this approach in our economy: former structures either weakened or destroyed, new ones not built. This approach can affect the nation's defense capability even more powerfully. In

order to prevent this from happening, we need to observe the laws which exist now. And we can see that they are not being observed everywhere.

The impunity is giving birth to more and more "dodgers." Not only are their ranks growing, but the very methods used for evading the draft are being perfected. A group of young men in a preparatory course at one of the capital's VUZs did not report to the induction center last spring. Their reasoning was simple: Fall will be here before Themis gets to the bottom of it (and, as we have seen, she is in no hurry). Perhaps I will be a student by then. All sorts of devices are used: reports of fictitious illnesses and various petitions going all the way to a declaration that the draftee is not a Soviet national. A basic investigation will dispel all of this nonsense, but by the time one has been conducted, the induction period has passed. The objective has been achieved! After one has become a student, no one is about to bring the individual to accountability for the fact that six months before he grossly violated the law. There has never yet been a single case of this!

Certain draftees also take advantage of the reliable "protection" of high-level military officials. It would seem that the military department should observe the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty more rigidly than anyone else. Unfortunately, however, it contains people who operate differently. For example, the editors learned that Aleksandr Zotov, born in 1971, had evaded the draft. He was to have been drafted into the army in the spring of 1989. He had no grounds for deferment, but he received one nonetheless. How did he manage that? It seems that the rayon military commissariat was instructed, in accordance with instructions from the USSR Air Force General Staff, to consider "the matter of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zotov's induction for active military duty in the rayon draft commission in the spring of 1990."

"Does this mean that you will draft Zotov this spring?" I asked a worker in the military commissariat.

"No," the officer said, and showed me a notice: "The consular section of the USSR Embassy confirms the fact that Comrade A.A. Zotov is a first-year student at Damascus University.—Ya. Islamov, head of the Consular Department of the USSR Embassy in the Syrian Arab Republic."

I do not want to think anything bad, but did the "instructions from the USSR Air Force General Staff" on the postponement of the induction from the fall to the spring not come into being because of this notice?

The General Staff is very busy, particularly at the present time. It apparently also has extensive authority of which we are unaware. When one learns about such instructions, certainly not national in scope, however, one automatically wonders whether the General Staff has the right to interfere with a law established by the nation's Supreme Soviet. And interference does occur.

We know, for example, that this same authority has deferred inductions into the army for a large number of young actors. The healthy fellows avoided the army with the help of the General Staff. Some of them are at the Bolshoy Theater, at the Moscow Conservatory, in the Moscow Philharmonic Society, in the Souvenir Theater Ensemble, at the Alla Pugacheva Theater and in a number of other musical and theater groups.

I would not venture to judge whether this action substantially strengthened Soviet culture, but I am certain that it was not beneficial to the army, a significant part of our social and state system.

And so, does the General Staff have the authority to issue draft deferments? If it does, then why is there not a word about this in the law? I have read it carefully and nowhere did I find such an article. The Council of Ministers, however, can, "in cases of special need, specify categories of citizens to whom deferments of induction for active military duty can be granted for other reasons"—that is, for reasons not stipulated in the law.

Even if we put the legal aspect aside, however, there is another factor in this "artistic" story which one cannot avoid. Go to the plants, sovkhozes and kolkhozes, reader, and ask them how many excellent and talented lathe operators, machine operators, grain harvesters and livestock specialists have been exempted from the draft because the farm needed them. At best, the question will evoke a condescending smile; in the worst case, you will be taken for crazy. You will not find any examples of this. It has become the rule that he who feeds and clothes the nation also has to defend it.

And so, this is how the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty is carried out. This duty is not universal, it turns out. That introduction, the saying "The law is like a shaft; whichever way you point it is where you will go," which, I previously assured you, goes back to the accursed czarist times, still lives. And it should not.

The Military Council Session

The results of the work performed by the military commissariats on the induction for active military duty in 1989 were discussed at a session of the district military council.

It was noted at the session that most of the military commissariats successfully coped with their inductions targets under the difficult conditions produced in a number of places by the unstable situation and by the growth of pacifist sentiments among the youth. The Voronezh, Bryansk, Tula and Kursk military commissariats had the best performance.

The poor organization of the work in a number of oblasts is a result of weak ties between the military commissariats and local party and soviet organs, DOSAAF committees and public organizations.

The lessons derived from the draft must be taken into account this year. New work methods should be actively adopted in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and in the training of the youth in military affairs.

Col Gen N.V. Kalinin, district commander, summed up the discussion.

Civil-Military Roundtable: Pros, Cons of Professional Army

90UM0410A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Mar 90
pp 1-2

[Roundtable discussion with Professor I.I. Yudin, doctor of economic sciences; CPSU Central Committee International Department Senior Reader A.P. Kireyev, candidate of economic sciences; Major General S.M. Yermakov, deputy chief of faculty of MFI [Moscow Institute of Finance]; Senior Scientific Associate of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute under the AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences] A.I. Izyumov; Colonel V.M. Deynega, deputy department chief of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, conducted by V. Badurkin and B. Kuzmishchev: "A Professional Army; For and Against"]

[Text] We have the largest Army in the world. Eight percent of the country's gross national product is spent on defense. Voices are being increasingly heard that the Army should be reduced and should become professional. The opponent's main argument is the inevitable increase of expenditures. A meeting of TRUD's roundtable was also dedicated to the economic grounds of the "polarized" points of view. The following people participated in it: Professor I.I. Yudin, doctor of economic sciences; Senior Reader of the CPSU Central Committee International Department A.P. Kireyev, candidate of economic sciences; Major General S.M. Yermakov, deputy chief of faculty of MFI [Moscow Institute of Finance]; Senior Scientific Associate of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute under the AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences] A.I. Izyumov; Colonel V.M. Deynega, deputy department chief of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin.

[Izyumov] I will immediately point out: I am an advocate of a professional army. Professionalism is, first of all, a reduction of losses in the event of conflicts. No matter how we assess it, let us say, the Americans lost a total of 23 men during the U.S. Army Panama operation (We are justifiably revolted by this aggression). Secondly, this is a reinforcement of discipline and the elimination of "dedovshchina" [hazing of conscripts] and other similar phenomena. Thirdly, professionals' equipment will serve for a longer period of time. Fourth, resolution of social problems (right now servicemen are one of the most vulnerable social categories, on a par with pensioners and students).

[Deynega] As far as I understand it, by professionalization you mean a transition to the principle of volunteer manning of the Armed Forces. And will it be more

effective from a military point of view in contrast with the currently existing [system] when a significant portion of the Army—officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers, and extended service personnel are already professionals? Moreover, I suggest that the current system demonstrates our advantages and not our shortcomings. It is capable of supplying the required mobilized reserve from those who have already undergone military service.

[Yudin] The Army's strength depends on many factors, including on the size of the country, the extent of its borders, and its human resources. Since the Middle Ages, they have determined how many soldiers the State may have based on millions of population.

[Kireyev] The most unproductive way is to calculate the number of people per square kilometer.

[Yudin] Of course that is not the main factor right now but it also must be considered. According to my calculations, and I have been engaged in this for a long time, the optimal size of our Army under the current military political situation should be approximately 2.4-2.8 million men. As of January 1st, we have four million [men]. The international situation permits us to reduce the Armed Forces to a much lower level, possibly to 1.5-2 million men.

As a result, we have favorable conditions to increase the professional portion of the Army. I will point out that I am not an advocate of transitioning to a totally professional army in the next 10-15 years but I advocate strengthening its professionalization. The fact is that there are many positions that do not require thorough special knowledge from soldiers. At the same time, it is economically disadvantageous to have professional servicemen in these positions. Therefore, it is advisable to arrive at this ratio in the Army: One extended service soldier to one professional serviceman. Right now the professional portion of the Army (officers, warrant officers, and female servicemen) comprises a smaller portion of Armed Forces strength. A mixed personnel manning principle will allow us to recruit volunteers for professional service from among those extended service servicemen released to the reserves who already know military life.

[Izyumov] Naturally, we cannot talk about Army reductions in the abstract without considering the external factor. All of our senior leadership's discussions are based a priori on the fact that an attack is being prepared against us. Of course, both we and "they" have strategic plans. But I think that today the probability of an economic or, let us say, an ecological disaster is much greater than military aggression. Under these conditions, it is very difficult for the economy to support an enormous Army.

According to official data, our country spends eight percent of its gross national product on defense. If that is really correct, that means we are spending one and a half times fewer physical resources than the U.S. to provide

the same military potential and our country's defense sector productivity is one and a half times greater than American [productivity]. There is something here that I cannot believe. I think that accounting for all direct and indirect expenditures for military needs will of course result in a number that is significantly more solid. This burden is beyond the economy's strength during the current crisis situation. Incidentally, recall that the sharpest reduction of the Army coincided with the beginning of the NEP [New Economic Policy] when the military political situation was much more alarming than it is now. But from 1920 through 1924, the Army was reduced from somewhere around five million to 500,000 men.

Now as for the increase in expenditures. In my opinion, the data on enormous expenditures for a professional army that our highest military leaders presented do not withstand criticism. They said in particular that expenditures will increase by a factor of six to seven. How did this number arise? Really unless expenditures for personnel salaries and equipment maintenance increase sixfold—and they total 20 billion rubles—then we will get 120 billion rubles. Does it turn out that we need 44,000 rubles per year for each servicemen's salary even with a four million man Army? Obviously this is absurd. Then just what do they have in mind with these six- and seven-fold increases in expenditures?

[Kireyev] I also find these calculations to be incomprehensible. Incidentally, it is very complicated to calculate our military budget since it is dispersed through a multitude of budget items in the most varied and unexpected ministries. When [these expenditures totaled] 77.3 billion rubles, I raised the question: How real is this figure?

[Yudin] The volume of military expenditures announced for 1989 does not personally cause me any doubts. The fact is that a year prior to this, using my own methodology, I calculated that we spend not 20.2 billion rubles for defense as the official statistics reported but approximately 74-76 billion rubles. Several other economists also obtained similar figures. As we can see, the independent estimate is close to the official data.

[Yermakov] Nevertheless, let us return to the topic of our conversation. No one from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense refutes the need to increase the efficiency of military labor right up to a professional army. The problem is something else: How economically justified is the creation of such an army at the present time.

[Deynega] We cannot approach the issue in a simplistic manner while defining the costs associated with the possible future transition of the Armed Forces to a volunteer manning principle. Significant expenditures will be associated with servicemen's monetary allowances. What should they be? Not long ago, the commander of the Moscow PVO [Air Defense] District asked a soldier: "Who among you will serve in the Army for

100 rubles? Under this same order?" They began laughing. "Who [among you will serve in the Army] for 200, for 300 [rubles]...?" And only two agreed to serve for 400 rubles. But if soldier's labor earns such salaries, the "value" of officer labor will increase accordingly. In the U.S., officers salaries are an average of two to three times greater than soldiers salaries.

Furthermore, creation of special conditions are required to increase the attractiveness of military duty and to make it more interesting. And we need to eliminate uncharacteristic labor activities and raise the provisioning equipment level to do this. Unfortunately, there is a mass of heavy, unskilled, and unattractive work right now in the Armed Forces. For example, how much loading and unloading work is accomplished using manual labor without elementary mechanized systems. This means we need to modernize rear services. This is also expensive.

[Yermakov] While challenging predicted expenditures, some economists assert that the transition to a totally professional Army in the U.S. did not result in a sharp increase in military expenditures. Yes, they did not but only because selective military service conscripts salaries were set at the same level as the professionals prior to the transition to 100 percent professionalization. Only the form of conscription or the manning principle was changed in their country but not the method of payment. And really we have an entirely different situation in our country.

Of today's nearly four million man Army, the majority are privates and sergeants whose labor will have to be paid for in a new way. According to my calculations, with 400 ruble per month salaries for professionals, we will need additional billions of rubles per year plus significant expenditures to satisfy their social needs. (apartments and the like). We need to add 4-5 billion rubles in unavoidable salary increases to this for the professionals (we already have). The result is 22-23 billion additional rubles. If you consider that we are spending 5.8 billion rubles per year for personnel salaries right now and not the 20 billion rubles per year that we talked about here. Of course, this is not such a frightening number but it will be very difficult to find it in our quite modest financial "bins."

[Kireyev] In my opinion, we need to change the direction of financing and make it socially oriented. Where do we take money for a professional army? First and foremost is to redefine the items in the military budget. What do I have in mind? Right now we have the military budget for 1990—71 billion rubles. Of that, 31 billion is being spent on equipment purchases and 19.3 billion for support of the Army and the Navy. Resources for the transition to a professional army may also be taken from these two budget items.

For information: These same budget items in the U.S. are roughly identical for the 1990 financial year. That is,

they are spending about the same for new equipment purchases and for maintenance of personnel.

Under the existing military budget structure, incomparably more equipment is being purchased than the Army can "digest." Already not talking about the fact that our Army is equipped with an enormous number of brands and types of equipment. Let us say we have more types of strategic missiles than the U.S. It would seem that there should be more of them over on the other side of the ocean since they have private suppliers there but things are just the opposite for now.

In short, our industrial complex has overloaded the Army with military equipment that is being poorly utilized to a significant degree, is often sitting idle, and malfunctions earlier because this component, like a man, is not worth the expenditures. Hence—low professionalism. This step has been suggesting itself for a long time: Reallocate the military budget in favor of the man in uniform.

[Yudin] If we increase expenditures for maintenance of personnel and combat equipment maintenance, the Army's equipment provisioning level will drop in our country. Understand me correctly. I do not advocate further militarization but there is no weapon in the world right now that costs less in comparison with a model from the previous generation. But I agree: We can find reserves in the military budget. Here is one of them—the command and control and maintenance system. Of course, in my opinion, it is rather large when you consider the redundant elements.

However, while speaking about the increase of expenditures associated with professionalization of the Army, we should not forget one very acute and painful issue—the social sphere. And I am afraid that precisely it (and first of all the housing problem) can become a major stumbling block on the path toward professionalization of the Army. You really cannot house hired soldiers in the barracks. They require rooms in hotel-type dormitories and the married ones require apartments. If contracts are long (and others are simply unthinkable), there will be quite a few soldiers with families. Additional appropriations of approximately 12-14 billion rubles per year are required for this purpose alone. Even in the event that the size of the Armed Forces is decreased by half.

If we continually base predictions on the Pentagon's example, we must also remember that, in the U.S., a soldier still has a number of social benefits besides a quite decent salary. For example, in the area of education. Furthermore, he receives a pension upon completion of the contract. Having served for ten years, he provides for his future.

I think that today and even for the next five or six years our economy cannot handle this "load."

[Kireyev] Thus, the transition to a professional army must also begin precisely with the social sphere! Yes,

many of our military leaders argue that it is impossible to transition to a professional system precisely due to the undeveloped social sphere. This question immediately arises: Just how are they planning to keep Soviet officers and soldiers in such, putting it mildly, unpleasant conditions? When financial priorities are primarily oriented toward development of the social sphere, the problem of creating a professional army can be placed on a practical footing.

[Yermakov] In my opinion, we must analyze not only the experience of the American Army but also those of European countries in our search for an optimal solution. In many of them, soldiers' positions are manned based on selective military service [conscription]. Almost half of their armed forces consist of soldiers who are not simply drafted but who are also selected for service.

I think that this is a possible version: Increase the number of professionals to 50 percent due to the transition of sergeant and specialist positions to this manning principle. And man the remaining fifty percent (and this will total more than one million men with a reduced Army) based on selective conscription. Really with our demographic capabilities, not so many boys will be annually required for the Army. The governing and public health organs will decide who stands in ranks. The main thing is that there will be a selection. This will allow us to have professionals in the key positions upon which our combat capability depends, will create a permanent flow of young men into the Army and Navy, and will promote formation of strong mobilized reserves. There may also be other alternatives but we need to study them all carefully.

Under all conditions, it is extremely important to create greater economic opportunities for professionals, to transfer them to a contract basis with strictly stated rights and obligations of the parties, and to create an incentive system for successful military service. Non-professional rank and file personnel must be totally freed from uncharacteristic economic work and their efforts must be concentrated only on mastering combat readiness missions. Society is obliged to also create an incentive system for those who undergo service under the selective service system.

From the editor: The discussion around military reform has already revealed quite a few problems that society must resolve if it decides in favor of a professional army. The draft pre-congress Party Central Committee platform notes that military reform is needed. The arguments set forth here are evidence that the task is complicated and it will not be resolved overnight. We need to consider not only emotions and good intentions but also the actual economic situation.

It is obvious that professionalization of our Army is not a matter for today. But since this idea has not only entered the social consciousness but has also materialized in the specific programs of some USSR People's

Deputies, we already need to consider various versions of it right now. And not only military but also independent economists. So that the simple people, the taxpayers, can really see: Is a professional army advantageous or not and does our state need it.

Azerbaijani Procuracy Promotes Observance of Draft

90UM0647A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 27 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Within the Azerbaijan SSR Procuracy"]

[Text] In accordance with the USSR Law "Regarding Universal Military Service," a great deal of organizational and military patriotic work is underway within the republic on preparing citizens for service within the USSR Armed Forces. As was rightly noted at the Second USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies, it is only young people from Azerbaijan who are not refusing to serve in the army.

However, some anti-social elements are disseminating anti-army attitudes and even are attempting to disrupt the conscription campaign in order to destabilize the situation within the republic. In connection with this, organs of the Procuracy are conducting a major propaganda and clarification effort among the population

about the need to observe the law about the universal military responsibility and about the consequences of not observing the law. Measures of a preventive nature are being taken in relation to those who would break the law; and the most malicious of these are receiving the full weight of Soviet laws. For example, Citizen F. Gadzhiyev was exposed by the office of the procuracy in the Kirovskiy Rayon of the city of Baku. During the spring 1989 call-up, Gadzhiyev, in a conspiracy with others and acting on behalf of the Azerbaijan Peoples' Front, penetrated the Baladzhar'skiy assembly point and flagrantly violated public order and the normal work of the draft organs. He used a megaphone to appeal to the young people to refuse to serve in the army. In spite of a warning, F. Gadzhiyev repeated such actions on several occasions. On one occasion he stopped a bus loaded with draftees on its way to Baku from one of the regions of the republic.

F. Gadzhiyev's actions have caused considerable harm to the government and criminal charges have been made against him; however, he hid from investigation.

F. Gadzhiyev has been arrested. When arrested he was wearing the uniform of a military serviceman with the rank of a colonel; and he was carrying an illegal firearm. F. Gadzhiyev has been charged and is now imprisoned under guard. The investigation of the matter continues.

GLAVPUR Initiates Textbook Competition

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 90
First Edition p 2*

[Article: "For Future Officers"]

[Text] The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy announces a competition for the preparation of new textbooks for students at higher military schools of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

GOAL OF THE COMPETITION:

Preparation of high-quality textbooks, corresponding to the new training programs for the social sciences being taught in USSR Ministry of Defense Higher Military Educational Institutions

AIMS OF THE COMPETITION:

- to activize scientific and methodological inquiry by social scientists at military and civilian higher educational institutions to improve the content and method of instruction of the social sciences;
- to seek the most successful variants for the development of textbooks for students at USSR Ministry of Defense higher military schools on the subjects: "Philosophy," "Political Economy," "Theory of Socialism," "Political History of the 20th Century," "Military Psychology and Pedagogy," "Military Economy," "Military Geography," "Political Education Work of the Commander (Military Engineer)," and "Logic;"
- to generalize and disseminate leading experience in teaching the social sciences and compiling topical plans and programs for the indicated educational disciplines.

CONDITIONS OF THE COMPETITION:

All who so desire may participate in the competition. Works shall be accepted that are prepared by a collective of authors, or by individual persons, typewritten (double spaced), not to exceed 20 typed pages (including illustrations and appendices).

The material must correspond to the standard topical plans and programs developed by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and meet the following basic requirements:

- optimal combination of scientific character and vividness of form, accessibility, simplicity of depiction, and general human and class approaches;

—methodological accuracy of assessments of history and our day, and of positions of non-Marxist views, ideas, and theories of the past and present;

—accounting for the particularities of military readers, and their professional military training;

—direct link with the life and activity of the USSR Armed Forces;

—an up-to-date view on the theory and practice of the subject, taking into account the latest achievements in the natural, technical and social sciences;

—practical implementation of the requirements of didactic principles.

The appearance of the finished material shall be in accordance with the requirements of the USSR State Committee on Education, for published works.

PERIOD OF THE COMPETITION:

May 1990-May 1991.

PROCEDURE FOR HOLDING THE COMPETITION:

The competition shall be held in two stages.

Stage 1: May-December 1990.

As a result of Stage 1, two each of the best works (textbooks, sections, chapters, paragraphs) will be selected for participation in the following stage.

Stage 2: January-May 1991.

Collectives of authors will be organized from among the Stage 1 winners to prepare the textbooks for publication.

A specially created commission shall hold and sum up the results of the competition, and determine its winners.

The participants and winners of the competition will be given incentive awards by the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

Send prepared materials to: **103160, Moscow, K-160, Marshal Shaposhnikov Street, 14, Social Sciences Department, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.**

Telephone numbers for information: 293-46-92 and 293-44-88.

'Confidential' 1939 Agreement Between Army, Lithuania

90UM0497A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 14, Apr 90
p 7

[Article: "Lithuania, 1939: What the Protocol to a Confidential Agreement Revealed"]

[Text] Entry of the Baltic republics into the USSR has recently become one of the most timely issues. Special attention is being turned to the manner in which Red Army forces were introduced. Did an occupation occur, or were Red Army units supposed to have shielded the republic from impending fascist aggression?

The answer to this question is contained in a number of documents of the Soviet Army Central State Archives that were quite recently declassified and transferred to open storage. One of these documents, never previously published, is presented here for the reader's attention. This is the protocol to an agreement between representatives of the command of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and the Lithuanian government on stationing Soviet troop units on the republic's territory, dated 31 October 1939.

Natalya Yelisseyeva, candidate of historical sciences, associate of the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army.

Confidential: AGREEMENT BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMAND OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS RED ARMY OF THE USSR AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT ON STATIONING OF USSR TROOP UNITS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC.

In correspondence with the agreement to transfer to the Lithuanian republic the city of Vilnius and Vilnius Oblast and on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania, signed on 10 October 1939 between the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic, representatives of the command of the Workers and Peasants Red Army of the USSR and representatives of the Lithuanian government resolved that:

1. USSR troop units with a total strength of up to 20,000 (twenty thousand) persons are to be stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic in the following places:

Ground Forces:

a) Novaya Vileyka—headquarters of Soviet forces in Lithuania, infantry and artillery. Total strength up to 4,500 (four thousand five hundred) persons.

b) Alitus—infantry, artillery, motorized and mechanized units, combat engineers and signal units. Total strength up to 8,000 (eight thousand) persons.

c) Priyenay—infantry and artillery. Total strength up to 2,500 (two thousand five hundred) persons.

d) Gayzhunay training ground—mechanized units. Total strength up to 3,500 (three thousand five hundred) persons.

Aviation:

Main bases:

a) Gayzhunay training ground airfield—bomber aviation, strength up to 900 (nine hundred) persons.

b) Alitus—fighter aviation, strength up to 600 (six hundred) persons.

Until such time that buildings and airfields are built at the above-indicated places, fighter and bomber aviation is to be located together with its bases at Porubanek airfield.

2. Land plots on a line extending through Skuodas, Jurbarkas and Alytus and on a line extending through Siauliai, Jonava and Vilnius—four plots along each of the two indicated lines—are allocated to provide landing strips (operating airfields) to aviation on the basis of an agreement between the Command of the Soviet Forces in Lithuania and the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army.

Reconnaissance and reservation of the land plots for landing strips are to begin immediately.

Soviet airplanes will land on the landing strips in coordination with the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army.

3. Soviet military aviation stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic possesses the right to fly within the region specified in the appended map, adhering to the same rules followed by Lithuanian military aviation.

4. Overflight of the state border of Lithuania into the USSR and back by Soviet airplanes is to occur on the basis of a special agreement with the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army in each individual case.

5. Buildings and land plots are to be reserved as training fields, airfields, landing strips and tank driving ranges and their boundaries are to be determined by the government of the Lithuanian Republic on agreement with the Command of the Soviet Forces in Lithuania.

These measures are to be implemented without delay.

6. Construction of main airfields, repair of allocated buildings and construction of new buildings are to be financed by the USSR government.

To the extent possible, the government of the Lithuanian Republic is to provide all-out assistance in supplying construction materials, equipment and manpower.

The procedures of construction work, leasing terms, and equally so the procedures of wage payment are established by a special agreement between the governments of the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic.

7. Matters concerning the use of communication resources, routes of communication and various forms of transportation belonging to the Lithuanian Republic, the procedures for making purchases on Lithuanian territory and paying for them, and the procedures for importing the military freight of Soviet forces into Lithuania and exporting it are determined by special agreements between the governments of the USSR and the Lithuanian Republic.

8. The command of Soviet forces present in Lithuania is to communicate with the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army directly or through a liaison officer.

Chiefs of stations occupied by Soviet troop units are to communicate directly or through a liaison officer, and only with those division commanders of the Lithuanian Army on whose territory their units are located.

In the necessary cases military officials are to communicate with the local administration, including bodies of local self-administration, by way of a Lithuanian Army liaison officer.

9. Individual Soviet servicemen or military teams may enter Lithuania and visit the locations of Soviet troop units only after first notifying the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army of such intent. Notification is accomplished through the Command of Soviet Forces in Lithuania.

The notice must include the first and last names of the servicemen, the Soviet troop unit station they wish to visit, and the border points through which they will enter into Lithuania.

Soviet servicemen entering Lithuania must possess temporary duty orders indicating the Soviet troop unit station in Lithuania they intend to visit.

Individual Soviet servicemen or teams returning to the USSR must possess the corresponding orders from the chief of their station, and visas from the Lithuanian liaison officer of that same station. The team chief maintains possession of the team roster.

10. Three days before the Soviet troop units foreseen in the agreement enter Lithuanian territory, the Commander of Soviet Forces in Lithuania is to furnish the Commander of the Lithuanian Army with information on the composition of the troop units traveling to their stations.

The order and route of travel of the units to their stations are determined jointly by the Command of Soviet Forces and the Headquarters of the Lithuanian Army.

11. Soviet troops are to enter Lithuanian territory as of 3 November 1939, and immediately in the cities of Novaya Vileyka and Porubanek.

12. Soviet forces temporarily stationed in the city of Vilnius are to be withdrawn not later than 15 December 1939.

13. All matters not qualified by this agreement associated with presence of Soviet troops in Lithuania are to be settled on the basis of special agreements.

14. This agreement becomes effective as of 30 October 1939.

This agreement was drafted in two originals in Russian and in Lithuanian, in the city of Kaunas on 28 October 1939.

Representatives of the Workers and Peasants Red Army:

Army Commander 2d Rank—(Kovalev), and four other persons.

Representatives of the Lithuanian Government:

General—Rashtikis and 13 other persons.

Confidential: SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

In order to maintain military secrecy, representatives of the Workers and Peasants Red Army of the USSR and representatives of the Lithuanian Government resolve that information on the location, composition, armament and combat training of Soviet troops in Lithuania will not be revealed in the Lithuanian press and on radio, and the location, composition, armament and combat training of Lithuanian troops will not be revealed in the Soviet press and on radio without preliminary coordination between the Soviet and Lithuanian military commands.

Kaunas, 28 October 1939

Army Commander 2d Rank L. Kovalev, chairman of the delegation from the Workers and Peasants Red Army

Rashtikis, chairman of the delegation from the Lithuanian Government

New-Found Wartime Documents Reveal German Intent Toward Baltics

90UM0497B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 13, Mar 90 p 7

[Article by Anna Yuryeva: "The General Plan 'Ost'"]

[Text] Almost 45 years have passed since Victory Day, and we are just beginning to read the history of the war as told by original documents. Recently a number of previously unknown or little-known captured documents were discovered in the archives of the GDR, providing additional information on the true intentions of the Germans in relation to the Baltic republics.

When I use the word "true" in relation to the documents, it is because I am familiar with the rather widespread opinion today in the Baltic, that in view of their closeness to the German race, the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would have been in some sort of privileged position under the Germans.

According to the plans of the German political and military leadership, approved long before the invasion of the USSR, all Soviet territory was to be divided into individual state formations, separate from each another and either openly possessing the status of German protectorates with the prospect of future direct inclusion into the "Third Reich," or treated as supposedly "independent" states but for practical purposes ones totally dependent on Germany.

Seven such future "territorial units" were listed in a memorandum dated 2 April 1941 (that is, two and a half months before the invasion of the USSR) and written by an "official for centralized solution of the problems of Eastern European space," specially appointed to administer the occupied territories. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were included in one of these units.

Immediately after their occupation, the Germans combined these three republics into the "Reichskommissariat Ostland." Together with other Reichskommissariats, "Ostland" was subordinated to the Imperial Ministry for Affairs of Occupied Eastern Territories, created in Berlin on 17 July 1941 and headed by the Baltic German Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitler's closest associates and a leading ideologist of racism and colonial policy in the East.

The objectives of practically achieving colonization of the captured territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia and especially the Soviet Union enjoyed their specific expression in the so-called general plan "Ost".

The writing of this plan began on Hitler's personal instructions back before the beginning of the war with the USSR, and it was approved in its initial form on 15 July 1941. What was "Ost"? First of all this was a comprehensive program of assimilation and Germanization of "Eastern space" and its economic resources. According to this plan the population was to undergo sorting: "The racially most useful" part was to be Germanized, while the "racially deficient" were to be either transformed into obedient slaves or physically destroyed.

Throughout 1941-1943 the general plan "Ost" was corrected, expanded and supplemented many times. Although it has not been discovered as an entire document, its existence elicits no doubt. Evidence to this effect can be found in direct references to this plan and in all sorts of proposals and recommendations concerning its writing, contained in recently found documents. The latter allow us to reconstruct rather accurately not only the general spirit but also the specific details of the plan.

Back more than a year before fascist Germany's invasion of the USSR, on 25 May 1940, Himmler prepared a special note for the Fuhrer regarding an appeal to the local population of captured Eastern territories: "Our uppermost interest is to totally exclude unification of the

peoples of the Eastern regions, and on the contrary to break them down into the smallest possible branches and groups."

They were not to have any higher schools—four-year public school was to be fully sufficient. The main things that had to be taught there to the children was simple counting, to 500 at the most, the ability to sign one's name, and the divine commandment of "obeying the Germans and being honest, diligent and obedient."

As the planned day of the beginning of the war against the USSR came nearer, the goals of occupation policy on Soviet territory received more concrete expression. The 2 April 1941 memorandum mentioned above formulated the main directions of the activities of German occupying authorities in relation to each of the seven planned new territorial formations. This document said the following in relation to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania:

"The question that must be answered is whether or not to impose a special task upon these regions as being the future territory of German settlement, called upon to assimilate the racially most suitable local elements.

"Outflow of significant numbers of intelligentsia, especially Latvian, into the central Russian regions will have to be ensured, after which the Baltic is to be populated by large masses of German peasants.

"In this case it would also apparently be impossible to do without resettlement of sizable numbers of deficient population groups in Lithuania outside the Baltic area."

The plans for accelerated colonization of the Baltic area received their official, directive confirmation in Rosenberg's very first instructions to the appointed Reichskommissar of "Ostland"—the highly placed Nazi official Kh. Loze [transliteration].

In this document, dated 21 June 1941, Rosenberg recalls the historical right to the Baltic lands supposedly possessed by the Germans, and emphasizes that the goal of the activities of the Reichskommissar in the Baltic regions is "to form an imperial protectorate here," and then transform this territory into "a part of the great German Reich." The Baltic Sea, Rosenberg states, "must become an inland northern sea under Germany's dominion."

The instructions lay special emphasis on the impermissibility of creating independent states in the Baltic region, and equally so, local national armed forces. All power in the Baltic region must belong to the German administration. In the area of cultural life, the instructions go on, "attempts to create specifically Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian universities and institutions of higher education must be cut off right at the threshold."

On the whole these very first instructions from Rosenberg to the Reichskommissar of "Ostland," which spelled out the general principles of Nazi occupation

policy in the Baltic, were fully in the spirit of the program principles of Hitler, who declared on several occasions:

"If I were to subordinate to myself a free country only to once again make it free, what sense there be in doing so? He who sheds blood also possesses the right to domination." In the occupied Eastern territories, "we are not in the least interested in increasing the non-German population." Therefore "it is extremely necessary to implement measures against growth of the non-German population." For it, "it would be simply insane to set up a public health system like that in Germany. Nor can there be any discussion of immunizations or any other kind of preventive medical measures. Even the aspiration toward such public health measures should be cut off among local inhabitants." "In no way should they be allowed a higher education...."

However, some provisions of the general plan "Ost" were initially formulated with insufficient clarity, and therefore they elicited passionate debate in the leading circles of the SS, the main administration of imperial security and Rosenberg's "Eastern ministry." These debates, which went on through 1942 and 1943, centered mainly on how many Germans from the Reich could realistically be settled on captured Eastern territories and when, and precisely what percentage of the local inhabitants should be "evacuated" into other regions for this purpose.

A special conference was devoted to this topic in particular in the "Eastern ministry" on 7 February 1942; it is evident from the minutes that all of its participants were certain of the need for moving the "racially deficient" part of the population of the Baltic regions to the East, and namely into Western Siberia, and not into Belorussia, as was initially proposed by the general plan "Ost". The only question was what part of the population of the Baltic republics represented "racially deficient elements." For example in the opinion of Professor Schultz, the SS Standardanfuhrer, the proportion of the "racially valuable" population of the Baltic was small—less than half, in any case.

Criticizing some provisions of the general plan "Ost", Doctor Vetsel [transliteration], the author of the plan for mass annihilation of people in mobile gas chambers, cast doubt upon the validity of calculations associated with the number of Germans that could realistically be resettled from the Reich to captured Eastern territories, and with the number of local inhabitants that should be moved out in this connection. He feels that both figures are severely understated, and that the number of people to be resettled out of their homelands into Western Siberia should actually be much greater than foreseen.

"Concerning the Lithuanians, whose overall racial data are significantly worse than those of the Estonians and Latvians, some thought should be given to providing them with territory in the East suitable for colonization," Vetsel insisted.

It would not be difficult to imagine that had general plan "Ost" been implemented by the Germans in the variant suggested by Vetsel and the influential circles of the Nazi leadership backing him, the peoples of the Baltic region would have been not just simply deprived of their national way of life, culture and language as a result of Germanization, but also significantly bled and scattered over all the land. And the Lithuanians would have completely lost their historical motherland.

Also supporting this assertion is a letter written by Himmler on 12 June 1942 to SS Brigadenfuhrer Grayfelt [transliteration], chief of staff of the imperial commission on problems of strengthening the German race: "...Matters are worse with Lithuania. There is less hope of Germanizing the population here. Moreover we should develop a general plan of colonizing this territory. And this is something that must be done."

In general, according to discovered documents, the plan "Ost" called for retaining and Germanizing over 50 percent of Estonians, up to 50 percent of Latvians and up to 15 percent of Lithuanians. The rest were to be either moved out or destroyed.

It might have seemed that the Estonians and Latvians could have hoped for greater benevolence from the Germans. But what was hidden behind this benevolence? There was a memorandum among recently found documents which were abandoned by the Germans in 1944 during their flight from Riga and which had a bearing on 1942. This memorandum clearly describes the relationship between the Germans and the Latvians. Here in particular is a passage from it: The Latvians had to be commanded, and not led. This would require "harnessing them to our cart, and driving them." "Given all of their intelligence and all of their organizational capabilities, the Latvians are immature in political respects. Their political independence must be minimized from the very beginning.... Latvians are incapable of subordinating their life to ideals other than the interests of their own gain. Capitalizing on this quality of the Latvians, we will be able to easily manipulate them and thus prevent their national unification. Until such time that assimilation is completed, a sharp line must be drawn between all Germans and Latvians in this country."

A document from Rosenberg's "brown file" also eloquently describes the sort of material living conditions that were to be afforded to all inhabitants of the Baltic region in connection with Germanization of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: "The long-range plan for Germanization of the Ostland must not lead to a general increase in the standard of living of all of the population living there. Everything must be done in order to raise agricultural production as high as possible and supply these products to the troops and to the Reich.... The only thing that will be new is that the standard of living of the local population must be made as low as possible."

In connection with the approach of Soviet troops to the Baltic territory in late 1943 and the sizable losses on the front, the German military command found itself facing the acute problem of replenishing personnel. Enlistment of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians for service in Wehrmacht and SS units was sharply activated. But the Nazi leadership in the Baltic and in the "Eastern ministry" had to have realized that the openly brutal occupation policy in relation to the local population would encourage increasingly larger numbers of people to evade service. The idea of somewhat relaxing the occupation conditions and allowing the Balts a certain semblance of self-administration arose in this connection. However, according to a telegram from the leadership of Reichskommissariat Ostland addressed to Ribbentrop

on 17 February 1944, Hitler categorically prohibited Rosenberg from conducting any sort of talks on the possibilities of administrative reforms in the Baltic region and of expanding the rights of the local civilian administration. The document graphically reveals that even at such a critical moment the supreme Nazi leadership could not discuss granting any kind of independence to the Baltic peoples.

By spring 1944, when the Soviet Army attained the borders of the Baltic region, implementation of the Nazi plans in relation to the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became aimless. Soon after, work on the general plan "Ost" was terminated on Hitler's orders.

Costs to USSR of Angola Involvement Examined

90UF0221A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 23, 6 Jun 90 p 15

[Article by Vladislav Yanelis under the rubric "The World Around Us": "The Angolan Knot: The Balance in Our Budget's African Item"]

[Text] For 15 years, Soviet freighters have been carrying arms and ammunition to Angola on special, free-of-charge voyages.

For 15 years, airplanes have been taking off from Soviet Union military airfields with military equipment, and maintaining a course to the same place, to Angola.

For 15 years, this African republic has been rocked by a war, which had a beginning, but will never have a victorious end because the people are waging war against themselves. The prosperous are waging war on the wealthy, and the poor are waging war on the poor.

What is this war in another hemisphere to us? Why have we been paying for it uncomplainingly? Why have we been putting our officers under the opposing sides' fire? Are we sure, having sided with (Agostinho Neto), that we are aiding a just cause? Are we certain that all who are destroyed by Soviet "Grad" missile launchers in Angola's Cuando Cubango Province, little known to us, are bad people, and that the Angolans will be happy only after annihilating them?

I am not defending the rebels, the UNITA bandits as the official Angolan press calls them. I know little about them. However, I have seen with my own eyes the luxurious villas, once belonging to Portuguese aristocrats or recently built, in which the present regime's provincial leadership lives, and, not far from these, the poor people's wretched hovels.

I have seen the American and Japanese automobiles of the latest models, in which provincial military commissars ride around, and the rickety, always hungry children on the sides of those roads. The children on the roadside never reach out for a handout. They are too proud, and, for that reason, they are doubly pitiful to me.

All right, let us assume that the Angolans will resolve their social inequities. But what is to be done about our problems?

The Soviet Military Mission in Angola has always been a token one—several hundred officers (In former times the number even exceeded 1,000). The officers are military advisers and military specialists. As a rule, they are highly skilled, which, by the way, is not reflected at all in their pay rates in currency. Western military specialists of similar rank receive many times as much when they work for hire in another country.

Apparently our specialists are satisfied with this, rightly assuming that 700 dollars a month in Angola is better than 400 rubles in Kostroma. Moreover, they earn their

salaries conscientiously, exhibiting real courage and fortitude at times. The risk of finding themselves under artillery fire in the immediate proximity of the front line does not frighten them. They are prepared to go without water for up to three days, sleep in a dugout, be captive witnesses to the disgusting orgies of corpse-eating ants on the remains of a fallen Angolan soldier, and suffer from malaria and yellow fever.

Our officers are, I repeat, courageous and long-suffering. However, it must not be thought that they go to certain hardship on the African foreign tour solely for the sake of the internationalist concept. I do not dare fault them for lacking romantic ardor when they go to a foreign country for hire.

They have been doing everything that they should to help the one side defeat the other. Our advisers have conscientiously taught their Angolan colleagues to plan military operations, use modern intelligence and communication means, organize a defense, deliver preemptive strikes, mine roads, organize the training of reserves, and even maintain records. For more than 10 years, they were the shadows of Angolan brigade commanders, jointly participating in the control of brigade elements in battle.

At the same time, our military specialists have helped the Angolans master the operation of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems, aircraft and tanks, and armored personnel carriers and howitzers. A former battalion commander from somewhere around Grodno did not consider it degrading to himself to repair an armored personnel carrier's [BTR's] engine and change its axle grease with his own hands, although he would hardly have engaged in such work at home.

And everything has been for the purpose of helping the FAPLA be victorious. However, victory has nevertheless slipped away. Military success in the South, at the cost of enormous losses, has had the effect of UNITA personnel's activation in the North, and the annihilation of Savimbi-supporter detachments in a far eastern province has brought about diversionary actions of these in the capital's vicinity.

We have been assisting the government regime, and UNITA has been enjoying the West's support.

The republic survived a most dangerous period during the times of Republic of South Africa troop incursions. Had it not been for the Cuban battalions and our military assistance, Luanda could not have held out.

However, the Republic of South Africa's troops have gone, and still there is no victory, although, according to all Angolan General Staff estimates, victory should have occurred long ago. Our people are by no means so optimistically inclined.

I remember some meetings in Angola.

At (Menonga): Its glossy black upper surface having stood out vividly, a snake slithered out of a bundle of

burned wires and quickly hid somewhere beneath wing fragments of the "Hercules." Soviet Lieutenant Colonel Fomichev, a specialist assigned to the chief engineer of an Angolan surface-to-air missile brigade, asks that I not move off to the side: "Mines have been planted all around, and a lot of all sorts of debris is also embedded in the ground." We are standing beside an aircraft, shot down by UNITA personnel, which still reeks of burning and death.

"When will all of this end?" I ask Fomichev.

He has a yellow face from suffering with malaria and sad, light blue eyes. He remains silent, turns away, and says through clenched teeth:

"Your airplane will be leaving soon. Don't be late."

At (Lubango), our military mission: There is an armored personnel carrier near the gate. It is a physically tiny compound, and there is a tiny vegetable garden behind it. The senior officer at the mission, Colonel Novitskiy (He is adviser to the second commander of the Southern Front) is raising cabbage in the vegetable garden out of nostalgia for the homeland. And just imagine, it is growing. I coaxed these comments out of Novitskiy.

"In reducing our presence here, we took our advisers out of the brigades. Everything went to pot, and good order ceased to exist. There is no army as such. Combat security is neglected. The attitude toward equipment servicing is careless. They forget to put oil in the engines.... There is no repair base either."

I interrupt: "And they want to wage war?"

"Come now, who really wants to wage war?"

"Repercussions of our new political thinking reached Luanda a year ago. Our military people were told: 'It is over. You are to take no leading role. You are to assist only in building the national armed forces and training military cadre. The war is the affair of the Angolans themselves.' However, it is fine to make recommendations from Moscow, but try to follow them on the spot."

"Our advisers participated in preparing the December offensive operation 'Zebra.' They were not in the front line, but the offensive's lines of control came together at front headquarters in (Cuito-Cuanavali)—and dozens of Soviet officers worked on the maps and documents there. Lieutenant General Valeriy Belyayev, a very fine specialist, directed them. Colonel Aleksandr Moroz, also an expert in his field, worked out the food supply system for the front's troops."

"He told me how he prepared the departure schedules and routes for the truck columns with the food, and how he set up bases in (Menonga) and (Cuito Cuanavali). The food products were gathered by the Angolans from all over the world: kidney beans from the USA, rice from India, canned goods from Holland, and meat from Italy and France. War is a very expensive affair. All of the food products were carried through the savanna on

Soviet 'KrAZ' and 'Ural' trucks [trucks made by the Kremenchug and Ural Motor Vehicle Plants], and these proved themselves handsomely in comparison with Western trucks, the axles of which broke from overloads."

"How is the work of our military advisers to be evaluated under these circumstances? And what are they to do in general if they are asked at Angolan General Staff Headquarters to help prepare an operation? Refuse? Try to talk their Angolan comrades out of attacking? But then our military advisers are military people too, and they should be receiving their salaries for that which they are obliged to do as professionals."

"By the way, Angola does not pay our advisers any money. Therefore, whether we keep them in Angola or not depends upon our government. It is the Soviet military specialists whom Angola supports, and the currency pay for the advisers is allocated out of their salaries (in currency)."

"Can we just drop everything and leave this country, which, nine times already, has requested that payment of its debts to the USSR be postponed?"

"We offered our assistance to the Angolan Government 15 years ago. The USSR leadership at that time thought it would put the African country on the socialist path with airplanes and tanks sent to Angola at a token price, and that without payment. Why the socialist path for Angola, which, before this, not only had been feeding itself, but even selling food products to Europe, is no longer important."

"We see what resulted from it. Angola knows no peace. The economic relations between provinces have been broken off. There is starvation in many cities and villages. Hundreds of thousands of people have perished and been maimed on the fronts. Production of the traditional export product—coffee—has fallen to a tenth of what it was before. The country has been ruined by the war, and more and more of its people favor the idea of national reconciliation and a treaty with the UNITA people and their leader, Savimbi."

"And what about us? What have we gained in supporting the MPLA for 15 years, taking considerable economic losses, and sacrificing the health and, at times, even the lives of Soviet people? Those kremlin occupants, to whom there once came the desire to play the Angolan card, have long been resting beside its walls. But others must assess the results. The hangover is at somebody else's party...."

"During the 15 years, we created an African version of the Soviet Army in Angola, quite a serious force, but rather unwieldy and, most importantly, incapable of getting along without our intellectual and material sponsorship. We accustomed the Angolan military to Soviet arsenals' being always accessible to them, and to our arms and equipment's being provided, either absolutely free of charge, or at a favorable price with indefinite postponement of payment."

"By my estimates, we have supplied about 600 tanks, 60 fighter aircraft, 30 short-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems, 1,000 artillery pieces and systems, 800 mortars, several dozen combat helicopters, 200 armored personnel carriers, a vast number of trucks, hundreds of thousands of small-arms pieces, dozens of field bakeries, hundreds of radio stations, and a great deal of other military property to Angola just during the recent years. A substantial part of the equipment was an outright gift, and the rest was at a discount; that is, at one-half, or even one-third, of the world market price.

"Of the airplanes and helicopters supplied by the USSR, half became inoperable, not under combat conditions, but because of flight-crew carelessness and poor maintenance, and about 30 percent of the tanks and 50 percent of the armored personnel carriers were lost for the same reasons, and so forth. And this was with our military servicing and maintenance specialists working in Angola. What will happen if we reduce their number? What will an enormous quantity of military equipment, especially the complex equipment—surface-to-air missile systems [ZRK's], airplanes, communication centers, air defense [PVO] systems—be turned into in a year or two? Into a pile of useless metal? Understand what I am saying—We have become hostages to our own sponsorship policy in Angola.

"I have seen a gigantic graveyard of Soviet trucks almost at the center of Luanda. There was nobody to repair them, and hundreds of vehicles that could still have served and served had been condemned to death and pilfering. All Soviets who see this pantheon of mismanagement for the first time get a lump in the throat—so much property wasted! But what can the small group of Soviet engineers do? God grant that they manage current repair.

"During the last year or two, our policy in Angola has become more realistic. In negotiations with the Angolans, we do not conceal our difficulties, and we let them know that we make tanks and armored personnel carriers out of metal which is in acute short supply in our own economy, so it would be well to set our further mutual accounts in order. Their answer to us: We have followed you and put our hopes only in you for 15 years, and you must not suddenly shut off the military assistance channels like this, it is not brotherly. We gently hint: It is time to end the war and seek peaceful means for normalizing the situation. To us: Yes, of course, in principle that is necessary, but the UNITA will deceive us again and break the truce, although it is even weaker in military respects now....

"There are a lot of different nuances here. It must be understood, for example, that a special caste of people, for which the war is a means of self-assertion and prosperity, has arisen in Angola during the 15 years. Thievery at military depots is as natural a phenomenon as the seasonal rains.... Samples of everything the army receives by way of foodstuffs and accoutrements may be found on the local markets. It is pointless to struggle

against this. Food products have been stolen even on the way from depots to the front and, almost certainly, under fire.

"However, I ask again: What do our people, who have deprived themselves of bare necessities for many years, get for supporting the African National Liberation Movement, as it is sometimes customary to call the simple change of political appearances? What besides a feeling of moral satisfaction from international assistance, the scope and objectives of which we did not know about until recently? I stipulate that I do not have medications, tents, blankets, and foodstuffs for those whom natural disaster has overtaken in mind. These constitute a special expense item which all countries that are somewhat prosperous are obliged to provide for in their budgets.

"Am I against military assistance to developing countries? Yes, if they are going to use the assistance for civil conflicts, because then the assistance is no longer to the nations, but to the regimes. I happen to know how much labor is required to manufacture just one military aircraft to be offered simply as a gift, and for the sake of political objectives that are not always clear at that.

"I am for normal military business. You need airplanes for border patrolling? Certainly. Pay us, shall we say, 20 million for each. You need tanks in order to feel more confident in the face of an impending regional conflict? Certainly. One costs about a million dollars. Expensive? American vehicles of this type cost more. What? You maintain that it is immoral to sell arms? But we have been selling them for a long time, and, as foreign sources allege, earning about 8 billion rubles in foreign currency at it annually. The whole world knows this. Thus it is immoral, in my opinion, to give arms away free of charge, because they are the same sort of goods as all the rest on the world market, and, if they are not purchased from us, they will be purchased from Israel, France, or America.

"It might be possible to understand even such an heirless "business" as exists between the USSR and Angola if the purchasing country were making some sort of concessions in other areas. But, alas, our fishing quotas near Angolan shores are cut. We are offered disadvantageous terms for doing oil reconnaissance. Our airplanes are serviced last in Luanda. The Angolan side considers it a matter of course to violate the terms for receiving Soviet specialists. These are not provided with the stipulated transportation, they live in houses without furniture, and are not furnished with groceries at moderate prices, etc. Angola's military and civil leadership can be late for an hour or more for formal receptions organized by the Soviet side.

"Very well, so be it. Let us consider that this is trifling. We ourselves are to blame for their taking advantage of us, and for Soviet specialists' getting by on their neighbors' cooking. All of this is our damned poverty, and I

have ended up abroad because of it—Tolerate it, that is the only chance to get out of the poverty.

“But can it be that we are poor also because we do not know how to count, because, in exporting our ideology, we reinforced it for decades with incredibly expensive gifts, absurd from a commonsense standpoint? Take that (Agostinho Neto) Monument Complex in Luanda. Someone among our political masters [metry] at that time made an expansive gesture: He proclaimed that the USSR would build a 127-meter colossus at the seashore as a symbol of friendship and solidarity. That was in 1982. The monument, construction of which has required the removal of millions of cubic meters of earth

and a vast quantity of concrete and metal, has not been finished to this day (“unfinished business” [“nezavershenka”] again!). They say that it has already cost us 40 million dollars, and mere mention of it causes a nervous tic in our embassy personnel.

“Anyway, what next? How do we untie the Angolan knot that we ourselves so diligently tied on our budget? And with it, perhaps, the other knots in various parts of the world as well. I cannot rid myself of the rebellious thought—Would we not, by untying these knots, be rendering a great service, not just to our own people, but also to the other peoples, who are utterly tired of wars?”

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85

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